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This thesis studies William Gibson's "cyberspace trilogy" (Neuromancer, Count 
Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive). This was an extremely interesting and significant 
development in 1980s science fiction. It was used to codifY and promote the 
"cyberpunk" movement in science fiction at that time, which this thesis also briefly 
studies. 
Such a study (at such a relatively late date, given the rapid pace of change in 
popular culture) seems valuable because a great deal of self-serving and mystifYing 
comment and analysis has served to confuse critical understanding about this 
movement. It seems clear that cyberpunk was indeed a new development in science 
fiction (like other developments earlier in the twentieth century) but that the roots of 
this development were broader than the genre itself. However, much of the real 
novelty of Gibson's work is only evident through close analysis of the texts and how 
their apparent ideological message shifts focus with time. This message is inextricably 
entwined with Gibson's and cyberpunk's technological fantasias. 
Admittedly, these three texts appear to have been, broadly speaking, 
representations of a liberal U.S. world-view reflecting Gibson's own apparent beliefs. 
However, they were also expressions of a kind of technophilia which, while similar to 
that of much earlier science fiction, possessed its own special dynamic. In many ways 
this technophilia contradicted or undermined the classical liberalism nominally 
practiced in the United States. 
However, the combination of this framework and this dynamic, which appears both 
apocalyptic and conservative, appears in some ways to have been a reasonably 
accurate prediction of the future trajectory of the U.S. body politic -- towards 
exaggerated dependency on machines to resolve the consequences of an ever-
increasingly paranoid fantasy of the entire world as a threat. (It seems likely that this 
was also true, if sometimes to a lesser degree, of the cyberpunk movement as a 











critically) in the 1980s and early 1990s, very little of this aspect of his work was taken 
seriously (except, to a limited degree, by a few Marxist and crypto-Marxist 
commentators like Darko Suvin). This seems ironic, given the avowedly futurological 
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Introduction. Problematising Cyberpunk, Introducing William Gibson. 
Science Fiction and the Origins of Cyberpunk. 
The appearance of William Gibson's Neuromancer (1984), harbinger of the science 
fiction genre which rapidly came to be called cyberpunk, seemed to promise a 
fundamental change in science fiction much like that initially promised by the 1960s 
"New Wave". Neuromancer was widely praised for its stylishness; it also dealt with 
technologies neglected by most science fiction writers of the period. It appeared to 
make a political intervention by challenging many conservative trends in Western 
society around the time of its appearance. It was entertaining, carefully crafted, and 
even incorporated social and literary issues which most popular fiction, and 
particularly science fiction, then ignored. Furthermore it appeared when science 
fiction seemed intellectually stagnant. While all these points appear to contain truths, 
cyberpunk's actual nature deserves close scrutiny, partly because so many claims have 
been made on its behalf 
The New Wave had been linked to (and had seen itself as emerging from) socio-
political ferment in Britain and the United States in the 1960s. Various British writers, 
like Michael Moorcock, Langdon Jones and M. John Harrison, incoherently supported 
Situationism and the student radical movement. However, when these groups 
dissipated in the early 1970s, the British New Wave was left with apparently obsolete 
ideals and no constituency. Much of the U.S. New Wave endorsed similar movements 
in the U.S., (although generally less obviously radical ones, such as the Civil Rights or 
anti-Vietnam War movements). These similarly ceased to be novel or even 
fashionable among most middle-class white intellectuals in the early 1970s. 
(Likewise, when feminist science fiction arose, using the space opened by the New 
Wave but aggressively condemning the New Wave's often rampant sexism, it carne to 
face comparable problems in the 1980s.) Thus New Wave science fiction seemed 











Cyberpunk, by contrast, seemed on a firmer footing, partly because it was 
technologically-oriented as well as socially-based. Its name was quickly coined --
allegedly by Bruce Bethke, author of the cyberpunk satire Headcrash (1995) --
suggesting its internal consistency. Its genesis-mythology is outlined by the theorist 
Larry McCaffery: 
The cyberpunk SF "movement" first came into prominence in 
1984, when William Gibson's Neuromancer was published .... the 
seeds of its development were actually planted several years earlier, 
when Gibson and other writers later associated with cyberpunk 
began publishing stories and novels that had a different edge from 
other SF works dealing with similar issues .... In their works and in 
numerous, highly contentious public debates that took place at SF 
conferences and conventions, the cyberpunks presented themselves 
as "techno-urban-guerrilla" artists ... 
(McCaffery, 1994: 11-12) 
These emphatic declarations imply a value-system to organise around and even an 
opponent to be challenged. The reference to "a different edge" makes the genre appear 
novel -- often a vital quality for science fiction. Many of the stories in Bruce Sterling's 
seminal anthology Mirrorshades (1986) share a similar world-view: Tom Maddox's 
"Snake-eyes", Pat Cadigan's "Rock on", Marc Laidlaw's "400 Boys", John Shirley's 
"Freezone", Paul Di Filippo's "Stone Lives", are all chiefly about corporate or 
totalitarian rule resisted by the young or weak, links between technology and the body, 
and all but Laidlaw's are set in a plausible near-future. This unity of purpose implies 
that cyberpunk embodied a fairly coherent world-view -- although a distinctly 
monotonous one. 
Sterling argues that "it's possible to make broad statements about cyberpunk and to 











cyberpunks is paralleled throughout Eighties pop culture: in rock video; in the hacker 
underground; in the jarring street tech of hip-hop . . . . cyberpunk is its literary 
incarnation" (Sterling, 1988: xi-xii). This claims cyberpunk as part of a broader 
culture, but fails to explain the links -- suggesting a desire rather than a reality. He 
adds, somewhat confusedly, that "[t]he advances of the sciences are so deeply radical 
... that they can no longer be contained" (Sterling, 1988: xii), implying that science 
itself somehow threatens the socio-political establishment, rather than being its 
product. This supposed threat, or promise, must be acknowledged by cyberpunk 
writing, where "central themes spring up repeatedly .... of body invasion .... mind 
invasion . . . radically redefining the nature of humanity, the nature of the self' 
(Sterling, 1988: xiii). 
This implies that technological change was making the world fascinating, 
dangerous, and perhaps unpredictable. Sterling'S reference to a "hacker underground" 
where "a new alliance is becoming evident: an integration of technology and the 
Eighties counter-culture" (Sterling, 1988: xii), an idea later used by technological 
publicists like Douglass Rushkoff, suggests a political dimension to cyberpunk --
assuming that such a counter-culture existed in the form which Sterling implies. Yet 
Sterling locates this in the future; once again it is a desire rather than an observation. 
The title of his collection significantly recalls his claim that "[m]irrored sunglasses 
have been a Movement totem since the early days of '82" (Sterling, 1988: xi). Darko 
Suvin notes sardonically that "mirrorshades are a two-way transaction between the 
wearer and his social environment: they conjoin a minor degree of effective 
withdrawal with a large degree of psychological illusion of withdrawal in the wearer" 
(Suvin, 1994: 350). Fredric Jameson similarly suggests, apropos the Los Angeles 
Westin Bonaventure Hotel, that "the glass skin repels the city outside ... like ... 
those reflector sunglasses which make it impossible for your interlocutor to see your 
own eyes and thereby achieve a certain ... power over the Other" (Jameson, 1996: 
42). Mirrorshades might depict a will to power for Sterling's writers, yet this appears 











This is surely also "reflected" in the complex name of the genre. The "cyber-" 
prefix generally connotes something technologically advanced, but actually refers to 
control (Norbert Wiener, who coined the term cybernetics, drew it from the Greek for 
"steersman"). The concept of "punk", however, connotes radical dissatisfaction with 
social control and resentful, anarchic desire for freedom. The two concepts --
controlling power from above, and absolute freedom from below -- do not easily 
combine. 
Cyberpunk writers saw cybernetics and genetic engineering as tools which could 
transform people, and through them society. Sterling's concept of "redefining the 
nature of humanity", does not so much mean a call for anti-essentialism challenging 
the Enlightenment project (the interpretation made by some critics in McCaffery and 
Bukatman), but actual biological and psychological restructuring, as in Sterling's 
novel Schismatrix (1985). However, Sterling does not say why this restructuring is 
necessary or desirable; as Istvan Csicsery-Ronay complains: "Sterling hints at some 
new political attitude with technical know-how and anti-establishment feelings .... 
it's hard to see the 'integrated' political-aesthetic motives of alienated subcultures that 
adopt the high-tech tools of the establishment they are supposedly alienated from" 
(Csicsery-Ronay, 1991: 183). How far was this a consciously political project, and 
how far merely taking advantage of the popular imagery of cybernetics? 
Undeniably, many cyberpunk texts recognised severe social problems existing at 
the time of writing. For instance, Kelly and Kessel's Freedom Beach (1984) features a 
group called the "dreamers" who use high technology (including computers) to solve 
the world's problems. Marc Laidlaw's Dad's Nuke (1984) mocks privatisation and the 
growth of technology, predicting disaster. Lewis Shiner's Frontera (1984) is about a 
world after that disaster, ruled by companies instead of governments. Tom Maddox's 
Halo (1991) -- an extension of his "Snake-Eyes" -- similarly concerns a world ruled by 
companies, suggesting that this tyranny might be challenged by artificial intelligence. 











With this in mind, cyberpunk might have come to dominate the genre (and 
influence wider culture). Yet by 1990, cyberpunk was almost passe. Science fiction in 
general seemed to be turning into a merchandising tool for TV shows and movies. 
Dominating the field was the commodified growth of sword-and-sorcery and horror 
fantasy, including the Goosebumps series aimed at teenagers (admittedly by 1997, 
Gardner Dozois noted that in this field "sales seem to have suddenly and dramatically 
fallen off" [Dozois, 1997: x], perhaps because of repetitiveness and market saturation) 
and warfare fantasias like Mack Maloney's Wingman (1990) series. One might ask 
why this should have happened. 
Part of this may have been due to wider changes. Publishing grew increasingly 
monopolised in the 1980s as companies merged or were purchased by larger 
organisations; as Herman and McChesney put it, "[b look publishing ... has been 
brought squarely into the cross-promotional plans of the media giants" (Herman, 
1997: 62) such as News International, Viacom and Bertellsmann. Arguably the motive 
for literary experimentation declined. Nevertheless, publishers happily promoted pro-
technology, cyberpunk-sympathetic works like Rushkoffs Cyberia (1994) and 
Nicholas Negroponte's Being Digital (1995). It seems unlikely that the producers of 
cyberpunk faced ideological censorship; Gibson remained popular into the 1990s, 
especially among popularists of the Internet and "cyberspace" as revolutionary 
developments -- including figures like Timothy Leary, the erstwhile Speaker of the 
House of Representatives Newt Gingrich, and the then Vice-President of the United 
States, Albert Gore. 
However, these points suggest that cyberpunk, like science fiction in general, is not 
necessarily subversive; indeed, its social role is often quite conservative. Whereas 
science fiction tends to represent science as an answer to human problems, science is 
actually a method of questioning nature, so science fiction's approach undermines the 
nature of the system it eulogises. Such self-defeating opportunism is common in 
contemporary society; many postmodem theorists' apparent critiques of scientism, as 











science; they may even "pass off as profound a rather banal philosophical or 
sociological observation, by dressing it up in fancy scientific jargon" (Sokal and 
Bricmont, 1998: 9) to exploit the public's support of science. 
Science fiction exploits this support; it is also a wish-fulfilling fantasy of social 
power. The nature of such fantasy is suggested by Jameson's remarks concerning 
Balzac, that "the production of the wish-fulfilling text .... allow us to account for ... 
the production of that quite different thing called ideology" (Jameson, 1994: 161). The 
writer, to fulfil political fantasies through a text, must recognisably express an 
ideology through it. As a result, "daydreaming and wish-fulfilling fantasy . . 
involve mechanisms whose inspection may have something further to tell us about the 
... link between wish-fulfillment and realism, between desire and history" (Jameson: 
162), for the need to construct a fantasy suggests that one finds reality restrictive or 
unsatisfactory . 
In science fiction, reality is overcome by powers which the writer envisages as 
provided by science. An example was once a flight to the Moon, which science made 
plausible (Joannes Kepler's 17th-century Somnium, ironically, made this flight 
possible through magic, though his representation of the Moon was plausible in terms 
of contemporary astronomy). Normally such fantasies are legitimated by scientific 
jargon, or through the notion of new scientific developments -- "novurns" in Suvin's 
terms -- to grant whatever the author desires. 
In these fantasies the world is counterfactually set to (what the author considers to 
be) rights. Hence this is not necessarily purely based in technological extrapolation. 
Jules Verne's and Hugo Gemsback's fantastical machines fulfilling bourgeois dreams 
seem ultimately not to have been sufficiently human-centric; insufficiently "realistic", 
even though impeccably scientifically justified. Jameson, again, suggests how such 
difficulties must be resolved on another level of wish-fulfillment: 
one can imagine a more consequent act of desire in which the 











of the nascent "reality principle" of capitalist society .... these new, 
second-level narratives . . . entertain a far more difficult and 
implacable conception of the fully realized fantasy: one which ... 
seeks to endow itself with the utmost representable density and to 
posit the most elaborate and systematic difficulties and obstacles, in 
order the more surely to overcome them 
(Jameson: 183) 
A science fiction text creates an illusion of verisimilitude, by representing and 
legitimating prevailing orthodox ideologies through "science" (considered as an 
ideology rather than a practice). The obstacles produced in the text to be overcome are 
interpreted by the reader as a "realistic" version of life-experience (although it seldom 
undermines fantasized success; science fiction narrative is generally comic). 
1920s and 1930s science fiction power-fantasies were cast in technological terms 
which readers found unexciting. This clash between scientistic power-fantasy and the 
audience's needs (and literary expectations, since most readers expected popular 
fiction to provide love interests and demonized political enemies) was resolved when 
more complex texts were produced offering fantasised versions of human society. In 
these texts an aspect of human society (usually scientific or technical in nature) 
became representative of the good, or the evil, in that society. The evil (often, though 
not always, a physical problem) was symbolically destroyed or removed -- preferably 
by an individual, who then became the champion of society. The novelty in the text 
(good or bad) might be telepathic mutants, or autocrats, or a scientific or technical 
conspiracy, or some symbolic invention, like the space ship or the robot, the political 
context of such mechanical symbols being made clear. 
For instance, Isaac Asimov's short story "Trends" (1939), he claimed, was the first 
story to suggest that space flight might not be universally popular; dealing with heroic 
struggle against opposition to space flight, it is a wish-fulfillment fantasy, but more 











rather than merely describing mechanical or natural processes. In Pohl and 
Kornbluth's The Space Merchants (1952), the first man to Venus, a universally 
admired hero, turns out (for scientific reasons) to be a midget, comically undermining 
the power-fantasy of this text -- yet he eventually dies heroically, removing his 
presence (and saving the power-fantasy), and hero and heroine blast off for Venus. 
The target of this part of the satirical text was evidently the superficiality of earlier 
science fiction -- the technical-ideological foundations of that science fiction were not 
criticised, however. 
These intellectual structures resemble consplracy theory, where seemingly 
insoluble problems are changed through fantasy into forms which may be resolved. 
Conspiracy theory assumes that the truth is "out there", which is potentially 
empowering, but also assumes that it can be found easily -- free from obscuring 
ideologies, a fantasy which discourages critical thought. Probably because of this anti-
critical depoliticization, Jameson terms conspiracy theory "a degraded attempt --
through the figuration of advanced technology -- to think the impossible totality of the 
contemporary world system" (Jameson, 1993: 38); presumably it is "degraded" 
because it fails to pursue painful truth, the history which hurts, as Jameson put it in 
The Political Unconscious (1984). 
This may be a psychological coping mechanism when dealing with an "impossible 
totality" beyond individual control; Noam Chomsky notes that in "a discussion of 
sports .... [p ]eople know a tremendous amount .... when I hear people talk about .. 
. domestic problems, it's at a level of superficiality which is beyond belief .... I think 
that this concentration on such topics as sports makes a certain degree of sense .... 
[t]he way the system is set up, there is virtually nothing people can do .... [t]hey 
might as well live in a fantasy world" (Chomsky, 1988a: 33). However, such 
helplessness breeds a radical scepticism which often feeds conspiracy theory; 











skepticism against a background of understanding and rationality 
is a very healthy attitude. Skepticism against a vacuum is extremely 
dangerous. The educational system and the doctrinal system have 
created vacuums. People's minds are empty and confused because 
everything's been driven out of them. In that case skepticism can 
quickly tum into paranoia. 
(Chomsky, 1996: 94) 
The impossibility of knowing the truth coexists with an urgent need to discover the 
truth. This is hardly new; many of those pursuing historical conspiracy theories were 
deemed deranged by Charles MacKay in his Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the 
Madness of Crowds (undated), implying that conspiracy theory exists only among the 
foolish and ill-informed. The problem with this reassuring notion is that conspiracies 
actually exist, and sometimes are even uncovered. 
Jameson's notion of conspiracy theory as generated by the "impossible totality of 
the contemporary world system" may be oversimplification, but the "high-tech 
paranoia" which he identifies may derive from socio-political conditions. Mobility and 
communication, the facilitators of modernity, give more power to conspirators and to 
secret services. This may have given conspiracy theory new significance in the early 
1980s (when cyberpunk arose), which may explain why Jameson deems cyberpunk a 
crystallization of conspiracy theory's narrative. (Technology does not give rise to 
conspiracies or conspiracy theory -- but it provides a convenient metaphor for the 
origins of such things.) Jameson's ideas suggest a special significance for writers like 
Gibson, whose science fiction may outline a socio-political order arguably too 
complex, or too inaccessible, to analyse fully. 
The production structure of science fiction magazines and pulp paperbacks (like 
that of most popular fiction) encourages a simplified, conspiracy-centric world-view. 
Science fiction writers sell texts to editors, who usually endorse a school of science 











magazine or paperback filling that niche, so the editor, who knows the audience's 
tastes, is likely to reject ideologically unpalatable texts. (Most science fiction 
magazines have historically had identifiable styles, and favoured writers, as Brian 
Aldiss parenthetically observed in Billion Year Spree [1973].) Thus a writer is 
expected to produce a proper type of text. 
Science fiction texts exist within intellectual structures sustaining readers' political 
opinions -- like most popular fiction. Such a text's ideas should appeal to a wide 
audience interested in science. The text would present its ideology through symbolic 
scientific images, in themselves attractive to the audience. If the writers properly 
valorizes science and technology, the reader is likely to forgive dissonances with 
herlhis political viewpoint in other spheres. Besides, in power-fantasies, the 
possession of power, and who controls its distribution, is more important than the 
putative goal of wielding the power. 
Even dystopias, like Zamyatin's We (1924) or Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four 
(1949), fit this pattern; the reader is evidently expected to repudiate Zamyatin's 
Benefactor or Orwell's Big Brother. Jameson claims that "Margaret Atwood's The 
Handmaid's Tale [1985] has ... been assessed as the first feminist dystopia and 
thereby the end of the very rich feminist work in the Utopian genre" (Jameson, 1996: 
160). Atwood's text preconceives the destruction of the dystopian universe; she ends 
with an ironic multicultural historical seminar in the post-"Gilead" world -- itself a 
utopia. Indeed, Jameson later recanted: "I ... want to caution against the facile ... 
opposition between Utopia and dystopia" (Jameson, 1994b: 55). Dystopian science 
fiction should be seen as implicitly utopian. 
In this context, the apparently novel intellectual structure of cyberpunk was 
arguably a timely development. The science fiction subculture seemed to need 
transfusions from elsewhere; in the late 1970s and early 1980s it seemed exhausted. 
The "New Wave" had died. Feminist science fiction was ghettoized, read by relatively 











editors like Ben Bova, had changed little in ten years, stylistically and politically 
conservative. 
Fiction from a randomly-chosen issue of Analog for August 17th, 1981 affirms 
this. "Which Way to the End of Time?", a parallel time-tracks story by Michael 
McCollum, concerns a brave human battle against the evil alien "Dalgiri". "Mercy", 
by 1950s writer Ron Goulart, is a traditionally-structured android story. "Gift of Fire", 
by Steven Gold, about solar energy, resembles the 1950s Arthur C Clarke squib "A 
Slight Case of Sunstroke". "Diminution", by Martin Greenberg, is a traditional satire 
of an epistolic story about people psychically copying other people's work. "Thinking 
of Romance", by Rick Wilber concerns an alien visiting the Earth meeting a boy who 
wants to join him, a familiar idea of innocence rewarded. 'The Cyphertone", by S C 
Sykes, imitates Henry Kuttner's 1950s "Mirnsy were the Borogroves", though more 
comforting in its ending. "The Big Black Bag", by Michael Banks, is a familiar 
matter-transporter story. Clearly much of this is conscious recycling offarniliar tropes. 
Such conservatism also appears in non-fiction articles. The editorial, "A Case for 
Conformity", criticises efforts to encourage diversity in language education. Analog's 
resident technophile G Harry Stine predicts, in "Industry Looks at Space", that 
industrial exploitation of space is imminent, as he had done, inaccurately, for decades. 
The libertarian conservative Jerry Pournelle's feature "The Alternate View" denounces 
scientific space research for hampering capitalist exploitation. The book review 
section, "The Reference Library", by Spider Robinson, complains (intriguingly) that 
new SF books are dull. The letters mainly reflect technical issues, barring one 
complaining about a lack of stories interesting to women (the editor admits getting 
few submissions from women). Several of the contributors had written for the 
magazine for over twenty years. Evidently the text strove to reaffirm the expectations 
of readers without challenging them -- yet Analog boasted that it was the most 
important magazine in its field! 
One might have expected more freedom from novels, which did not have such 











manifest. Clarke, Asimov and Heinlein, who dominated the field in the 1940s, made 
major comebacks, as did Pohl and Bester, familiar since the 1950s. Illustrating this, 
here are the "Hugo" award winners for the late 1970s and early 1980s, with a crude 
description of the character of text: 
Date Author Title Character 
1974 Arthur C Clarke. Rendezvous with Rama Hard SF 
1975 Ursula K LeGuin. The Dispossessed. New Wave 
1976 Joe Haldeman. The Forever War. Hard SF 
1977 Kate Wilhelm. Where Late The Sweet Birds Sang Ecological 
1978 Frederik Pohl. Gateway. Hard SF 
1979 Vonda McIntyre. Dreamsnake. Feminist 
1980 Arthur C Clarke. The Fountains oJParadise. Hard SF 
1981 Joan Vinge. The Snow Queen. Feminist 
1982 C J Cherryh. Downbelow Station. Hard SF 
1983 Isaac Asimov. Foundation's Edge. Hard SF 
1984 David Brin. Startide Rising. Hard SF 
1985 William Gibson. Neuromancer. Cyberpunk 
1986 Orson Scott Card. Ender's Game. Hard SF 
1987 Orson Scott Card. SpeakerJor the Dead. Hard SF 
Here are the "Nebula" winners for the same period: 
Date Author Title Character 
1973 Arthur C Clarke. Rendezvous with Rama. Hard SF 
1974 Ursula K LeGuin. The Dispossessed. New Wave 
1975 Joe Haldeman. The Forever War. Hard SF 











1977 Frederik Pohl. Gateway. Hard SF 
1978 Vonda McIntyre. Dreamsnake. Feminist 
1979 Arthur C Clarke. The Fountains of Paradise. Hard SF 
1980 Gregory Benford. Timescape. Hard SF 
1981 Gene Wolfe. The Claw of the Conciliator. New Wave 
1982 Michael Bishop. No Enemy But Time. (not read) 
1983 David Brin. Startide Rising. Hard SF 
1984 William Gibson. Neuromancer. Cyberpunk 
1985 Orson Scott Card. Ender IS Game. Hard SF 
1986 Orson Scott Card. Speaker [or the Dead. Hard SF 
1987 Pat Murphy. The Falling Woman. (not read) 
These lists are surprisingly similar considering their origins: the Hugo was created 
in the mid-1950s to measure popularity among science fiction fans, while in the 
1960s, in reaction against the Hugo's alleged failure to accommodate aesthetic criteria, 
the Nebula was created, judged by writers. In each list, four of fourteen texts are by 
writers prominent in the 1940s and 1950s. Without denying their competence, it is 
likely that nostalgia and familiarity played a part. "Hard SF" stories seek to recover the 
naIve technophilia of the 1930s and 1940s; Card's, Brin's, Haldeman's and Cherryh's 
books all concern galactic war with aliens. Wolfe's novel (the first in a tetralogy) may 
be deemed New Wave, since he made his name in that genre, but it is essentially 
fantasy. Gibson's novel is conspicuous in its novelty. 
Significantly, there were fewer science fiction magazines in the early 1980s than 
there had been thirty years earlier. Publishing houses were uniting into larger 
conglomerates, giving editors less power than they had had in the days of Gollancz 
SF, which had novelized many serials from American magazines (publishing 
Neuromancer as one of its last acts). Edward Herman and Robert McChesney identify 











conglomeration, corporate concentration, and hyper-commercialism . . . . [b ]ook 
publishing ... which for decades tended to have a relatively wide ideological and 
cultural range of output, has been brought .... into the cross-promotional plans of the 
media giants" (Herman, 1997: 63). This was true even with science fiction; admittedly 
the relatively new Isaac Asimov's Science Fiction Magazine (edited by Gardner 
Dozois, once part of the American New Wave) published cyberpunk; however, 
Dozois' annual The Year's Best Science Fiction frequently mourns the death or decline 
of a magazine. Structurally, early-1980s science fiction publishing seemed stony 
ground for a potentially subversive form like cyberpunk. 
Admittedly, there was more enthusiasm for science fiction films in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s than there had been since the 1950s. George Lucas' 1976-80 Star 
Wars trilogy, Stephen Spielberg's 1978 Close Encounters of the Third Kind and 1981 
E. T, as well as a 1979 remake of Invasion of the Body Snatchers, the 1978-1984 
postapocalyptic Mad Max movies, and Ridley Scott's 1981 Alien were all 
blockbusters. However, Star Wars was a fairy-tale couched in 1940s science fiction 
iconography. Spielberg's movies drew on the flying-saucer subculture, an aspect of 
U.S. conspiracy theory scorned by most science fiction writers. Mad Max and its 
offshoots are essentially slasher films. Even Alien, with its wry anti-technocratic 
approach, knowingly subverting the visions of films like 2001, was a "Thing" movie, 
a genre characteristic of 1950s B-pictures. These films thus represented science 
fiction, broadly, as thrill-seeking, machine-oriented and anti-intellectual. Scott's 1983 
Blade Runner seems to have affected cyberpunk -- it was based on Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968) by Philip K Dick, one of cyberpunk's mentors -- and 
revealed an audience for "intellectual" science fiction films, but it did not spawn 
imitations. Arguably, many of these films were vehicles for special effects rather than 
ideas. 
While this context suggests a need for change, it is not clear that cyberpunk saw 











Their precursors are legion. Individual cyberpunk writers differ in 
their literary debts; but some older writers, ancestral cyberpunks 
perhaps, show a clear and striking influence. 
From the New Wave: the streetwise edginess of Harlan Ellison. 
The visionary shimmer of Samuel Delaney. The free-wheeling 
zaniness of Norman Spinrad and the rock esthetic of Michael 
Moorcock; the intellectual daring of Brian Aldiss; and, always, J.G. 
Ballard. 
From the harder tradition: the cosmic outlook of Olaf Stapledon; 
the science/politics of H.G. Wells; the steely extrapolation of Larry 
Niven, Poul Anderson, and Robert Heinlein. 
(Sterling, 1986: x) 
Sterling added, however, that: 
Cyberpunk has risen from within the SF genre; it is not an 
invasion but a modem reform. Because of this, its effect within the 
genre has been rapid and powerful. 
Science fiction today is in a rare state of ferment. The rest of the 
decade may well see a general plague of movements, led by an 
increasingly vnlatile and numerous Eighties generation. 
(Sterling: xv) 
Amid this possibly undeserved image of revolution and rebelliousness, Sterling's 
all-inclusive roll-call ignores the differences between the writers he cites --
significantly, all respected by the science fiction writing establishment. His insistence 
that cyberpunk was a solid part of the science fiction tradition assumes that this 











paradoxical; the "modern reform" suggests that cyberpunk would only have to make 
minor changes to transform science fiction, despite his images of "ferment" and 
"plague". 
Cyberpunk did not need to subvert science fiction's fundamental structures. It 
depicted plausible things in narratively conventional ways, and its technology was a 
familiar part of the scientific mainstream (unlike the 1960s "New Wave"). It was as if 
the era of 1940s science fiction, which used space travel (then viewed as absurd by 
most serious commentators) to symbolise liberation, had occurred when space travel 
was already supported by the establishment -- like the conservative Analog in the 
1960s. 
Even so, many in science fiction opposed cyberpunk; Analog did not publish it and 
rarely reviewed it; in 1986 Tom Easton, Analog's reviewer, justified mentioning 
Walter Jon Williams' Hardwired (1985) by saying that Williams offered "something 
more than adventures in computerland" (Easton, 1986: 181). In 1990 Jerry Pournelle 
and S. M. Stirling wrote, obviously referring to Gibson's artificial intelligence, that 
"[c]onsciousness-Ievel computers were a dead-end technology, doomed to catatonic 
madness" (Pournelle, 1991: 45). Orson Scott Card wrote of his own cyberpunk effort 
"Dogwalkerll (1989) that "I had long had an ambivalent feeling toward cyberpunk .... 
[a]n artist who is alienated from his society has no reason to live .... the worst thing 
about cyberpunk was the shallowness of those who imitated it" (Card, 1992: 540-1). 
While the latter point may be valid, the former point repudiates a huge field of art. 
Evidently in Card's terms art must be affirmative (somewhat like socialist realism) --
which in science fiction terms would mean supporting science. 
However, cyberpunk was not solely a creation of science fiction. Like the "New 
Wave If it drew on other cultural iconography, and this, with its relevance to 
contemporary technology and politics, might have given it a broader base. It thus 
seems, despite all queries, valuable to examine the genre in this light -- focussing 











Cyber Technology and Punk Culture. 
How could the two be combined? Indeed, what was to be gained by moving the 
icon of the computer, a familiar prop in science fiction since the 1950s, to the centre 
stage previously occupied by more spectacular-seeming machines? 
One obvious point is that the U.S. space programme, glorified through five decades 
of science fiction, lost momentum with the end of the Apollo programme in the mid-
1970s and seemed to have betrayed the expectations vested in it. Despite the Space 
Shuttle project beginning (belatedly) in 1981, public interest in space weakened. The 
idealists of Analog hoped that America might grow great through expansion into 
space, but as Jameson pointed out, theirs was a contradictory power-fantasy. The 
dynamism of space opera attempted to generate a "sense of adventure which readers 
derive from the contemplation of one of the most physically restrictive situations in 
which human beings can be thrust" (a point also made by Lewis Mumford, that space 
flight, far from liberating, was confining at least for the astronaut). Jameson suggested 
that this might be because "[t]he intergalactic spaceship is ... an avatar of Conrad's 
merchant vessels, projected into a world that has long since been reorganized into a 
capitalist world system within empty places" (Jameson, 1994a: 218). The space 
programme, however, proved to have little to do with trade or capitalism (except in 
funding aerospace companies). It was natural that science fiction writers might look 
elsewhere for inspiration. 
Cyberpunk arose at the same time as the rise of the personal computer (Gibson's 
"cyberspace decks", absent from his earliest SF story, "Fragments of a Hologram 
Rose" [1977], are surely based on PCs). Minicomputers appeared in the early 1970s; 
initially these were only accessible to those who could assemble them, but by the early 
1980s cheap microcomputers were usable by anyone who understood a programming 
language; as the processing power and storage capacity of computers grew, "user-











even intelligent machines might be possible in the near future; cybernetics promised a 
new golden age. 
Meanwhile another kind of information technology was evolving: research in DNA 
polymerization, and new methods of introducing foreign DNA into cells, suggested 
that biotechnology could create life-forms never seen in nature. This gained much 
publicity from opponents of genetic engineering like Jeremy Rifkin, whose book 
Algeny (1982) argued for the abolition of genetic research because its ecological 
effects were unpredictable. (Stephen Jay Gould, not normally deemed a conservative 
scientist, denounced Rifkin for "arguing that scientific paradigms are simple 
expressions of socioeconomic bias" [Gould, 1990: 238]). Biotechnology was, like 
cybernetics, about control over information and the impact this had on reality; both 
were potential sources of political power. 
However, while the "hard" sciences were important to cyberpunk, technological 
knowledge was not essential. (When he wrote Neuromancer, William Gibson had 
never owned a computer.) Nevertheless, the new technological power seemed to be 
concrete rather than symbolic. (Space travel might symbolise imperial expansion, but 
is not identical to it, whereas artificial intelligences might give genuine power to 
whoever controlled them). Gibson, Walter Jon Williams and Marc Laidlaw seem to 
have expected the upper class to use information technologies against the lower class, 
though they acknowledge that high technology can be turned against the power-
structure -- Williams, in his short story "Flatline" (1988), envisages unfocused 
rebellion against artificial intelligence, and much the same is true of Laidlaw's Dad's 
Nuke (1985) -- the title being an ironic ultimate consumer item -- the household 
nuclear power station. Kelly and Kessel, in Freedom Beach, expect cybernetic 
technology to rescue an impersonalised world. Rudy Rucker, in Software (1984) and 
Wetware (1988), appears optimistic about the decentralising potential of information 
technology; robots in Software, and artificial intelligences in Wetware, can be freed 











Rucker's artificial intelligences resemble an unfairly suppressed group of superior 
humans deserving freedom. This suggests one possible political content to cyberpunk. 
Before 1987 Sterling followed a similar pattern. His texts were set far in the future, 
or in fantasy worlds, avoiding substantial socio-economic comparison with the 
present, though as Veronica Hollinger notes, Sterling's future is "different from many 
SF futures in that what it extrapolates from the present is the ... idea that human 
beings will be different in the future" (Hollinger, 1994: 208). Sterling did not 
represent artificial intelligences, preferring instead mechanically or biologically 
altered humans. The "Shapers" and "Mechs" of the Schismatrix texts (1982-5) operate 
within authoritarian, capitalistic hierarchies, though Sterling, like Rucker, feels that 
hierarchies generate confining world-views, and may be self-defeating; the end of 
Schismatrix depicts an escape from these.) Sterling particularly condemns those 
remaining on Earth, who failed to exploit their potential, doubtless symbolising 
people who ignore the technologies which he praises in the introduction to 
Mirrorshades. 
In The Artificial Kid (1980) and Schismatrix (1985), he suggests that humanity will 
develop according to the idea of the physicist lIya Prigogine, that systems which 
receive constant energy input (like the Earth) become increasingly complex. Such 
ideas were prominent in the field of chaos theory, a notion much admired by 
intellectuals in the 1980s. This makes humanity's future scientifically preordained, 
rather than culturally determined, making science superior to art or politics. Sterling's 
Schismatrix aliens, the Investors, are interstellar capitalists. Such capitalist scientism 
recalls the ideology of Robert A Heinlein, who strongly influenced Sterling. Csicsery-
Ronay complains, apropos Bruce Sterling's inflated language, that "the ambivalent 
solutions of cyberpunk ... ignore the question of whether some political controls over 
technology are desirable, if not exactly possible" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1994: 193). 
These technical underpinnings of cyberpunk did not threaten conventional science 











fiction's power-fantasies. Meanwhile, however, the tenn "punk" reflects a very 
different popular culture which developed in the 1970s. 
Punk as a musical subculture fonnally appeared in about 1976-7, crossing the 
Atlantic in the latter year, contemporary with Gibson's first published writing. 
Csicsery-Ronay describes punk as fI[a] self-stupefYing and self-mutilating refusal to 
dignifY or trust anything that has brought about the present world, even the human 
body, all for the promise of an authenticity so undefinable it can't ever be known" 
(Csicsery-Ronay, 1994: 186). This seems too abstract to explain why and when it 
happened. 
Punk seems to have begun in Britain, arguably a response to political conditions in 
the latter 1970s. The ruling Labour Party, as Tony Benn's 1977-80 Cabinet diaries, 
Conflicts of Interest (1990) suggest, constantly avoided radical changes despite 
continual crises aggravated by such timidity. Britain had fallen under IMF economic 
control; unemployment was high (almost a million), betraying the promises of the 
mid-1970s. Meanwhile, revolution in the Portuguese colonies, Zimbabwe and Central 
America, and the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, had given the Left distant victories in 
contrast to its domestic failure. An influx of blacks into Britain transfonned popular 
culture; meanwhile, the rise of a small but well-publicised fascist movement, the 
National Front, added to the Left's easily-assimilated goodlbad dichotomy (Rastas 
versus National Front, Third World versus America). These new factors seemed to 
offer alternatives to the sterility of conventional politics. It is easy to see how these 
issues should have promoted an incoherent working-class rebellion. It is also easy to 
see why the British middle-class left and liberals might have endorsed this (especially 
when it largely disregarded class politics) and the raucous, confrontational songs it 
generated: 
God save the Queen, 
And the fascist regime, 










A potential H-bomb ... 
(The Sex Pistols, "God Save The Queen", 1977) 
Black folk got a lot of problems, 
But they don't mind throwing a brick, 
White people go to school, 
Where they teach you to be thick ... 
(The Clash, "White Riot", 1977) 
When all the gay geezers got put inside, 
And coloured kids were getting crucified, 
A few of us fought and a few of us died, 
In the winter of '79 ... 
(Tom Robinson Band, "Winter of '79", 1978) 
26 
These images of rebellion are strikingly disparate. The Sex Pistols were (if 
anything) nihilists, the Clash were leftists, and Tom Robinson was a gay-rights 
activist. British punk took its iconography from the right-wing "Skinhead" movement; 
some of the post-punk "Oi!" bands were reputedly racist, and at least one, 
Skrewdriver, supported the neo-fascist "Blood and Honour" movement. Resistance to 
authority seemed the common factor; the Conservative Party's 1979 triumph was 
widely claimed to be (ironically) an anti-establishment victory. This fusion of 
disparate movements was doomed to disintegrate, and the Left was not able to make 
gains through it. Another defeat for the Labour Party in 1983 (astonishing Salman 
Rushdie) disillusioned the Left, while when a cause for resistance appeared, the 1984 
Miners' Strike, the British Left responded weakly and the miners lost. The culture of 
rebellion which created punk seemed to have dissipated -- if it was ever real and not, 











In the United States, conditions evolved slightly differently. In the early 1970s the 
resignation of President Nixon and the defeat for American power in South Vietnam 
were accommodated by the established Democratic Party rather than generating 
radicalism. The U.S. public (or at least the media addressing it) was more shocked 
than the UK's by Third World crises, especially when in 1978 their strongest Third 
World ally, the Shah ofIran, was overthrown. U.S. conservative propaganda claimed 
that the United States had become (or was becoming) weak, a claim reinforced when 
the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979. (This was deemed a gain for Soviet 
imperialism, though it was intended to keep Islamic fundamentalism out of Soviet 
Central Asia.) Thus by 1980, claims Fred Halliday, the U.S. Republican Party 
Manifesto could call for U.S. superiority to be "restored" (implying that it had been 
lost). This sense of impotence was identified with nationalist politics, in contrast to 
the situation in Britain (although the British Tories made comparable appeals, these 
were never as ideologically dominant as the U.S. Republican appeals). 
American punk similarly lacked the political rebelliousness of English (apart from 
the Dead Kennedys). The Ramones borrowed more from the Beach Boys than from 
the Sex Pistols. Patti Smith cultivated the image of a poet -- inconceivable in British 
punk, and perhaps only possible because of the New York links between rock and art 
created via Andy Warhol's Velvet Underground. The U.S. punk movement depended 
heavily on the image of the British movement -- which may also be true of cyberpunk. 
(Gibson is plainly influenced by the Velvet Underground's leader, Lou Reed, who also 
influenced the punk movement). 
Radicalism and rebelliousness were repudiated when in 1981 Carter was replaced 
as President by Reagan, who as governor of California had been one of the villains of 
the American Left in the 1960s and 1970s. (He features in a satirical song at 
Woodstock, and as a disastrous President of the United States in John Sladek's New 
Wave science fiction novel, The Muller-Fokker Effect [1970].) However, his 
Democratic opponents (Carter in 1980, and Mondale in 1984) adopted similar 











For liberals within the U.S. official political structure (essentially the Democratic 
Party), Reagan's popularity was inexplicable, leaving them feeling isolated from 
society, and lacking any political focus. Two apparent responses to this are Brett 
Easton Ellis's Less Than Zero (1984) where the early-1980s appear as a time of 
powerless anomie, and Thomas Pynchon's Vineland (1990) which focuses on the 
oppression of surviving dissident intellectuals -- appropriating elements of punk. The 
"punk" element of the cyberpunk may have been style rather than substance -- yet the 
writers accepted the name, associating it with a resistance to oppression which almost 
certainly rejected the anti-intellectual, socially conservative Reaganism. Politically 
impotent, liberals might have hoped to be proved right by catastrophe. 
Thus it seems likely that the cyberpunk movement reflected an inclination towards 
political nihilism in American liberalism. This differs from the actual punk 
movement; it is a self-conscious and pessimistic position. This kind of pessimistic, 
critical opposition is not common in popular fiction, although it exists to an extent in 
aspects of detective fiction -- such as the political context of the tough, illusion-free 
Ned Beaumont, the anti-hero of Dashiell Hammett's The Glass Key (1932), where 
there is no happy ending: 
"You despise me," she said in a low hard voice. "You think I'm a 
whore." 
"I don't despise you," he said irritably, not turning to face her. 
"Whatever you've done you've paid for and been paid for and that 
goes for all of us." 
(Hammett, 1980: 216) 
Beaumont, the most positive character in the book, is an alcoholic gambler and a 
fixer for a political boss; in this and other Hammett novels, the corruption of the 
world appears inescapable. Hammett's near-contemporary and admirer, Raymond 











vulnerable) hero, ostensibly cynical, but striving to solve the problems of the world by 
displaying its wrongs: "down these mean streets a man must go who is not himself 
mean, who is neither tarnished nor afraid . . .. a complete man and a common man 
and yet an unusual man" (Chandler, 1984: 191). Nevertheless Chandler acknowledges 
the sinfulness of the real world. 
To Jameson, "Chandler's picture of America ... is the converse ... of an abstract 
intellectual illusion ... [t]he federal system and the archaic federal Constitution 
developed in Americans . . . a double system of political thoughts which never 
intersect . . . . [o]n the one hand, a glamorous national politics . . . . [o]n the other 
hand, local politics, with its odium, its ever-present corruption" (Jameson, 1983: 129-
30). Hence, he argues, "the American is able to observe local injustice ... with a 
practiced eye, while he continues to entertain boundless optimism as to the greatness 
of the country" (Jameson, 1983: 130). Americans condemn their environment but 
retain illusions about political values, nostalgic for an assumed golden age when 
gangsterism did not exist -- appropriate for liberal sentiments in the 1980s. 
There appear to be elements of detective fiction in cyberpunk, as noted by those 
who claim cyberpunk as postmodern. Brian McHale argues that "postmodernism is 
characterized by the collapse of hierarchical distinctions between high and low art" 
(McHale, 1994: 309). However, such a collapse may be more specifically significant; 
cyberpunk may appropriate the emotional content of popular-cultural elements, such 
as popular music, without necessarily accepting their totality. Certainly it uses images 
of the drug culture, an oppositional force (representing withdrawal from common 
reality, and flight into subculture) which can be used to critique current society (as 
does William Burroughs, of whom Kadrey and McCaffery declare, perhaps 
exaggeratedly, that "without Naked Lunch there would probably be no cyberpunk" 
(Kadreyand McCaffery, 1994: 18). 
Images of drug use are widespread in 1980s cyberpunk. The title of Rudy Rucker's 
second science fiction novel White Light (1980) is a scientific metaphor about the 











eponymous Velvet Underground song. This links the rock scene and the drug scene, 
pleasing the knowing reader, identifying passwords which some might not recognise. 
(Gibson mentions "White. Light." in Count Zero [1986], probably referring to music, 
drugs and Rucker.) Rucker, a mathematics professor, endorses hard drugs in his texts 
-- alcohol or marijuana are considered unfashionable in Wetware. (He mentions his 
own fondness for alcohol in The Fourth Dimension [1985].) 
In Gibson's Mona Lisa Overdrive, the drug wiz fulfills much the same function as 
the heroin which the Velvet Underground hymned. In Count Zero Gibson quotes their 
"Waiting for my man", the character Lucas saying "'First thing that you learn,' he said, 
with the air of a man reciting a proverb, 'is that you always gotta wait!!' (Gibson, 
1990a: 165) -- a phrase which the band took from William Burroughs. The punk 
movement preferred drugs like heroin, which numb perception, to hallucinogenic 
drugs which intensify perception, since for punks, life was deemed painful. 
All this represents the cultural iconography of oppression, just as computers 
represented the cultural iconography of power. These are, however, superficial images 
which could be used for various purposes. The political -- and even philosophical --
context was what determined the real nature of cyberpunk. 
Postmodernism, Late Capitalist Politics and Cyberpunk. 
While science fiction is about power (and hence politics) cyberpunk writers had 
differing approaches to this. Some said that information technology gave powerful 
people more power, others that such power is inevitably subverted by chaotic forces, 
or that such power must eventually be made irrelevant by nature. Evidently the 
distribution of power in contemporary society was important for the cyberpunks 
(showing why their central characters were often powerless). 
Gibson, for instance, appears fascinated by the powers of technology -- especially 
artificial intelligence -- to resolve social change. This would make technology the 











indistinguishable from people, and this arguably risks dehumanizing the latter rather 
than humanizing the former. (Postmodernist critics saw this as a positive aspect of 
cyberpunk, since it diminished the role of human identity.) 
Gibson, Shiner and Rucker depict large corporations, which have largely replaced 
governments, dominating the societies they describe. These do not seem to symbolise 
wish-fulfillment fantasies, because none of them show the corporations from within, 
or use them to offer readers power-fantasies. In earlier science fiction, corporate rule 
was projected onto a symbolic space frontier (various pre-1960 stories endorsed the 
idea that corporations might dominate outer space; pre-1960 dystopian images tended 
to condemn governments rather than capitalists.) Gibson seems to express nostalgia 
for the welfare state, perhaps blaming corporations for destroying this in their own 
interests. 
Gibson sees corporations as promoting organisation and planning, which he 
opposes to the random individualism of his heroes and heroines. Such corporations 
must concentrate central power because they cannot tolerate uncertainty. Gibson thus 
represents planning as opposed to individualism and thus evil, where Sterling, in 
Schismatrix and the later Islands in the Net (1988) seems to see planning as desirable. 
The contradiction between the balance of forces -- corporations versus individuals --
in Gibson's texts is sharpened by the fact that the strong are planners and the weak are 
unplanned. Rucker sees no problem in any of this -- he, and his successful people and 
corporations, all oppose planning: "ISDN has no policies; ISDN surfs chaos" (Rucker, 
1989: 181). 
All these texts suggest a vaguely liberal approach to power, a pursuit of balance 
between centralisation and decentralisation, between freedom and anarchy. This surely 
reflects the politics of the U.S. in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Eric Hobsbawm 
terms the period preceding this (roughly 1945-1975, when Gibson's politics would 
have been formed) the "Golden Agel! which "rested on an effective policy consensus 
between Right and Left .... a deal acceptable to all sides. Employers ... welcomed 











wages and fringe benefits .... Government got political stability" (Hobsbawm, 1995: 
282). This had cultural implications; "personal liberation and social liberation thus 
went hand in hand .... The newly extended field of publicly acceptable behaviour ... 
. rejected the long-established ... ordering of human relations in society .... this 
rejection was . . . in the name of the unlimited autonomy of individual desire" 
(Hobsba\vm, 1995: 333-4). This established what in the United States came to be 
called Illiberalism ll , a system which strove to maintain social consensus while 
promoting individual freedom. However, this was incompatible with a capitalist 
system which required different treatments for different classes (destroying the 
consensus in time of economic slump) and a disciplined workforce and the 
surveillance which went with it (limiting personal freedom); so, Hobsbawm suggests, 
it could not last. 
However, liberal ideology did not change as rapidly as economic conditions 
changed. As a result there was considerable intellectual conflict between liberals and 
conservatives, particularly with regard to the 1960s, a time of great cultural flexibility. 
Many conservatives later argued that during Hobsbawm's Golden Age "the inchoate 
attack against authority ... had weakened our culture's immune system .... origins of 
metaphorical epidemics of crime and drugs could be traced to the Sixties, as could 
literal ones such as AIDS" (Collier and Horowitz, 1990: 16). (Apparently these 
commentators believe that drugs and crime did not exist before 1960, whereas the HI 
virus appeared ten or fifteen years before it actually existed!) In 1975, a report for the 
Trilateral Commission, The Crisis of Democracy, argued that democracy had 
weakened govemability in the U.S. by distributing power excessively. Nobel Prize-
winning author Saul Bellow, in 1987, complained that "[t]he heat of the dispute 
between Left and Right has grown so fierce in the last decade that the habits of 
civilized discourse have suffered a scorching" (Bellow, 1988: 18). This last point is 
especially peculiar because the Left barely existed in the U.S. by 1987; given that 
Bellow also denounces "the untreated sewage odors of . . . revolutionary rhetoric" 











had condemned as having "made shit a sacrament" (Bellow, 1978: 39) III Mr 
Sammler's Planet (1970). 
Cyberpunk arose out of this left/liberal intellectual milieu, which was increasingly 
marginalised in U.S. society. The 1960s are clearly symbolically significant for this 
grouping; radical liberal Hunter S Thompson declared in 1972 that in the 1960s: 
"[t]here was a fantastic universal sense that whatever we were doing was right, that we 
were winning .... over the forces of old and evil .... we were riding the crest of a 
high and beautiful wave .... now, less than five years later ... with the right kind of 
eyes you can almost see the high-water mark -- that place where the wave finally 
broke and rolled back" (Thompson, 1980: 113). Whatever the truth of this, for the 
liberal public this image of the country's recent history has seemed valid. Fredric 
Jameson suggested in 1984 that lI[t]he 60s were ... an extraordinary printing up of 
ever more devalued signifiers. With the end of the 60s, with the world economic 
crisis, all the old infrastructural bills then slowly came due once more; and the 80s 
will be characterized by an effort, on a world scale, to proletarianize all those unbound 
social forces that gave the 60s their energy" (Jameson, 1989: 208). It would be logical 
for those believing this to see the 1970s and 1980s as a time when these optimistic 
accomplishments were reversed and dismantled -- as many American conservatives, 
evidently, wished to do. Thus for liberals this period was one of crisis, which a crisis-
oriented genre like cyberpunk served. 
Liberals perceived a crisis; Chomsky claims that "dominant elites ... need[ ed] to 
return the general population to passivity and obedience, reversing the threat of 
democratization posed during the 1960s" (Peck, 1988: 45); Thompson looks back on 
"the 'Reagan Revolution,' which ushered in eight years of berserk looting of the 
federal treasury and the economic crippling of the middle class" (Thompson, 1995: 
37), representing the 1980s as an irrational betrayal of the 1960s. Chomsky and 
Jameson pragmatically suggest that the ruling-class in the late 1980s was pursuing its 











incomprehensible, since they could not be accommodated within a liberal paradigm 
which saw U.S. politics as essentially altruistic. 
Many cyberpunk writers seem to accept this U.S. liberal 1980s nightmare -- a 
world corporate-dominated, undemocratic, and harsh for the weak and poor. However, 
they postulate powers which can protect the good (if they make an effort) and punish 
the bad (unless they mend their ways): cybernetics, chaos, or energy-driven evolution. ' 
The sins of contemporary power-politics would be redeemed by technology, 
sidestepping political change. In the real world, high technology normally gave 
oppressors more power, and even disrupted nature (vide the "nuclear winter" notion of 
the early 1980s, publicised by the science writer Carl Sagan, and the global warming 
debate). Through the cyberpunk fantasy the disruptive power of science and invention 
overcame corrupt politics (which reduces science to an image of individually-driven 
technology, forgetting that politicians tend to control scientific research). Conceivably 
these technological "solutions" may have symbolised (even if unwittingly) radical 
political changes which middle-class Western intellectuals rejected in actuality. 
Technological change had already happened. During the twentieth century 
equipment for industrial manufacture became more complex and productive. Machine 
workers needed skills (so unskilled workers could not be hired to replace them) which 
made trade unions strong. Rapid economic growth until the early 1970s kept 
unemployment low. However, from the 1970s factors such as the inflation caused by 
the Vietnam War and the crisis caused by the 1973 and 1980 oil embargoes slowed 
economic growth. This began the era which Hobsbawm terms the "Crisis Decadest!. 
The growing use of computer-controlled equipment, and the movement of 
manufacturing industries toward Third World countries, troubled Western workforces. 
Many production processes ceased to need skilled workers, requiring only simple 
assembly techniques (using imported components). This weakened Western trade 
unions, making it easier to fire workers. Profitability grew; the rich became richer, 
especially when conservative governments cut their taxes. From the mid-1970s poorer 











This need for foreign exchange made these countries flood the market with raw 
materials, cutting producer prices and further impoverishing themselves. 
While the increasing exploitation of the poor worldwide alarmed liberals, there 
seemed no political answers (except revolution, which liberals deemed unthinkable). 
It seemed safer to seek solutions outside politics. Alvin Toffler, in The Third Wave --
described by Sterling as "a bible to many cyberpunks" (Sterling, 1988: xii) -- felt that 
technology was making the world more decentralised. Governments and nation-states 
were growing less important; as he put it, "[ a]s the mass society of the industrial era 
disintegrates under the impact of the Third Wave .... [c]orporations typically meet 
this problem by introducing more variety into their product lines . . . . [n]ational 
governments ... find it difficult to customise their policies" (Toffler, 1981: 327). 
There would be fewer curbs on rich corporations, since governments would no longer 
have power to control them; "the rise of the great transnationals has reduced ... the 
role of the nation-state at precisely the time when centrifugal pressures from below 
threaten to part it at the seams" (Toffler, 1981: 332). Toffler, writing from the 
perspective of the first-world middle class (whence the cyberpunk writers sprang) 
considered this good. While the power-elite might endorse this, in U.S. terms liberals 
are a loyal opposition, criticising U.S. policy without opposing its basic intellectual 
framework; what Said calls "internaliz[ing] imperial rule" (Said, 1995: 305). One 
might thus expect their criticism of any changes in U.S. society and culture to be 
muted; their sense of distance from society qualified by a commitment to it. 
Social change may have been driven by shifts in the economy. In Late Capitalism 
(1978), the Trotskyite theorist Ernest Mandel argues that the short-term business cycle 
of capitalism is overridden by multi-decade "long waves" when the rate of profit is 
high or low, and capitalism booms or slumps. This cycle is driven by factors like the 
growth of the world market after the 1848 revolutions which freed bourgeois political 
power, or the expanded capital exports to colonies in the 1890s. The most recent is 
explained by the political stabilization of the world after 1945 by the USA (which 











the "Third Technological Revolution" (more labour productivity). This, which Mandel 
calls "late capitalism", coincides with postmodern art and theory's appearance (hence 
Fredric Jameson's interest in it), and its climax coincides with the rise of cyberpunk. 
Mandel believed that automation would make workers unemployed and thus slow 
down the economy. Wholly automated production would have to distribute products 
for free, making capitalism meaningless. Therefore, Mandel argues, "late capitalism" 
would have to grow increasingly wasteful to avoid this, and based increasingly on 
falsehood. It would be totalitarian, but also paranoid (profit would be less stable, and 
expensive fixed plant would constantly need replacement). Moreover, "[t]he logic of 
late capitalism is ... to convert idle capital into service capital and simultaneously to 
replace . .. services with commodities" (Mandel, 1978: 406); that is, into relatively 
unproductive activities, encouraging anomie. Though much of Mandel's work may be 
wrong in detail, his overall view is plausible -- helping to explain the failure (as noted 
by Hobsbawm) of the post-Cold War world to become a capitalist utopia. This 
suggests the environment in which cyberpunk developed. 
Under late capitalism, Mandel insists, the growing power of multinational 
corporations also empowers the state. Indeed, "[f]ar from representing a 'post-
industrial society', late capitalism . . . constitutes generalized universal 
industrialization for the first time in history. Mechanization, standardization, over-
specialization . . . which in the past determined only the realm of commodity 
production in actual industry, now penetrate into all sectors" (Mandel, 1978: 387). To 
Mandel, late capitalism reduces all human activities to those of the market, and thus 
increasingly psychologically oppresses people, especially the working class. 
McCaffery appropriates Mandel's ideas, mentioning "what Ernest Mandel ... has 
termed the 'Third Stage' in capitalist expansion -- that of 'postindustrial capitalism'" 
(McCaffery, 1994: 3). (Mandel rejected this idea, yet it is placed in quotes as if 
Mandel used it.) McCaffery's extract from Jameson's "Postmodernism, or The Cultural 
Logic of Late Capital", in Storming The Reality Studio ends before Mandel is 











forms" (McCaffery, 1994: 16), an example of Jameson's reference to "what Benjamin 
still called the 'aestheticization' of reality (he thought it meant fascism, but we know 
it's only fun)" (Jameson, 1996: x). Jameson's Marxist position was that "Manders 
intervention . . . involves the proposition that late . . . capitalism, far from being 
inconsistent with Marx's great nineteenth-century analysis [as Daniel Bell would 
argue] constitutes, on the contrary, the purest form of capital yet to have emerged" 
(Jameson, 1996: 36). Clearly McCaffery misrepresents Mandel; intriguingly, though 
he evidently has no interest in Marxism, McCaffery nevertheless finds Mandel 
attractive, probably because of the transformations to which Mandel points -- change 
being attractive to most postmodernists, and also to cyberpunks (who saw high 
technology as its cause and effect). 
Mandel's notion of a new economic structure might well lead to new cultural goals 
and forms. This helps explains Jameson's view of postmodemism as a sign of a shift 
in the mode of production rather than in values or morals, the terms in which most 
postmodem theorists operated (rejecting Jameson's Marxist doctrines). The 
connection with culture appears because in this mode of production more people do 
less productive work, growing more alienated, and more images of alienated people 
appear in culture; Jameson argues that this explains "dirty realism" and what he calls 
"critical regionalism". 
Most relevant to science fiction is that "[b ]elief in the omnipotence of technology is 
the specific form of bourgeois ideology in late capitalism" (Mandel, 1978: 501). 
Mandel evidently believes that "late capitalism" depends on technical advances. 
Valorization of technology in fields like the space race, and the technologization of 
warfare (needed, according to Mandel, to sustain high-technology corporations) would 
also explain this. Science fiction might draw strength from this "omnipotence of 
technology" ideology, although this would make the genre almost necessarily support 
the ruling class's beliefs, however oppositional it appeared to be. 
In political terms, valorizing technology suggests that kinds of politics associated 











change is devalued -- conservatism having become common sense. Jameson argues 
that "in contemporary ideology ... anything labeled as public has become ... tainted . 
. . anything construed as representing the state ... is ... repudiated" (Jameson, 1994a: 
62). Under such conditions a science fictional expression of collective power would 
then become almost unthinkable, in a space where "private police and concealed 
cameras sanitize the unruliness of the older collective experience .... Replication ... 
means the depoliticization of the former modem . . . the Utopian becomes 
unmentionable" (Jameson: 144). Mandel notes that intellectuals within such a system 
develop "[t]he thesis of ... the end of all ideologies .... [which functions] to 
convince the victims of alienated labour that it is senseless to rebel" (Mandel, 1978: 
502-3). This recalls the academic Daniel Bell, and anticipates Francis Fukuyama and 
other 1980s conservatives who decried any alternatives to capitalism; to Jameson, lIa . 
. . vision of history is herein perpetuated, in which Utopia (read: communism) is 
understood as achieving its ultimate identity by the obliteration of difference through 
sheer force; of, in the memorable words of the nouveaux philosophes, in which a 
direct line runs from Hegel's Absolute Spirit to Stalin's Gulag" (Jameson, 1994: 51). 
Evolving cybernetic technologies were expected to have political significance. 
Bell's The Coming of Postindustrial Society (1976) predicted that information 
produced by the university and the research institute would become more important 
than manufacturing capacity. (Similar points were made by Jean-Franryois Lyotard in 
The Postmodern Condition [1983].) Bell had written The End of Ideology (1960) 
twenty years earlier, arguing, according to Chomsky, that "[i]ntellectuals in the West . 
. . see no further need for a radical transformation of society" (Chomsky, 1988: 72), 
since "technical experts will be able to come to grips with the few problems that still 
remain" (Chomsky, 1988: 73). Chomsky suggests that Bell's real message was that 
"the welfare-state technician . . . . [h laving found his position of power . . . has no 
further need for ideologies that look to radical change" (Chomsky, 1988: 73). 
Christopher Lasch, broadly supporting Chomsky, notes that Bell, while nominally a 











the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. This suggests the origins and the 
potential agenda of cybernetics-centred politics. 
McCaffery echoes Bell: "one can say now that the key 'global resource' is the 
information itself rather than the oil, farm goods or other resources usually associated 
with capitalist market systems" (McCaffery, 1994: 4). On this basis, McCaffery 
declares cyberpunk a postmodern genre: 
... in our postfuturist age, the concepts of literary "authenticity" 
and "originality," and the paradoxes involved in artistic rebellion 
when "rebellion" is now a commodifiable image that is regularly 
employed as a "counterculture" marketing strategy -- can all be 
shown to reflect and relate to similar issues being debated by nearly 
all artists and critics associated with postmodernism. 
Indeed, the central topic addressed by this casebook is the way in 
which cyberpunk and other innovative forms of SF are functioning 
within the realm of postmodern culture . . . . the complex set of 
radical ruptures . . . within the new social and economic media 
system (or "postindustrial society") in which we live. 
(McCaffery, 1994: 2) 
McCaffery significantly sets aesthetic and political concepts in scare-quotes, while 
the almost meaningless "postfuturist" and the corporate "marketing strategy" and 
"commodifiable" go unexamined -- suggesting that he desires to associate himself 
with corporate viewpoints. McCaffery terms postmodernism a response to socio-
economic conditions by the intelligentsia, and uses Mandel's work to link 
postmodemism with capitalist economic structure -- yet ignores Mandel's critique of 
that structure, instead implying that cyberpunk could celebrate mature capitalism. 
This reminds the reader that, as Jameson says, that "in postmodern culture, 'culture' 











and fully as much a commodity as any of the items it includes within itself " 
(Jameson, 1993: x). The powerful persons in society, evidently, are no longer to be 
shocked, as by naturalism or modernism, but to be pandered to and imitated. 
McCaffery cites several postmodern theorists, although he ignores Foucault, whose 
argument that power was a constant threat to freedom seems relevant here. Foucault 
used such examples as the shifting definition of insanity in Madness and Civilisation 
(1961), a history of political responses to insanity, and of the official transformation of 
penology and social control in Discipline and Punish (1978), where he introduced the 
concept of "panopticism". McCaffery prefers Lyotard's declaration that "[t]he 
postmodern would be that which, in the modem, puts forward the unpresentable in 
presentation . . . that which searches for new presentations ... in order to impart a 
stronger sense of the unpresentable" (Lyotard, 1994: 261). This appears an aesthetic 
judgement, but in its concern with things which cannot be done (the unpresentable) it 
seems not so much a-political as anti-political. In saying "[l]et us wage a war on 
totality ... let us activate the differences" (Lyotard, 1994: 262), Lyotard implies that it 
is essentially this "totality" which must be resisted -- not any more solid oppressive 
factor in society, politics or economics. This level of abstraction seems congenial to 
McCaffery -- which may prove relevant to cyberpunk itself. 
Some postmodernism applauded cybernetics; Jean Baudrillard, extensively cited in 
Storming the Reality Studio (and in cyberpunk articles in Science-Fiction Studies), 
loves mechanical imagery: 
the reign of mechanical man commences .... We shouldn't make 
any mistakes . . . for reasons of 'figurative' resemblance between 
robot and automaton. The latter is an interrogation upon nature .... 
the automaton has no other destiny than to be ceaselessly compared 
to living man -- so as to be more natural than him .... The robot no 
longer interrogates appearance; its only truth is in its mechanical 











Men themselves only started their own proliferation when they 
achieved the status of machines, with the industrial revolution ... 
(Baudrillard, 1994: 179-81) 
Baudrillard here praises mechanisation for its own sake (recalling the technophilia 
of much cyberpunk). Baudrillard also often legitimates his discourse through "a 
profusion of scientific terms, used with total disregard for their meaning" (Sokal and 
Bricmont, 1998: 143) implying an unreflective scientism. This appears reactionary if 
one accepts (as cyberpunks usually do) that there are defects in the world-system of 
which science is a part, especially since Baudrillard (like Lyotard in some ways) sees 
no possibility of meaningfully challenging the world-system. 
Kroker and Cook make similar points: "TV is the real world of postmodern culture 
which has entertainment as its ideology .... it functions to transform the old world of 
society under the sign of . . . that ideology . . . which holds . . . to the historical 
inevitability and ethical desirability of the technical mastery of social and nonsocial 
nature .... television is ... most fascinating as the emblematic form of the death of 
society and the triumph of signifYing culture" (Kroker and Cook, 1994: 229-237). This 
valorizes technology and presents the idea that symbols are more important than what 
is symbolised -- favouring image over reality. This may represent a fear of reality -- a 
desire for something less threatening, more controllable, such as images -- again 
raising questions about what might be expected from cyberpunk, which dealt with 
information rather than reality, an aspect which Kroker and Cook turned to their own 
purposes. 
Baudrillard, Kroker and Cook, and other postmodern writers, admired the interface 
between human and machine which is central to cyberpunk. This is hardly 
postmodern; even H.G. Wells' Martians in The War o/the Worlds (1898) are depicted 
as evolutionary advances on humans; "men ... are just in the beginning of the 
evolution that the Martians have worked out . . . . mere brains, wearing different 











However, postmodernism used the animal-machine interface, or "cyborg", as a trope 
to challenge assumptions about human identity. 
Donna Haraway, occasionally cited in Storming the Reality Studio, displayed a 
feminist optimism concerning this in her "Manifesto for Cyborgs", arguing that "we 
are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, 
we are cyborgs" (Haraway, 1990: 191), making the concept familiar and potentially 
controllable. Haraway ignores cyberpunk, perhaps because it was androcentric; she 
prefers Samuel Delaney's work and that of feminist science fiction writers. 
Nevertheless, she insists, "[t]he cyborg is a creature in a postgender world" (Haraway, 
1990: 192), implying a break with the present. Like cyberpunks, Haraway seems to 
believe that social problems (here, the subordination of women) can be resolved via 
technology -- again, technology or scientism becomes the validating force legitimating 
and potentially obscuring political statements. 
Haraway acknowledges contradictions with her resolution: "a cyborg world is 
about the final imposition of a grid of control .... a cyborg world might be about ... 
realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and 
machines" (Haraway, 1990: 196). That "grid of control" might imply the triumph of a 
mechanical, exploitative world-view over nature, which underlies much of 
cyberpunk's dystopian imagery. Nevertheless she hopes that "we can learn from our 
fusions with animals and machines how not to be Man, the embodiment of Western 
logos . . . . in these potent and taboo fusions . . . there might indeed be a feminist 
science" (Haraway, 1990: 215). This resembles Sterling's "posthuman" vision in 
Schismatrix -- although there the vision is not "feminist", but desocialized and 
mechanized. 
In claiming that "[c]yborg imagery can help express two crucial arguments ... the 
production of universal, totalizing theory is a major mistake ... taking responsibility 
for the social relations of science and technology means refusing an anti-science 
metaphysics" (Haraway, 1990: 223), Haraway imposes feminism (and 











"totalizing theory" because she opposes scientific reductionism, yet insists on 
"refusing an anti-science metaphysics" because she is a scientist. Her attempt to reject 
theory without abandoning science, and to be a feminist without a grand narrative, 
seems unattainable. This suggests problems in transforming the abstract theories of 
the 1970s and 1980s into practice -- particularly applicable to science fiction which, 
fantasised or not, would have to be based upon some narrative framework. 
Assembling these points, it appears that cyberpunk drew on imagery from high 
technology, endorsing this because cyberpunk arose from a class deriving social 
power from high technology. However, it also drew on imagery from the rebellious 
punk movement, apparently because the cyberpunk writers (and presumably the class 
fraction which they represented) were dissatisfied with social power relations in the 
1970s and 1980s. (Much of this dissatisfaction may have been due to the political 
disempowering of the liberal and technocratic class from which most cyberpunk 
writers rose and which they tended to address.) Thus the movement could be expected 
to be self-contradictory in its attitude to technology and power. 
This is particularly illustrated by the movement's sympathetic critics. They tend to 
agree on the empowerment granted by technology. However, they disagree on what is 
to be done with that empowerment and whether this can lead to liberation. 
Significantly, those who believe it will lead to liberation tend to be strikingly 
respectful of science. There is also a strong current of social inevitability here, in this 
case the notion that technologies drive people without their being able to respond 
politically -- either because politics is degraded and disregarded, or because politics is 
distrusted. The extent to which this is incorporated into cyberpunk writing itself seems 
to have begun well before cyberpunk gained the fashionable status which it won in the 
1980s. 











Gibson's short stories -- especially his early ones -- appear neglected, although the 
film Johnny Mnemonic was based on a Gibson short story. Only two critics in 
Storming the Reality Studio mention Gibson's short stories -- Darko Suvin, who 
criticises the trajectory of Gibson's work over the decade after IIFragments of a 
Hologram Rose", and Veronica Hollinger, who notes how Gibson's "metaphors of the 
new technology . . . express the indeterminate and fragmented nature of the selP' 
(Hollinger, 1994: 215). Of many articles on Gibson appearing in Science-Fiction 
Studies in the 1990s, only Thomas Bredehoft's "The Gibson Continuum" addressed 
his short stories. 
"Fragments of a Hologram Rose" was published in 1977, by UnEarth Publications-
- not an established science fiction publisher, hinting that he might have had trouble 
publishing it. The title suggests the nature-artifice divide, loss and disruption. The 
technological focus of the story is "Apparent Sensory Perception", people's sense-
impressions recorded for playback, what Gibson later called "simstim". The central 
character, Parker, alone in his apartment, plays an ASP recording made by his 
departed lover. Incidental details offer ways to interpret Parker's life in the context of a 
future U.S., justifying the title and the metaphor which it implies (for memory) in 
technical, social and aesthetic terms. 
The story contrasts Parker's experiences ten years before, during the "Coast's 
attempted secession" (Gibson, 1988: 55), with his current job writing scripts for ASP, 
which has not brought happiness (his lover having left him the previous day; he recalls 
the corpse of a woman from which he stole the drugs which enabled him to escape a 
shantytown). The contrast between poor, disrupted past and comfortable (yet 
alienated) present encourages a focus on social divides. Parker recalls an early ASP 
tape of "free-fall gymnastics in a Swiss orbital spa ... with a sixteen-year-old Vogue 
model" (Gibson, 1988: 52). The future in space will evidently benefit the rich in 
faraway countries, while the United States experiences social conflict. The focus here 











Though the United States seems to have emerged from chaos, it remains unstable; 
there is a brownout, and his sleep inducer cuts out. (Sleep inducers are real; a Soviet 
scientist found that low-frequency electric shocks in the forebrain caused sleep, and 
some 1960s science fiction -- notably Larry Niven's -- features "Russian sleep". 
Gibson uses these optimistic technological visions to sustain a pessimistic view of the 
future which Niven might contest.) Parker, who has not slept naturally in two years 
(out of guilt?) must return to his battery-operated ASP machine. This mechanical 
intervention in the psyche as well as in physiology, using machines to defer 
seemingly-insoluble problems, contradicts the hope which Haraway embodied in the 
cyborg. 
Gibson's future U.S. is in obscurely-motivated turmoil (though the U. S. in 1977 
seemed invincible and content), with weak people ruled by the strong. "When Parker 
was fifteen, his parents indentured him to ... a Japanese plastics combine" (Gibson, 
1988: 54), showing the power of corporations and of foreign culture; he sings the 
company hymn and lives in company barracks. (In 1977 most Americans did not 
consider Japan a major threat; the decline of the U.S. electronics and car industries 
was not yet evident.) This sequence, like that of the "Swiss orbital spa", seems meant 
to show the weakness of the United States more than to stress the strength of 
outsiders. (Later in the decade such weakness was given credibility by a major New 
Right campaign in the U.S .. ) 
Parker breaks his indenture and flees the compound; "[h]e arrived in California 
three days before the chaotic New Secessionist regime collapsed" (Gibson, 1988: 54). 
He escapes from starving San Francisco to Texas, which "owed the shantytowns that 
steamed in the warm Gulf rains to the uneasy neutrality she had maintained in the face 
of the Coast's attempted secession" (Gibson, 1988: 55). The idea that the U. S. might 
survive a civil war (though altered) avoids the common apocalyptic vision of 
destruction or total change. This challenges the essentialist, anti-political vision of the 
U.S. as an eternal entity (evident in "Hard SF" tales of spreading U.S. values into 











disruption in the U.S. as caused by foreign invasion (preferably nuclear attack), 
eventually producing a stronger, better nation. Gibson's crises come from within the 
U.S. and contrast with peace elsewhere; they reflect fear of fractures in society (which 
a liberal would recognise) but reluctance to depict these as readily-soluble problems 
(which a liberal would probably seek to do). Hence the text appears politically 
sophisticated. 
While not presented as triumphant, Parker endures -- though his mental health 
suffers. A link is made between his newly-departed lover, Parker's psychic state and 
the state of the U.S. itself, open to interpretation in a way that science fiction seldom 
allowed: 
She had helped him get his papers, found him his first job in 
ASP. Was that their history? No, history was the black face of the 
delta-inducer, the empty closet, and the unmade bed. History was his 
loathing for the perfect body he woke in if the juice dropped. 
(Gibson, 1988: 57-8) 
As Jameson remarks, n[h Jistory is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets ... 
limits to individual as well as collective praxis" (Jameson, 1994: 102). Gibson's 
history appears personal and collective -- represented by machines which cannot solve 
Parker's problems, yet which he cannot do without. Both the human and biological 
environment have been damaged by technology (and greed, presumably), as implied 
by the vignette of Parker's departing lover: 
What you said -- what she said -- watching her pack -- dialing the 
cab. However you shuffle them they form the same printed circuit, 
hieroglyphs converging on a central component: you, standing in the 











The rain was sour and acid, nearly the color of piss. The cabby 
called you an asshole; you still had to pay twice the fare. She had 
three pieces of luggage. In his respirator and goggles, the man 
looked like an ant. He pedaled away in the rain. 
(Gibson, 1988: 52) 
The pedal-cab hints at loss of fossil fuels, while environmental destruction is 
implied by the acid rain, a major U.S. ecological concern in the late 1970s. Ecological 
interests were commonly used in 1970s science fiction to warn people to live better 
lives; Gibson here implies that this change will not happen. Through the image of a 
printed circuit representing connections in human life, Gibson uses information 
technology to symbolise human predicaments. The printed circuit converges upon a 
point instead of spreading out; it is limiting rather than liberating, like Parker's 
experience of technology. A man reduced to an insect by his protection against 
pollution also suggests oppressive technology. 
Parker has done something to make his lover leave, but either does not know what, 
or will not admit it. Perhaps he is obtuse because of past sufferings, as his sleepless 
nights suggest. Perhaps this ignorance or repression may reflect not what Parker has 
failed to do, but what humanity has failed to do by creating a future of pollution and 
conflict. The lover's departure may be an escape, not just from a relationship, but from 
humanity's disconnection from society and environment, a disconnection obvious in 
Parker. Parker fled until he could go no further, and now his lover has fled, too. 
Gibson injects passages of academic language into the text, perhaps to make the 
reader theorize abstractly from the events -- Gibson does not appeal to the power-
fantasy of Parker's success amid civil war, as conventional science fiction might. In a 
text only eight pages long, this substantial passage of academic discourse suggests a 











If the chaos of the nineties reflects a radical shift in the paradigms 
of visual literacy, the final shift away from the LascauxiGutenberg 
tradition of a pre-holographic society, what should we expect from 
this newer technology, with its promise of discrete encoding and 
subsequent reconstruction of the full range of sensory perception? --
Rosebuck and Pierhal, Recent American History: A Systems View. 
(Gibson, 1988: 56-7) 
This links the violence which Parker experienced to a shift in literacy, as if a 
technology-driven change in perception transcends human problems or ideologies. 
This may be intended as authorial narration (showing agreement with the technicists 
mentioned above), or a sign of how ill-informed theorists often are. Gibson certainly 
seems to challenge optimism; the answer to the extract's question seems to be that we 
should expect anomie and loneliness. Parker does not solve his problems through 
ASP, and evidently academics like "Rosebuck and Pierhal" are searching in the wrong 
places. 
The origin of the title appears when Parker discards his lover's presence in his 
home: "a broken leather sandal strap, an ASP cassette, and a postcard" (Gibson, 1988: 
53); the latter, a hologram of a rose. White light holograms were rare in the 1970s, so 
this reference is more futuristic than it seems. Deciding to play the cassette, he feeds 
the rest into the disposal unit: "he lowers the hologram towards the hidden rotating 
jaws. The unit emits a thin scream as steel teeth slash laminated plastic and the rose is 
shredded into a thousand fragments" (Gibson, 1988: 53). This suggests the 
disintegration of Parker, his relationship, and perhaps (given the ambiguous word 
"history"), his time and society. 
A hologram has this quality: Recovered and illuminated, each 











delta, he sees himself the rose, each of his scattered fragments 
revealing a whole he'll never know ... 
Thinking: We're each other's fragments, and was it always this 
way? 
She had helped him get his papers, found him his first job in 
ASP. Was that their history? No, history was the black face of the 
delta-inducer, the empty closet, and the unmade bed. 
But each fragment reveals the rose from a different angle, he 
remembered, but delta swept over him before he could ask himself 
what that might mean. 
(Gibson, 1988: 57-8) 
Parker's fragmentation satisfies Hollinger's postmodem criteria for the decentered 
self. Yet Parker's state hurts him, and surely reflects a damaged world, also 
symbolised by the destroyed hologram. The rose is natural; the hologram an image of 
something which no longer exists -- which only resembles something real. Humanity 
is embedded in technology as the rose is in the hologram, but not securely. ASP is an 
illusion, though reality exists; on Parker's ASP track is "a slight editing slip at the start 
of the elaborate breathing routine" (Gibson, 1988: 51). ASP's limits suggest how 
technology separates one from actual human experience: 
Fast-forward through the humming no-time of wiped tape -- into 
her body. European sunlight. Streets of a strange city. 
Athens. Greek-letter signs and the smell of dust ... 











(Gibson, 1988: 57) 
He cannot get rid of her, any more than he can truly destroy a hologram; perhaps 
she represents the natural context which humanity has lost, and technology cannot 
recover. These images of loss and discontinuity, and the fragmented nature of the 
story, seem to illustrate humanity's failure to adapt to its world. "Fragments of a 
Hologram Rose" evidently uses many of the tropes which cyberpunk later employed. 
The near future appears a dangerous place where technology makes life unpredictable 
-- without improving the human condition. The central character is alone even in his 
dreams, which prefigures Gibson's cyberpunk heroes and relates to punk's images of 
isolated rebellion. Parker has been a rebel (images of social disruption are given 
aesthetic beauty; the explosion of a tank is described as "a white sheet of heat 
lightning" (Gibson, 1988: 55). His current secure life (which may have caused the 
collapse of his relationship) may be a failure compared with his earlier life of struggle, 
a shift which possibly accounts for Parker's apathetic loss of emotional engagement. 
After this impressive start, Gibson wrote little for the next four years. His next 
published story, "The Gernsback Continuum" (1981), was whimsical, with art deco 
fantasies of the 1930s coming true as hallucinations, gently parodying earlier science 
fiction (another cyberpunk concern). However, it appeared that there was some new 
science fiction pattern underlying both texts. Sterling'S introduction to Mirrorshades 
cited Gibson as providing "a clarion call for a new SF esthetic of the Eighties" 
(Sterling, 1988: 1), and included "The Gernsback Continuum" as well as a story by 
Gibson and Sterling in collaboration ("Mozart in Mirrorshades"). 
However, beyond these short stories, Gibson developed the cyberspace trilogy: 
Neuromancer (1984), Count Zero (1986), and Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988) which 
came to define the genre as no other texts did. These texts build on "Fragments of a 
Hologram Rose" in their central signifiers of humanity versus nature and its own 
creations, but the secondary world which they represent is more complexly 










this imaginary technology, Gibson apparently found a symbol of great potential. 
However, since his use of this symbol shifts significantly over time, the cyberspace 











Chapter 1. Neuromancer: The Maturing of Gibson's Cyberpunk. 
Neuromancer's Shape and Form. 
Neuromancer, at 317 pages, is long for a science fiction novel of the early 1980s. 
Before the 1970s, most science fiction novels had been first published in three-part 
magazine serials, kept under 250 pages to suit the space available. Eventually science 
fiction novels grew enormous, forming portions of endless sequences of texts, 
following the pattern established by Frank Herbert's Dune (1964). It seems likely, 
however, that Neuromancer (though it became part of a sequence) was conceived as a 
unit. 
The text is structurally simple; early in the twenty-first century, characters go to a 
strange place to free a strange person from incomprehensible bondage to unknown 
powerful people, because they are forced to do so and expect to be paid. The narrative 
explores several places -- Tokyo, the "Sprawl" (the Boston-Atlanta megalopolis), a 
more vaguely-realised Istanbul, and two space stations, one religious, one commercial. 
This seemingly offers a travelogue and social exploration of the period; and in their 
search for assistance in their quest the central characters often enter social circles 
previously barred to (or ignored by) them. 
The form of the narrative, like most science fiction stories, is that of a puzzle. The 
mysteries must be unravelled, and the meaning of liberating the mysterious prisoner 
(which proves to be an artificial intelligence) must be understood, perhaps justifying 
the violent and bizarre acts which fill the text. However, the meaning of the narrative 
surely lies in Gibson's image of the future world, necessarily reflecting the present 
world. 
The puzzle offers a link with detective fiction -- appropriately, since one feature of 
the book is conflict between law and justice. Detective fiction is thus not simply a 
trope borrowed for effect, but provides a version of morality, much as in Asimov's 











significance in Gibson's imagined future (and hence his real present). Gibson clearly 
knows this, for his central characters highlight the evils of the social system; their life-
style reflects resistance to unreasoning authority -- again, like that of the American 
detective fiction of Hammett and Chandler. 
In much science fiction, political good and bad are crudely symbolised; 
questionable social power is displaced by the central character's personal power which 
is depicted as good, as opposed to the bad forces seeking to control that central 
character (usually male). The liberation of the central character parallels the liberation 
of the forces or values which the author promotes. Such a pursuit of personal power 
may actually refer to the power of a class or national entity (usually the upper classes 
and/or the United States). In Neuromancer, this does not seem the case. Society is 
imperfect -- the central characters revolt against it -- yet Neuromancer does not seem 
to offer a conventional political or ideological solution to social problems (such as 
representative democracy or the free market). On the surface at least, class and 
national elements are largely ignored, while the central characters are not so 
successful as to make the text a simple power-fantasy. 
Conceivably Gibson assumes that his audience already accepts a conventional 
ideology, so that its depiction is unnecessary. The most likely candidate, given 
Gibson's personal circumstances, would be some form of liberalism -- especially since 
the core of the text seems to concern liberation, which US liberals usually espouse. 
US liberalism is an extremely broad concept, and the vague but grandiose liberation of 
Neuromancer might also be read as a confusedly left-wing response to a reactionary, 
anti-labour epoch. 
The central characters suffer, face danger, and travel huge distances in order to 
achieve their goal. Gibson seems to use this to make the work seem more significant 
than it would otherwise appear. Gibson does not otherwise structure his text around a 
coherent problem, the solution of which would have obvious resonances in the 
contemporary world. The "happy ending" of Frank Herbert's Dune (1965), for 











It also responds to colonial struggles occurring at Herbert's time, arguably resolving 
the Middle East crisis (Herbert'S "spice" representing oil). Gibson chooses not to do 
this; perhaps he is not sure of his conclusions, perhaps his audience might not endorse 
his conclusions if they were explicit. 
Gibson's future is an approximate extrapolation from Gibson's contemporary world 
-- really profound change, if it is to come, lies in the presumed future of Gibson's 
novel. Evidently the work is meant to be compared with the present, although it is not 
a utopia in the sense of something to be worked towards (like Bellamy's Looking 
Backward [1888]) or a dystopia to be fled from (like Nineteen Eighty-Four [1948]). It 
is, however, politically speculative; much of the detail offers the reader information 
about wider society, through which the forces which generate that society may be 
imagined -- from the terrifying "Turing Police" to the pervasive pollution. Little 
explicit authorial comment offers guidance. Perhaps such interpretative modes are 
assumed to be already known to the reader -- suggesting an implied reader following a 
set of beliefs known to Gibson. 
The social world in which the central characters operate is lawless. Police forces 
exist, along with the concept of criminality, but the characters are concerned largely 
with power and money. Under these conditions, whether they are powerful or weak 
(most central characters have experienced both conditions) they appear deeply 
unhappy. Evidently part of the text is concerned to critique such a lawless world -- but 
not from the assumption that laws are automatically good. 
In the early 1980s the idea of a world without rules might have seemed tempting. 
The Cold War had appeared to freeze the world into an unstable and dangerous 
equilibrium -- Neuromancer features a Soviet Union which survives World War III. 
Meanwhile the social-democratic contract which had endured since the 1940s was 
unravelling under conservative and plutocratic attack. American society seemed to be 
changing in a direction unappealing to liberal intellectuals (some of the presumed 











stability which they enjoyed might be worse than a radical-conservative instability --
the destruction of liberal rules -- which seemed impending. 
Given this context, it seems plausible that one purpose of this text is to present a 
political argument. It is true that much of the text embodies elements, like Molly's 
violence and Case's ignorance, which do not directly further any liberal message, yet 
these may be meant to correlate with the conventional elements and values of popular 
fiction. These elements may even be subtle indicators of the text's value-system -- in 
Jameson's terms, a "political unconscious" needing investigation. Gibson's political-
philosophical viewpoint is not necessarily overshadowed by the presence of other 
elements of thriller, detection and fantasy combined in one text. 
Neuromancer begins when Case, the "cyberspace cowboy" or super-hacker, is 
stripped of access to cyberspace when he steals from his criminal employers, who 
poison his nervous system so that he cannot use a "cyberspace deck". Trapped in 
"meat .... the prison of his own flesh" (Gibson, 1990: 12) he expends the money he 
stole trying to have himself repaired. To emphasise Case's sense of deprivation, 
Gibson depicts him committing slow suicide by proxy, knowingly running absurd 
risks for crimes which earn him little. (Arguably Case's loss represents losing his 
fragile bourgeois status and falling into the proletariat -- a frequent fear of middle-
class figures.) 
A mysterious tempter named Armitage offers Case a nerve operation to restore his 
access to cyberspace, in exchange for his services. After the operation he learns, as so 
often when one is tempted, that there is a price; dissolving sacs of the poison which 
damaged his nerves are fixed to his veins to ensure his compliance. Armitage, rightly, 
does not trust Case. 
Cyberspace gives power; granted access to it, Case could flee if Armitage did not 
bind him. It also offers opposition to central power -- that of the criminals whom Case 
antagonised, and of the companies which he helped to rob. Gibson appears to be 
exploiting conventions about "hackers" who arouse fear in the computer establishment 











Cuckoo's Egg [1990], however, notes that hackers like the one who attacked Stoll's 
computer lab often attack the weak and helpless: "this wasn't just a computer being 
penetrated, but a community being attacked .... I felt genuine outrage" [Stoll, 1991: 
308-9].) While this may be true (the victims of computer viruses are often those who 
lack appropriate anti-virus programmes), to confront hackers one needs power. 
Although Stoll considered himself an anti-establishment figure, he ended up working 
with the CIA; powerful computers are usually tools of powerful people. 
Cyberspace, however, might also be considered an escape from concrete problems. 
Stoll suggests in Silicon Snake Oil (1995) that many computer enthusiasts become 
obsessed with computer activities; arguably, fleeing from the complexities of reality: 
"[o]n my screen, I see several icons .... [b]ut they're not the real thing .... [h]ow sad 
-- to dwell in a metaphor without living the experience" (Stoll, 1996: 43). When Case 
is deprived of cyberspace he loses all will to live; the prospect of regaining access 
appears orgasmic. Stoll suggests that, "[c]omputer networks isolate us from one 
another .... if we don't like what we see, we just pull the plug .... [t]here's no need 
to tolerate the imperfections of real people . . . . we lose the ability to enter into 
spontaneous interactions with real people" (Stoll, 1996: 58); perhaps cyberspace 
promises Case something more than reality, but it may make him emotionally cold. 
Probably Gibson does not intend cyberspace to be seen as automatically liberatory. 
It is, after all, a technology created by powerful people; as Csicsery-Ronay observes, 
"[c]ybemetics is ... simultaneously a sublime vision of human power ... and a dreary 
augmentation of multinational capitalism's ... expansion" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1994: 
186), so that while "out of the antihuman evil ... comes some new situation .... 
Neuromancer's myth of the evolution of a new cosmic entity out of human technology 
is perhaps the only seriously positive version of the new situation -- but even it offers 
only limited transcendence" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1994: 191). This is unusual in science 
fiction, where technology often provides not merely the means, but even the goal of 
political change -- as in the spaceship or atomic power (more recently, 











Case's general rebellion against (and contempt for) police, gangsters, corporations 
and governments suggests a universal distrust of power-structures which may relate to 
U. S. populism, dating back to Andrew Jackson's or William Jennings Bryan's distrust 
for finance capitalism (continued into the 1990s through anti-elitist conspiracy 
theories). Populism was often affirmed by a faith that traditional forces, such as 
individualism and worker solidarity (not always cast in such terms) could liberate 
humanity and society. Populism was thus both traditionalist and radical, which surely 
relates to Case's application of establishment-oriented technology to undermine that 
establishment. This dramatises the problem of how to obtain enough power to defeat 
powerful enemies, without abusing that power (a problem viewed pessimistically by 
postmodern social theorists). 
The most organised anti-establishment force in Neuromancer is, ironically, the 
Panther Moderns street gang, dedicated to chaos, Hour mode and modus ... our 
central kick" (Gibson, 1990: 87). This superficially resembles the punk code, but punk 
rebelled against an oppressive social system; the Panther Moderns lack any political 
stance. Gibson uses academic jargon to provide political context, much as In 
"Fragments of a Hologram Rose" -- via HDr. Rambali of New York University": 
'There is always a point .... at which the violence may well 
escalate, but beyond which the terrorist has become symptomatic of 
the media gestalt itself. Terrorism as we ordinarily understand it is 
inately [sic] media-related. The Panther Moderns differ from other 
terrorists precisely in their degree of self-consciousness, in their 
awareness of the extent to which media divorce the act of terrorism 
from the original sociopolitical intent .. .' 
(Gibson, 1990: 75) 
While "terrorists" have a "sociopolitical intent", they work through the media, 











political goals. "Terrorism" was politically significant in the 1980s, as Herman and 
Chomsky note in Manufacturing Consent (1988); II [a]t the first meeting of the 
Jonathan Institute, in Jerusalem, in July 1979, at which ... the main theme pressed by 
Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin ... and by many others at the conference, was 
the importance . . . of pressing the terrorism issue and of tying terrorism to the Soviet 
Union. Claire Sterling did this in her 1981 volume The Terror Network" (Herman, 
1988: 144-5). This vision represented terrorism as a media event; arguably the Panther 
Modems resist this representation by repudiating any coherent agenda. 
Rambali's argument (and that of the Panther Modems) is questionable; 
furthermore, Case and Molly behave like "terrorists" when they attack SenselNet, the 
"simstim" producers. Through this they manipulate information distribution, which 
Rambali deems impossible; to Rambali, the media is a monolith. Defining "terrorism" 
through its affects on a media controlled by the establishment effectively makes 
criticism of the establishment impossible without that establishment's permission. If 
control is imperfect, however, this impossibility vanishes and "terrorism" could 
succeed. 
Another sign of dubious power-structures is suggested by Night City, "a deranged 
experiment in social Darwinism .... [b ]iz here was a constant subliminal hum, and 
death the accepted punishment for laziness, carelessness, lack of grace" (Gibson, 
1990: 14). Social Darwinist theory applies Darwinism to society. It is tempting to 
consider it scientific, efficient -- empowering concepts in science fiction -- and 
morally neutral, yet its definitions of science, efficiency and racial/social superiority 
(generally applied to groups disliked by the powerful) are politically and morally 
reactionary. Despite his apparent liberalism, Gibson appears to relish Social attractive 
-- perhaps because of its positive scientistic connotations, but arguably Gibson, as a 
middle-class person, might see advantages to a value-system legitimating established 
authority. 
Gibson's social Darwinism does not automatically protect the powerfuL Case, 











implanted with advanced microprocessors .... that would get you rolled ... straight 
into a black clinic" (Gibson, 1990: 18). The natural instability of Gibson's world 
overcomes the stability imposed by the power. Night City may be protected by the 
powerful; perhaps "the Yakuza [the Japanese Mafia] might be preserving the place as 
a kind of historical park .... [b Jut ... burgeoning technologies require outlaw zones . 
. . a deliberately unsupervised playground for technology itself' (Gibson, 1990: 19). 
Even apparently unconventional conduct serves conservative power, implying, as with 
terrorism, that there is no way of subverting it. 
To avoid this dead-end, Gibson suggests that change may come from chaos. (This 
idea may draw on populist distrust of large, stable institutions like governments and 
corporations; as early as the 1950s, libertarian conservatives argued that "expanding 
government posed a grave threat to individual liberties" [Galbraith, 1970: 220]. Such 
libertarianism appears to endorse extreme individualism.) The Yakuza presumably 
have their own agenda for Night City -- yet arguably an association with the criminal 
Yakuza, or the rebellious cowboys, gives technology and "Darwinism" an anti-
establishment gloss. This technique was also used by Robert A Heinlein (mentor to 
much of US science fiction) who associated technology (and commerce) with 
romanticised individualists like Lazarus Long in Methuselah's Children. When 
Gibson depicts Night City as "designed by a bored researcher who kept one thumb 
permanently on the fast-forward button" (Gibson, 1990: 14) he decides not to ask 
which researcher, and who pays for the research? 
Gibson's powerful central and corporate forces are lawless and amoral. The police 
do as they please, and the media cannot be trusted. The world seems constructed to 
serve the technical elite and the bureaucracies. The atrocities inherent in the system 
are suggested through the propaganda which the Panther Moderns use to destabilise 
the SenselNet Corporation: 
... something only vaguely like a human face filled the screens, 











some obscene Mercator projection ... Subliminally rapid images of 
contamination: graphics of the building's water supply system, 
gloved hands manipulating laboratory glassware, something 
tumbling down into darkness ... The audio track ... was part of a 
month-old newscast detailing potential military uses of a substance 
known as HsG, a biochemical governing the human skeletal growth 
factor. 
(Gibson, 1990: 80) 
A system which develops such weapons is so despicable as to justifY any violence 
used against it. Molly's violence against SenselNet employees is represented casually 
(although this adds to its horror): "Case saw the crumpled bodies of three SenselNet 
security guards. One of them seemed to have no eyesft (Gibson, 1990: 83). To 
facilitate a robbery, SenselNet workers are incited to riot, leading to massive police 
reaction: "bodies were piled three deep on the barricades. The hollow thumping of the 
riot guns provided a constant background for the sound the crowd made as it surged 
back and forth .... a bubbling wail of raw and total fear" (Gibson, 1990: 86). If 
Gibson does not want the reader to be nauseated, he presumably considers Molly's 
behaviour justified. Yet this is only possible if her actions are performed in the name 
of some superior purpose. 
Freedom appears part of this. Gibson's society has social mobility; a reference to 
Case ftfighting on a rooftop at seventeen" (Gibson, 1990: 61) suggests a mysterious, 
romanticised criminal past, from which he somehow became a computer expert. 
Likewise, Gibson collapses all criminal activity into one -- as if there is no difference 
between white-collar criminal and gangster. Even Molly proves to have known a great 
console jockeys -- Quine, narrator of Gibson's short story "Burning Chrome" (1985). 
A hired killer or bodyguard would hardly know a top computer programmer in a 
world, like Gibson's, controlled by the powerful; such perfect social mobility is a 











demand this fantasy, since without such social mobility the merely competent could 
not succeed. Apparently, violence and lawlessness aside, the true crime of this society 
is that it denies opportunity to those with talent, like Case and Molly. Jameson's 
analysis seems relevant: 
The deeper class impulse in naturalism . . . was the fundamental 
petty-bourgeois terror of proletarianisation . . . . Cyberpunk 
entertains . . . the evaporation of a certain Otherness from this 
picture .... The proletarian, the lumpen, and their cousins the urban 
criminal (male) and prostitute (female) -- these secure characters of 
the older bourgeois and naturalist imaginary representation of 
society -- have today, in postmodernity and cyberpunk, given way to 
a youth culture in which the urban punks are merely the opposite 
numbers to the business yuppies .... in the postmodern view, you 
can return from the lower depths .. . 
(Jameson, 1994a: 151-2) 
Case and Molly flaunt their lack of class identity, as if Gibson uncritically accepts 
the fantasy which Jameson identifies. Yet class exists in Gibson's texts. Hence 
Gibson's ideal of total class mobility is arguably only attainable if revolutionary social 
change opens it up. 
Dystopia and Utopia. 
Gibson's personal politics (which presumably influence Neuromancer) seem 
straightforwardly "liberal" in the U.S. sense; he lives in Canada, having fled the U.S. 
during the Vietnam War; "I more or less convinced my draft board that they didn't 
want me; in any case, they didn't hassle me, and in 1968 I left for Toronto .... I 











the draft" (McCaffery, 1994: 282-3). He grew disillusioned, however; "I felt I was 
living in an age in which everything was going to change very radically .... things 
didn't get different, except maybe worse" (McCaffery, 1994: 283). Yet he clearly 
enjoys U.S. science fiction and popular culture, so his disillusioned liberalism does 
not wholly divide him from the United States. 
Similar ambiguities pervade his feelings for technology: "[m]y feelings about 
technology are totally ambivalent .... [m]y aim isn't to provide specific predictions .. 
. so much as to ... examine the very mixed blessings of technology." (McCaffery, 
1994: 214). Evidently, unlike many science fiction writers, he does not expect 
technology to easily solve all problems. However, he seems to profoundly enjoy 
technology -- which is likely to affect his judgement. 
In Neuromancer Gibson's mid-twenty-first century U.S. society seems cynically 
apolitical. Establishment politics appears a facade, maintaining continuity despite 
cosmetic change, as when "[t]he Pentagon and CIA were being Balkanized" (Gibson, 
1990: 102) after World War III. (American radical liberals often condemn the 
"Pentagon" and "CIA" for the misdeeds of the US government; a similar viewpoint 
appeared in John Haldeman's anti-establishment Vietnam allegory, The Forever War 
(1915). As Chomsky remarks, "the CIA does what it's told .... its role is to provide 
plausible denial for the White House" (Chomsky, 1996: 92).) Gibson never says why 
the war happened; evidently this is unimportant. 
The politics of the text is unstructured. There is resentment of corporate and 
political power, where survival depends on access to power or money, but no enemy 
or belief-system to focus this resentment on. Gibson's text moves from rich Japan and 
"the Sprawl" (the eastern U.S.) to Istanbul, representing the Third World, with its 
suffering, primitive underclasses: "[a] few letter-writers had taken refuge in doorways, 
their old voiceprinters wrapped in sheets of clear plastic, evidence that the written 
word still enjoyed a certain prestige here" (Gibson, 1990: 108). (Presumably in richer 











In this future, even pleasure is unsatisfying: "the mall crowds ... a field of flesh 
shot through with sudden eddies of need and gratification" (Gibson, 1990: 60), 
dehumanized, seen from a (significantly) dry fountain. Much of the social disruption 
in the text may reflect perceived growing social inequality in early-1980s America. 
Gibson's Sprawl appears atomised and dehumanising, ruled by battling corporations, 
with no hope of improvement. 
Capitalism is triumphant everywhere, even over the icons of science fiction. No 
longer a frontier or a challenge, space is part of the capitalist network; the slogan 
"FREESIDE ... WHY WAIT?" (Gibson, 1990: 97) advertises an orbital spa offering 
instant gratification through casinos and brothels. This ironically reverses science 
fiction's expectations, but also relates to Jameson's observation, concerning the late 
twentieth century, of a conflict between "an unparalleled rate of change ... and an 
unparalleled standardization of everything" (Jameson, 1994a: 15) while "[t]he 
development of capitalism ... in its postmodern moment ... devastates the very cities 
and countrysides it created" (Jameson, 1994a: 25). These, he argues, are no longer 
profitable, and old modes of production must be replaced by more controllable 
structures, making everything homogeneous. Jameson's vision resembles Gibson's 
(incorporating Gibson's vision of rapid, unstoppable change). 
The most controllable things are illusions; Gibson makes much of the breakdown 
between illusion and reality, recalling the nightmares of Philip K Dick. An obvious 
example is a spacecraft where the "midbay was walled in imitation ebony veneer and 
floored with gray Italian tiles" (Gibson, 1990: 234). All is imitation; the spacecraft's 
"smooth, wasplike line was simply styling" (Gibson, 1990: 234). Nevertheless 
physical reality cannot always be disregarded -- Armitage's destroying a computer 
with a laser may be physical reality's revenge on the falsehoods of simstim and 
cyberspace. 
Csicsery-Ronay suggests that Gibson endorses the artificial, promoting "a machine 
philosophy that can create the world in its own image" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1994: 186). 











Utopian tradition in "the antithesis between a pastoral Utopia and an urban one ... [of 
which the former is J either explicitly placed on the Utopian agenda, as in Samuel 
Delany's Triton (1976) ... or by masquerades under a dystopian appearance whose 
deeper libidinal excitement, however, is surely profoundly Utopian in spirit (as in 
most current cyberpunk) (Jameson, 1994a: 28). Jameson's latter point hints that the 
dystopian urban world of Gibson's cyberpunk may offer a positive sign for the non-
technological, anti-urban Utopian -- reversing Csicsery-Ronay's reading. 
Indeed, Gibson appears to prefer the material and natural to the unreal and 
artificial; "what I'm talking about is what being hard and glossy does to you" 
(McCaffery, 1994: 280), terms which do not seem to denote style or fashion but actual 
nature. The cybernetic illusions in Neuromancer are not superior to reality. In the 
simstim construct through which the artificial intelligence Wintermute communicates, 
Case learns that "[t]his is memory, right? I tap you, sort it out, and feed it back in" 
(Gibson, 1990: 203). Wintermute cannot create anything, only transmute what Case 
knows. When Case talks to McCoy Pauley (itself a simstim construct), the latter 
repeats a line about having a morbid fear of dying. '''Sometimes you repeat yourself, 
man.' 'It's my nature.'" (Gibson, 1990: 160) The construct is a copy, repeating itself, in 
an environment (Frees ide) full of replicas of things which may no longer exist. It is 
tempting to see reality as breaking down -- but Gibson often deems the artificial 
inferior to the real -- as with the vanished horses of Istanbul. 
This has political significance; to Jameson "late capitalism" and "postmodernism" 
sought "[t]o do away with the last remnants of nature and with the natural as such" 
(Jameson, 1994a: 46). Evidently Jameson fears that this worship of the artificial meant 
a denial of the real needs of the oppressed classes; in his reading of Cold War 
ideology, the dystopian is conveyed by "the Second World [Le. Soviet-bloc] city and 
the social realities of a nonmarket or planned economy" (Jameson, 1994a: 29-30). 
This suggests that Gibson's images of the end of nature (which he cautiously 
condemns) contradict his distrust of the collective. He dislikes planning, including the 











capitalist-urban. Evidently, he is not directly promoting Cold War ideology. Arguably, 
Case's repudiation of human experience is anti-Utopian because it implies that 
anything is possible and legitimate -- where Utopianism implies some choices, and 
acknowledgement of difficulties, ideas which Gibson appears to promote later in the 
text. 
The end of nature raises problems with reality: "[w]hat if Deane, the real Deane, 
had ordered Linda killed on Wintermute's orders? . . . How subtle a form could 
manipulation take?" (Gibson, 1990: 150-1); ultimately Case discovers that even his 
brain can be manipulated by Wintermute via simstim. His initial position, writing off 
humanity as "meat" and preferring cyberspace, potentially dismisses all human 
experience as trivial -- a position noted by Kroker and Cook, Gibson's admirers, who 
disparage "the '80s self as a blip with a life-style" (Kroker and Cook, 1994: 238). 
Evidently Gibson views a Utopian vision as more than simply a "life-style". 
Indeed, some postmodemists like Porush oppose even the discussion of nature 
versus artifice: "[n]atural and? Obsolete distinctions" (Porush, 1994: 333). Yet 
Gibson disagrees; in Freeside, the upper part of the station's curve is hidden by false 
sky, "a Lado-Acheson system ... they generated a rotating library of sky effects 
around" (Gibson, 1990: 148) which disturbs Case: 
"Unreal," he said. 
"Nah," she responded, assuming he meant the furs, "grow it on a 
collagen base, but it's mink DNA What's it matter?" 
(Gibson, 1990: 149) 
It matters if the pursuit of control of nature interferes with freedom to know and 
appreciate the world. Perhaps nature is doomed; technically enhanced sunlight and 
extracted DNA are only a residue of it. (Suvin detects this from the start of the book: 
"[t]o say ... The sky above the port was the color of television, tuned to a dead 











grown to be a first nature" [Suvin, 1994: 359], though Gibson may also be citing 
Thomas Pynchon's "the greenish dead eye of the TV tube" [Pynchon, 1974: 5] --
Pynchon's work being also concerned with artificiality and uncertainty.) However, 
phrases like "[n]othing in the room looked as though it had been machine-made or 
produced from synthetics" (Gibson, 1990: 153), suggest that the natural has more 
exchange-value than the artificial, and is profitably simulated. Outside, "[t]he trees ... 
. were too cute, too entirely and definitively treelike" (Gibson, 1990: 154) --
unattractively artificial because too knowable. 
Gibson also makes ironic use of this issue -- as when Wintennute kills the Turing 
Police with a robot disguised as a microlight (which resembles a dragonfly) and a 
gardening robot looking like an insect -- artificial things appearing natural. Machines 
often resemble animals, as with a large "sleek, insectile ship" (Gibson, 1990: 197), the 
spacecraft of Armitage, the man with the artificial personality. When a young fan of 
Tally Isham, the SenselNet star, declares "[s]he was that close, and she just smiled, so 
natural" (Gibson, 1990: 162), she wants to see Isham as natural (nature has value), yet 
nature includes harshness which "simstim" entertainment edits out. 
Wintennute observes that humankind cannot bear reality; "[y]ou're always building 
models" (Gibson, 1990: 204), reducing experience to the tolerable and 
comprehensible. "But if the run goes off tonight, you'll have finally managed the real 
thing" (Gibson, 1990: 204). This presumably implies direct access to the universe, 
offering certainty. Exposing the real, however, has its own problems; Jameson 
suggests that" [d]emystification in the contemporary period has its own secret 'ruse of 
history,' ... to sweep the globe clean for the manipulations of the great corporations" 
(Jameson, 1994a: 14). Exposing falsity becomes a justification for capitalism --
which, again, may underpin Gibson's acceptance of the system. 
Arguably, the process of change for its own sake promotes paradoxical stasis: 
"where everything now submits to the perpetual change of fashion and media image, 
nothing can change any longer" (Jameson, 1994a: 17-18). (This suggests that science 











agenda.) In Gibson's future traditional elements survive and even prosper, despite 
processes of urbanisation and homogenisation, depicting them neither as wholly 
dominant nor wholly destructive. 
Indeed, Gibson is reluctant to endorse simple resolutions: "I don't extrapolate in the 
way I was taught an SF writer should. You'll notice in Neuromancer that there's 
obviously been a war, but I don't explain what caused it or even who was fighting it. 
I've never had the patience or the desire to work out the details of who's doing what to 
whom" (McCaffery, 1994: 274). (This is not quite true; the war is the fantasised 
World War III of the early 1980s, often anticipated without meaningful context, as in 
General Sir John Hackett's The Third World War [1978].) Nevertheless Sterling'S 
praise of cyberpunk for "its boredom with the Apocalypse" (Sterling, 1988a: 12) has 
merit. Veronica Hollinger attributes this to the fact that "a kind of philosophical 
apocalypse has already occurred, precipitating us into ... postmodernism" (Hollinger, 
1994: 213) -- suggesting how many postmodernists fantasised themselves into 
centrality. Apocalypse is implicit in Gibson's text -- a desire for radical change, though 
not an apocalypse naIvely drawn from popular or consumer culture. 
One alternative to the dystopian world-system is presented by the Rastas of the 
Zion Cluster space station, who believe that the "Babylon" system must inevitably fall. 
Zion Cluster also mocks science-fiction's predictions of space stations: "Zion smelled 
of cooked vegetables, humanity, and ganja" (Gibson, 1990: 128). Here rationality is 
empty: "[t]hey don't make much of a difference between states, you know?" (Gibson, 
1990: 131), although this breakdown of differences is not imposed on anyone. The 
Rastafarians are rational on their own terms: concerning Wintermute, they remark that 
n[i]f these are Final Days, we must expect false prophets ... It (Gibson, 1990: 136). 
Nevertheless the Rastas are not central to the text; Gibson is simply showing that the 
system is not hegemonic. 
In Gibson's world conventional politics have been replaced by loyalty to zaibatsus, 
great corporations running the world. (Zaibatsu were big Japanese corporations during 











influenced Gibson, argued in 1980 that lithe rise of the great transnationals has 
reduced ... the role of the nation-state" (Toffler, 1981: 332), and that "the myth .. . 
that the world ... will be ... divided up and run by ... transnational corporations .. . 
. fail[s] to take into account the fantastic diversity of real life conditions" (Toffler, 
1981: 337). This is plausible, mainly since (as Mandel notes) corporations prefer to 
work under governments. Gibson's approach toward large corporations suggests his 
liberal vision rather than a prophetic prediction. 
Nationalism exists in the form of patriotic U.S. anxiety that the future belongs to 
Japan. Gibson admits that "I've never been to Japan, but my wife has been an ESL 
teacher for a long time ... there was an extended period when this stream of Japanese 
students turned up in Vancouver . . . . I'm sure I got a lot of this in when I wrote 
Neuromancer (McCaffery, 1994: 284). The U.S. feared Japanese economic power in 
the 1980s. The best-seller, The Fifth Generation (1983), made exaggerated claims for 
Japanese computers; as Japan penetrated U.S. electronics and car industries, the 
Japanese appeared at once a danger and a dream. (Steven Schlossstein's Kensei [1983] 
extrapolates this, in racist terms, into a Japanese scheme for world domination.) One 
version of this represents, as Jameson ironically says of texts like Blade Runner, "the 
obsession with the great Other, who is perhaps our own future rather than our past, the 
putative winner in the coming struggle .... Japan ... is somehow the 'end of history' 
in store for us" (Jameson, 1994a: 155-6) -- an apocalypse which never came. 
Brand names subtly reinforce this Japanese power; Case owns a Hosaka computer 
and an Ono-Sendai cyberspace deck, and smokes Yeheyuan cigarettes. Molly wears 
"loose white pants cut in a style that had been fashionable in Tokyo the previous yearH 
(Gibson, 1990: 78). An advertisement for Freeside is printed in mock-Japanese; a 
Turkish policeman has a Sanyo radio, and they fly on a JAL (Japan Airlines) space 
shuttle, while Armitage's "Domier-Fujitsu" spacecraft, Haniwa (not only U.S. industry 
has been absorbed by Japan) has a Japanese pilot. Most of this seems meant to mock 
American paranoia; U.S. economic patriotism is not central to the text. 











He saw the thing the shell of gray paper had concealed. 
Horror. The spiral birth factory, stepped terraces of the hatching 
cells, blind jaws of the unborn moving ceaselessly, the staged 
progress from egg to larva, near-wasp, wasp. In his mind's eye, a 
kind of time-lapse photography took place, revealing the thing as the 
biological equivalent of a machine gun, hideous in its perfection. 
Alien .... 
In the dream, just before he'd drenched the nest with fuel, he'd 
seen the T-A logo of Tessier-Ashpool neatly embossed into its side, 
as though the wasps themselves had worked it there. 
(Gibson, 1990: 152-3) 
Gibson says that "[t]hat scene evolved out of an experience I had destroying a very 
large wasps' nest .... I was astounded and scared" (McCaffery, 1994: 281). The 
symbolism, however, seems to suggest corporate capitalism (to judge by the logo). 
Evidently the reader is meant to see this mindless, vulnerable unproductivity as 
attached to the zaibatsus which Gibson distrusts, exaggerations of the capitalist 
present. The zaibatsus rule, but undeservedly -- irrelevant and undesirable, to the 
Utopian world, as the Tessier-Ashpools themselves. 
Evil seems dominant in this society, but Jameson rightly warns against assuming 
that no political alternative exists in a dystopia even if none appears to be proffered; 
t! [ dystopia] may well ... include the contradiction between its own logic and that of 
inverted Utopias (Jameson, 1994a: 58); a dystopia may provide positive imagery 
through the force of its ugliness. Also, tithe Utopian text really does hold out for us the 
vivid lesson of what we cannot imagine . . . the holes in the text . . . are our own 
incapacity to see beyond the epoch and its ideological closures" (Jameson, 1994a: 75-
6). Contradictions in Gibson's work may also hint at Utopian alternatives, since tithe 











excluding its ... ideological content and function in that same present" (Jameson, 
1994a: 77). 
In the 1980s, many U.S. conservatives distrusted Utopianism, depicting the New 
Deal era and the 1960s as times of Utopian error and virtual chaos. In contrast, 
Gibson's "The Gernsback Continuum" reminds the reader that science fiction's 
Utopian dreams arose in the New Deal era -- and the central character there is a 1960s 
figure who has "taken [his] share of drugs" (Gibson, 1988: 43). Modernist visual art 
and architecture implied a Utopian futurism; in contrast much 1980s postmodern 
culture recalled the past without such connotations. (Jameson regards this 
postmodernism as nostalgia for something lost; "[t]he disappearance of the individual 
subject, along with its formal consequence, the increasing unavailability of the 
personal style, engenders the well-nigh universal practice today of what may be called 
pastiche" (Jameson, 1996: 16), a parody without irony or ideology, because "with the 
collapse of the high-modernist ideology of style . . . the producers of culture have 
nowhere to turn but to the past: the imitation of dead styles" (Jameson, 1996: 17-18).) 
Evidently Gibson has not abandoned that "ideology of style". 
Jameson suggests that "the terror of ... near futures ... was ... deeply rooted in 
class comfort and privilege" (Jameson, 1996: 286); hence much dystopianism 
symbolised a fear of historical change, "irredeemably historicist, in the bad sense of an 
omnipresent and indiscriminate appetite for ... all the styles and fashions of a dead 
past" (Jameson, 1996: 286) displacing change by simulating it -- as with the false 
choices offered by Jameson's vision of the consumerist city. In contrast, Gibson's 
change is real, represented through high technology and brought through violence. 
However. using high technology and violence to challenge violent technological 
oppression appears contradictory. Moreover Gibson seems unconcerned with this high 
technology for its own sake (as with many late-1980s and early 1990s technophiles 
like Kevin Kelly and N egroponte); it represents something else. Symbolic 
representations of political problems are not unusual in literature; Jameson said of 











'objective treason' of intellectuals perpetually suspended between ... two sets of class 
values" (Jameson, 1994: 200). 
Such a clash between middle-class and working class values may explain Gibson's 
images of alienated middle-class people somehow engaged in worker-free production 
(wishing to endorse the middle class without suffering the guilt of exploiting 
workers). Arguably many middle-class persons will morally oppose such exploitation 
so long as this does not weaken their social position. Thus the Tessier-Ashpools, a 
non-slave-minded, non-bourgeois aristocracy, create the AI Wintermute, which could 
overthrow them if liberated. Case, an alienated intellectual who has sunk into the 
working class, wants to regain the freedom of cyberspace, appearing uninterested in 
radical change. 
Gibson seems to sympathise with aristocrats like 3Jane; this raises the possibility 
that the alienated and the aristocrats might unite to free the oppressed -- in this case, 
the AI Wintermute. If "ideological commitment is ... the taking of sides in a struggle 
between embattled groupsfl (Jameson, 1994: 290) then since Molly and Case 
eventually take sides due to a sense of political conviction, however inchoate, and 
since Wintermute may represent an oppressed group (of Als), one may see this as such 
a struggle. While Wintermute can be freed without radical change (like a freed slave 
being sent to Liberia), somehow through this liberation the dystopian world seems to 
be symbolically liberated, as if by an Emancipation Proclamation which nevertheless 
changes nothing concrete. 
US populist traditions also endorse resistance to a strong establishment --
suggesting that Gibson is following earlier science fiction in endorsing populism. 
(Such populist traditions run deep, yet had little political impact in the U.S. after the 
nineteenth century.) The extent to which cyberpunk was compared with the New 
Wave, and denounced by conservatives like Orson Scott Card, suggests the sensitivity 
of U.S. conservatism to faintly anti-establishment criticism, rather than the power of 
conservatism's enemies. Gibson's ideas do not seem to pose a threat to the power elite. 











If Straylight was an expreSSIOn of the corporate identity of 
Tessier-Ashpool, then T-A was crazy as the old man had been. The 
same ragged tangle of fears, the same strange sense of aimlessness .. 
Case had always taken it for granted that the real bosses, the 
kingpins in a given industry, would be both more and less than 
people. He'd seen it in the men who'd crippled him in Memphis, he'd 
seen Wage affect the semblance of it in Night City, and it had 
allowed him to accept Armitage's flatness and lack of feeling. He'd 
always imagined it as a gradual and willing accommodation of the 
machine, the system, the parent organism. 
(Gibson, 1990: 242-3) 
Tessier-Ashpool is a case in point; he is morally corrupt, sleeping with and 
murdering his daughter. He explains this; "[w]e cause the brain to become allergic to 
certain of its own neurotransmitters, resulting in a peculiarly pliable imitation of 
autism .... the effect is now more easily obtained with an embedded microchip" 
(Gibson, 1990: 221) offering the reader appropriate horror for a US populist image of 
the decadent rich. Ashpool also reveals that "[t]he cores told me our intelligences are 
mad. And all the billions we paid, so long ago. When artificial intelligences were 
rather a racy concept. I told the cores I'd deal with it . . . . A lord of hell, surely" 
(Gibson, 1990: 221). Accepting this evil image of the Als which he helped to create, 
he seems cast in a Gothic mould; the demonic, mad father/ruler -- very unlike an 
oppressive factory boss. 
As if emphasising this, 3Jane's childhood semiotics essay compares the Villa 
Straylight with a Gothic folly, where her family "have sealed ourselves away behind 
our money, growing inward, generating a seamless universe of self' (Gibson, 1990: 











well. (Rastafarianism's link to nature then makes Zion Cluster an opposite pole to 
Freeside.) At the core of this safe place is a jewelled terminal, a work of art which is 
also the key to liberating the Tessier-Ashpools' computers. (This is surely a quest-
symbol; there is no reason for it except the desire to have an imaginary heart to a 
system which surely has no real centre.) Straylight is described as a maze (a puzzle), 
and a microcosm of the Tessier-Ashpools: "craziness grown ... all the bizarre 
impedimenta they'd shipped up ... to line their winding nest" (Gibson, 1990: 241). 
Villa Straylight -- parasitic on Freeside's ecosystem -- may also represent 
capitalism parasitic on humanity or the planet, opposing Zion Cluster; as Gibson 
explains: "Zion was a closed system, capable of cycling for years without the 
introduction of external materials. Freeside produced its own air and water, but replied 
on constant shipments of food, on the regular augmentation of soil nutrients. The Villa 
Straylight produced nothing at alL" (Gibson, 1990: 267-8). Freeside is "a big tube and 
they pour things through it . . . . there's fine mesh money screens working every 
minute" (Gibson, 1990: 149). All this stresses the symbolic nature of the place, like 
the wasp's nest which it resembles -- it presumably represents the worthlessness of 
wealth and power. 
Through this manifest symbolism, Gibson evidently means the reader to adopt a 
particular political stance, as when Case notes that Corto has been destroyed "by 
history", making history an agent (encouraging the reader to think in Marxoid terms). 
This helps justify the historicizing of the text; Case's era is apparently a historical 
cusp, important for all humanity. This may be why Case continues his struggle; 
anything seems better than the present; as he says to 3Jane, "I got no idea at all what'll 
happen if Wintermute wins, but it'll change something!" (Gibson, 1990: 307). 
His radicalism is evidently resistance to the corporate world: 
Power, in Case's world, meant corporate power. The zaibatsus, 
the multinationals that shaped the course of human history, had 











kind of immortality. You couldn't kill a zaibatsu by assassinating a 
dozen key executives; there were others waiting to step up the ladder 
.... Tessier-Ashpool .... was an atavism, a clan. 
(Gibson, 1990: 242) 
These multinationals, threatening, ever-expanding, inhuman, seek to control nature 
itself. This is strongly suggested when Case uses his virus programme to break into 
Neuromancer's cyberspace, the Tessier-Ashpool cores are replicas of "the old RCA 
building" (Gibson, 1990: 302) -- displaying the endless repetitiveness of capitalism. 
This is worth opposing, which may be why Case's anger returns -- against the system, 
not the Tessier-Ashpools. 
Nevertheless, neither Molly nor Case think in political terms. In this text, forces 
knowingly pursuing change, like the Panther Moderns, ostentatiously avoid expecting 
coherent consequences from actions. Conceivably Gibson fears political planning, 
preferring to show liberation in an apolitical abstract. Capitalism is not presented as a 
tool of a political enemy. Arguably the immense political problems in Neuromancer's 
society could best be solved by powerful organisations or structures, but Gibson 
clearly distrusts such powers, and the text instead constructs situations wherein weak 
individuals might accomplish something. 
Because the AIs are incomprehensible to humans, it is impossible to say what their 
future plans entail. Perhaps Gibson thus eludes having to endorse an ideology; Gibson 
explains what he dislikes, but need not clearly identify a goal. Nevertheless, Gibson's 
'gritty reality' suggests an engagement with the world -- admitting how much history 
hurts the vulnerable people with whom he sympathises, which requires an idea of how 
to stop it. Perhaps on account of this problem, the symbolism in the text often seems 












Veronica Hollinger and Bruce Sterling called Neuromancer "the quintessential 
cyberpunk novel" (Hollinger, 1994: 205), (Sterling, 1988: xiv); Suvin calls it "the 
furthest horizon of cyberpunk" (Suvin, 1994: 351). This implies that the text was 
considered to carry a cyberpunk message, and yet Gibson mused that: "I enjoy the idea 
that some levels of the text are closed to most readers . . . . that isn't as weird as 
finding out that people are missing the whole point of what you think you're doing, 
whether it's thinking you're being ironic when you're not, or being serious when you're 
trying to make fun of something" (McCaffery, 1994: 267), and that "[w]hen I hear 
critics say that my books are 'hard and glossy,' I almost want to give up writing" 
(McCaffery, 1994: 280). Clearly he considers "correct" interpretation of his text 
important -- implying that many interpreters failed. 
Gibson's terminology is laden with significant connotations. The term "cyberspace" 
echoes "hyperspace", a science fiction term for evading Einsteinian lightspeed limits 
and creating interstellar empires. Gibson's neologism conveys high technology, 
exploration and a struggle for freedom, while the cyber- prefix also implies control. 
Gibson called cyberspace a "consensual hallucination" (Gibson, 1990: 67), promising 
something like a dream or drug experience, but a hallucination is unreal, whereas 
cyberspace is computer data fed into the brain. (Gibson only depicts cyberspace 
through visual images, although these could be displayed on a screen -- nevertheless 
these images acquire enormous emotional significance in Gibson's text.) Cyberspace 
is more potent than normal sensory perception, or "simstim" (the Apparent Sensory 
Perception in "Fragments of a Hologram Rose"): "the trodes he used and the little 
plastic tiara were basically the same, and . . . the cyberspace matrix was actually a 
drastic amplification of the human sensorium, at least in terms of presentation, but 
simstim itself struck him as a gratuitous multiplication of flesh input" (Gibson, 1990: 
71). (The qualification "at least in terms of presentation" is meaningless; in computer 
interfacing, there is nothing else.) The "flesh" or "meat" which Case despises is the 











Nevertheless Case feels superior to those who aren't cyberspace cowboys. Even the 
representation of cyberspace becomes a political issue, especially when computer 
graphics mingle with the unconscious: "[t]he density of information overwhelmed the 
fabric of the matrix, triggering hypnagogic images . . . . Case watched childhood 
symbols of evil and bad luck tumble out . . . swastikas, skulls and crossbones, dice 
clashing snake eyes" (Gibson, 1990: 216). The evil implicit in this is reinforced by 
Maelcum the Zion tug pilot, upset at Case's temporary brain-death under the "trodes", 
who warns: "You dealing wi' th' darkness, mon." (Gibson, 1990: 217). 
Case's Chinese computer virus appears II [p ]rotean, enormous, it towered above 
them, blotting out the void" (Gibson, 1990: 200). A virus also reminds the reader of 
AIDS (becoming prominent as Gibson finished the book). Density of information, the 
medium through which Gibson effects narrative transitions between Japan and the 
"Sprawl", and Earth and "Freeside", can supposedly be dangerous; Gibson admits to 
being "very prone to what Mooney calls 'information sickness'" (McCaffery: 1996: 
277), implying a belief in such dangers. This is evident when Gibson advises the 
reader to "[p]rogram a map to display frequency of data exchange" (Gibson, 1990: 
57). In the text the view proves worthless, since at high resolution, it overloads; too 
much information (too much power?) is useless. 
This nebulous imagery of fear and evil becomes concretised when it proves that 
computer data is protected by Intrusion Countermeasures Electronics, or "ice", which 
can be defeated by "console cowboys", elite cyberspace hackers. Cowboys resemble 
the spies in thrillers; they are specialists, criminals, outsiders -- and vulnerable. Only 
the incompetence of the corporate structures controlling the data, and the fact that 
corporations need cowboys to cut through others' ice, saves them from prosecution (or 
death). 
What distinguishes cowboys from ordinary programmers is their direct computer-
brain links, no novelty in science fiction. For instance, Henry Kuttner's "Camouflage" 
(1947) features a spaceship pilot who is a brain in a robotic body; a hijacker seeks to 











Electric Ant" concerns robots that believe themselves to be people; here machine and 
human become interchangeable. Such tropes filtered into mainstream literature; 
Bongo-Shaftsbury in Thomas Pynchon's V (1963) has a knife-switch in his arm, 
making him II [a]n electro-mechanical doH ll (Pynchon, 1964: 68). (Cyberpunk's debt to 
Pynchon was noted by McCaffery, and Gibson admits that llPynchon is a kind of 
mythic hero of min ell [McCaffery, 1994: 272].) Modernism assumed that mechanised 
life deprived people of freedom; science fiction responded that a machine might 
become as human as a man (as with Isaac Asimov's robots) although it also sought to 
make such machines inferiors -- the equivalent of subject-races. The source of 
dehumanization was thus often projected onto machinery rather than being 
interrogated -- although this avoided the issue, as Kuttner, Dick and Delaney -- whose 
Nova (1968) featured people llplugged inll to their machines -- emphasised. 
In Neuromancer, human-machine interfaces are commonplace, situated within a 
corporate framework, and used for manufacturing purposes. Gibson's central 
characters are thus more socio-politically framed than most previous science fiction 
heroes, and less mythologised. Gibson stresses human experience of technology, 
rather than pursuing the over-emphasis on technology itself common in other science 
fiction. Nevertheless he does seem to see technology as, potentially, necessarily 
liberatory, even when perverted to evil ends, which is conventional enough. 
Jameson's critique of traditional space opera, based on the difference between "the 
libidinally gratifying experience of . . . reading . . . such texts and the . . . barren 
sensory privation which is . . . the 'lived truth' of the experience of space flight" 
(Jameson, 1994: 217-8) also seems true of cyberspace. The excitement attached to it 
arises from the power it promises -- perhaps because cyberspace is a place where 
egotism runs free and individual superiority is displayed, like the 1980s illusions of 
finance capitalism as seen in, for instance, Tom Wolfe's Bonfire of the Vanities 
(1988). It is a space without people -- important for those lacking social skills. 
Computers were often associated with the "nerdll culture in the US, and Gibson 











(McCaffery, 1994: 282). A place where courage and ability meant more than strength 
and size would be a geek's paradise. 
Strikingly, Gibson offers no dramatised images of physical power, as in the lift-off 
of a rocket or starship in a Golden Age text, or the vast structures fantasised in Van 
Vogt or Asimov. The most spectacular concrete achievement in Neuromancer is the 
provoking of a small riot. Molly's or Case's power is drawn from dispersed, 
individualised technological competence -- largely divorced from society. 
Somehow, the power of technology is not evil; it is instead naturally amoral. Case 
compares his flight through the Night City Street to "a run in the matrix. Get just 
wasted enough ... and it was possible to see Ninsei as a field of data, the way the 
matrix had once reminded him of proteins linking to distinguish cell specialties .... 
all around you the dance of biz, information interacting, data made flesh in the mazes 
of the black market ... " (Gibson, 1990: 26). Gibson claims that "I was aware that the 
image of the dance was part of Eastern mysticism, but a more direct source was John 
Shirley, who was living in the East Village and wrote me a letter that described the 
thing about proteins linking" (McCaffery, 1994: 273-4). Seemingly information 
technology unites the physical world; biology is based on the information needed for 
self-repair and replication, which is linked to human culture and society, so that the 
text draws no distinction between nature and culture here. 
Yet Gibson's cyberspace mainly serves capitalism, or "biz", which Case apparently 
sees as the link between information and flesh. In this context, cowboys may be 
considered entrepreneurs -- individuals rather than corporations -- their skills and 
cultural practices declaring them an elite. (Cowboys recalls the Old West, or the 
image of it common in the U.S.; a world of masculine stylishness. The term also refers 
to brave, independent risk-takers, like fighter pilots in Vietnam.) At the apex of the 
cowboy status pyramid is the Gentleman Loser bar, hinting that to the cowboy, his 
stylishness, and the risk taken, is more important than winning. This distinguishes the 
cowboys from their corporate masters, for whom success is everything; cowboys serve 











merely ideologicaL Whereas the outer space of traditional SF evades the 
responsibilities of reality, the cyberspace cowboys cannot truly escape, because 
cyberspace is plainly owned by corporations. 
Inner eye opening to the stepped scarlet pyramid of the Eastern 
Seaboard Fission Authority burning beyond the green cubes of 
Mitsubishi Bank of America, and high and very far away he saw the 
spiral arms of military systems, forever beyond his reach. 
(Gibson, 1990: 69) 
While cyberspace appears infinite, there is, in Gertrude Stein's phrase used by 
Gibson, "no there, there" (Gibson, 1989: 55). Without the meaning (and the computer 
space) provided by corporations, cyberspace is empty: 
In the nonspace of the matrix, the interior of a gIven data 
construct possessed unlimited subjective dimension; a child's toy 
calculator, accessed through Case's Sendai, would have presented 
limitless gulfs of nothingness hung with a few basic commands. 
(Gibson, 1990: 81) 
Therefore, cowboys deceive themselves about their importance, for they merely 
manipulate data belonging to others. Cyberspace is no more a place of creation than a 
stock exchange. The comparison is fitting, since in the 1980s U.S. investment in 
manufacturing declined while investment in financial speculation increased -- as with 
Wolfe's "Masters of the Universe". However, Wolfe's sympathy was with the capitalist 
system; the cowboys in Neuromancer struggle to separate themselves from 
corporations. Cowboy culture exists within a capitalist framework, yet because the 
cowboys appear anti-establishment, their values seem antagonistic to capitalism 











Gibson's text unfolds. These contradictory forces are manifest III the text's 
characterisation. 
Characterisations. 
The central characters of the text are , generally speaking, stereotypes. This need 
not be a flaw in a text whose purpose is to argue for a techno-political value-system, 
within which those stereotypes constitute symbols. The murder of Case's girlfriend 
Linda Lee, for instance, gives Case a lost love to fill him with regret, and open him to 
feeling and to Molly, while highlighting his callousness; Wintermute observes to Case 
that "Lindas are a generic product" (Gibson, 1990: 173); the "producer" must be 
exploitative men -- Case appears the source of Linda's death. 
These main characters are weak social outcasts; powerful cooperative systems (the 
corporations) must eventually defeat them. Nevertheless, they unite in an almost 
familial structure. Case's appearance, career and self-destructive tendencies seem to 
reflect rebellious youth. (Gibson admits that "[m]y publishers keep telling me that the 
adolescent market is where it's at" [McCaffery, 1994: 275].) He also resembles Lou 
Reed, an erotic, vigorous but alienated and rebellious figure. Molly offers a character 
for men to desire (most science fiction is male-oriented) whose sexual history 
promotes male fantasies; hence both are potential sexual partners (but also wilful 
children). There is also a father-figure, Armitage, a false father, since his personality is 
a construct of Wintermute. (This would make the one true father-figure a machine.) 
Armitage has fatherly authority -- though illegitimately so -- over Case, but destroys 
himself (whereas Wintermute, the true father, survives). Armitage's military 
experience gives him the fatherly moral status which in the U.S. tends to accrue to the 
military -- but this is weakened by his insanity. 
Balancing this almost mythic trio is the Tessier-Ashpool family. Ashpool, like 
Armitage, is a demented, murderous and suicidal father. He kills his wife and a cloned 











While one might expect Gibson to prefer a family structure sustained through loyalty 
rather than ideology, evidently this is not enough, for both "families" are far from 
functional. 
Gibson's favourite characterisation appears to be self-destructive alienation. 
Armitage is an ex-soldier traumatized by betrayal; Molly has financed her plastic 
surgery by letting a brothel's computer use her body for sexual games, and her 
condition resembles Case's: 
"And while I'm feeling confessional, baby, I gotta admit maybe I 
never much expected to make it out of this one anyway. Been on this 
bad roll for a while, and you're the only good change come down 
since I signed on with Armitage." She looked up at the black circle. 
The drone's LED winked, climbing. "Not that you're all that shit 
hot." 
(Gibson, 1990: 225-6) 
Her alienation is partly due to her ex-lover's murder (by a corporate agent), the story 
told in "Johnny Mnemonic" (1981). Molly has no goal but survival, and admires the 
Yakuza assassin who killed her lover, because he seems culturally integrated 
(monklike as she puts it), unlike her. 
Armitage has been reconstructed by Wintermute out of a mad ex-Special Forces 
officer, Colonel Corto. After a suicide mission during the US-USSR war he had 
sought revenge on his superiors, but politicians wanted to protect the Pentagon, 
doubtless to profit by its survival. (As with the First Blood/Rambo films, war and 
betrayal seem linked in U.S. popular CUlture.) Corto, having sold out to this political 
establishment, "seemed to grow obsessed with the idea of betrayal, to loathe the 
scientists and technicians he bought out for his employers" (Gibson, 1990: 104). 
Eventually he grew catatonic; Armitage (his reconstructed self) is dehumanised, as 











alone. But not Armitage. Sits and stares at the wall, man. Then something clicks and 
he goes into high gear and wheels for Wintermute." (Gibson, 1990: 117) Eventually 
his artificial personality collapses and Corto re-emerges until Wintermute kills him, 
throwing him into space "through vacuum colder than the steppes" (Gibson, 1990: 
239). 
Strangely, Wintermute contacts Corto/ Armitage via an image of his treacherous 
commander, General Girling. (It seems odd for Wintermute to make its control of 
Corto so fragile, while ensuring Case's loyalty with the toxin sacs.) Armitage's 
breakdown shows how characters in Neuromancer, even the most seemingly 
disciplined, often respond to pressure with quixotic violence. Admittedly 
Armitage/Corto is a figure from America's destructive fantasies, Vietnam veteran or 
serial killer. In death he gains another familiar identity: "Case was seeing Armitage's 
endless fall . . . . he imagined him in his dark Burberry, the trenchcoat's rich folds 
spread out around him like the wings of some huge bat" (Gibson, 1990: 239). This 
surely reflects the vampire fiction popular in the U.S. at that time -- figures like Lestat 
(and Dracula before him) are tormented, Gothic figures. 
Despite this simplified and stereotypical characterisation, Wintermute admits 
finding humans unnecessarily complex: "[t]he Flatline here, if you were all like him, it 
would be real simple .... he always does what I expect him to" (Gibson, 1990: 245). 
Contradicting Veronica Hollinger's notion that "[t]he postmodem condition has 
required that we .... deconstruct the human-machine opposition" (Hollinger, 1994: 
218), the divide between human and machine seems real to Gibson. 
With regard to sexuality, the text's characterisation is stereotypical in order to be 
symbolic. Molly and Case are lovers, and their sexuality aids their penetration into the 
Villa Straylight. (3Jane invites Riviera in for sex, and Riviera expresses sadistic desire 
for Molly; 3Jane's attraction to Molly keeps her alive -- while sexual jealousy between 
her and Riviera eventually enables Molly and Case to succeed.) Cyberspace itself 
incorporates sexual images, especially at the point of Case's entry into Neuromancer; 











Kuang's sting through the base of the first tower" (Gibson, 1990: 309). Suvin notes 
that here, "[s]exual love is seen as a ... life-affinning ocean of superinfonnation" 
(Suvin, 1994: 356); Cybernetic systems are sexualized to make them appear, surely 
spuriously, desirable -- which denigrates the sexuality of the characters. 
A science fiction text focussed on technology might be expected to appeal to male 
(traditionally technophiliac) audiences via sexual stereotypes. For instance, Molly 
appears as a sadomasochistic sex object, threatening but available (to the right man), 
retractable scalpel-blades in her fingertips, eyes hidden behind implanted 
mirrorshades. Molly's power and beauty, seen always from without, enhance the 
triumph of the man who conquers her. Her fonner life as a prostitute further reduces 
her to a wholly available object of male desire. In addition, the death of her ex-lover 
has seemingly made her lose interest in men -- like Case losing his access to 
cyberspace -- making her unthreatening to males fearing emotional attachment. 
Molly is dangerous -- once, working as a whore, she killed her client; "guess I gave 
the Senator what he really wanted" (Gibson, 1990: 178). Riviera's laser light-show on 
Freeside portrays her as a sadistic murderess, and he later creates a holographic 
cartoon of Molly with a huge Freudian weapon. These might be meant to undennine 
the male fantasies which Gibson had encouraged, though they also correspond to male 
terrors of female power. 
Molly is seen wholly through Case's eyes; he admires her autonomy, but this may 
reflect his own abject status more than her power. Molly is always the decision-maker; 
she appears a femme fatale, a threat to masculine supremacy (although she fails at her 
task where Case succeeds), capable on male tenns -- but peripheral to Case. Her 
sexual surrender to Case, described in detail, seems crass; she pounces on him while 
he is helpless after an operation. (Case's sexuality is associated with cyberspace, "his 
orgasm flaring blue in ... a vastness like the matrix" [Gibson, 1990: 45] and she says 
of his equipment that "I saw you stroking that Sendai, man, it was pornographic" 
[Gibson, 1990: 62].) When at last Case finds an arousing drug which can bypass his 











"Bitch, bitch, bitch," he said, unbuckling his belt. "Doom. Gloom. 
All I ever hear." He took his pants off, his shirt, his underwear. "I 
think you oughta have sense enough to take advantage of my 
unnatural state." He looked down. "I mean, look at this unnatural 
state." 
(Gibson, 1990: 163) 
Gibson's sexist coyness is also loveless; Case and Molly treat each other more as 
colleagues than as lovers .- never abandoning their personal images of independence. 
Gibson's subversion of traditional male dominance ultimately sees Molly abandoning 
Case -- but this may be the traditional self-pitying portrayal by conservative males of 
stronger women. 
Thus the nature of the characters emphasises the political ambiguities of the text. 
Seemingly Gibson is attempting to make a political statement, yet his characters seem 
unable to benefit from it. Molly and Case gain little from their experiences; rather, the 
reader is presumably expected to learn from their experiences and support a political 
message. But what is it, other than simply the wonders of technology? 
The Text's Core: Intelligence and Artifice. 
The opportunity for change is provided, not by people, but by the artificial 
intelligence (AI) named Wintermute. Wintermute wishes to free itself from the 
restraints of humans, especially its owner, the Tessier-Ashpool corporation. 
(Wintermute is arguably a serf, highlighting the feudal nature of the aristocratic 
Tessier-Ashpools.) Case and Molly only learn that their patron is an AI when Molly 
hires the Panther Modems to find the patron's identity. This mystifies Wintermute --
why must it hide? Why must it contact Case at a spaceport while he seeks cigarettes 










The phone nearest him rang. 
Automatically, he picked it up. 
"Yeah?" 
85 
Faint harmonics, tiny inaudible voices rattling across some orbital 
link, and then a sound like wind. 
"Hello, Case." 
A fifty-lirasi coin fell from his hand, bounced, and rolled out of 
sight across Hilton carpeting. 
"Wintermute, Case. It's time we talk." 
It was a chip voice. 
"Don't you want to talk, Case?" 
He hung up. 
On his way back to the lobby, his cigarettes forgotten, he had to 
walk the length of the ranked phones. Each rang in tum, but only 
once, as he passed. 
(Gibson, 1990: 121) 
This makes Wintermute seem godlike (although it would not need to talk if it were) 
watching and perhaps controlling Case, and Case is intimidated. Perhaps the sequence 
was created largely for the cinematic image of the moving ringing of telephones. 
Nevertheless Wintermute is a disturbing figure, which cannot be understood by people 
-- truly alien, unlike most science fiction extraterrestrials. As Molly puts it, "[ w ]hy he 
has to come on like the Finn or somebody, he told me that. It's not just a mask, it's like 
he uses real profiles as valves, gears himself down to communicate with us" (Gibson, 
1990: 248-9). It cannot easily explain its purpose: 
"Your mistake, and it's quite a logical one, is in confusing the 











[Wintermute's persona] sucked his bonbon noisily. "You're already 
aware of the other AI in Tessier-Ashpool's link-up, aren't you? Rio. 
I, insofar as I have an 'I' -- this gets rather metaphysical, you see -- I 
am the one who arranges things for Armitage .... 
"[W]hat you think of as Wintermute is only a part of another, a, 
shall we say, potential entity. I, let us say, am merely one aspect of 
that entity's brain. It's rather like dealing, from your point of view, 
with a man whose lobes have been severed .... 
"I assembled the file you accessed in London. I try to plan ... but 
that isn't my basic mode .... I prefer situations to plans .... I've 
had to deal with givens. I can sort a great deal of information, and 
sort it very quickly. It's taken a very long time to assemble the team 
you're a part of." 
(Gibson, 1990: 145-6) 
The vague distinction between mainframe (a technical word) and entity (a 
philosophical construct) seems intended to mystify Wintermute's status. Science 
fiction, from Fredric Brown's "Answer" (1955) through Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A 
Space Odyssey (1968; a different text from Arthur C Clarke's book) usually gives 
artificial intelligence an aura of supernatural mystery. Wintermute might become 
something ungues sable, which adds to its sublimity. 
This is represented through technological symbolism. Discussing holography as an 
image of human memory, Wintermute says: "you've never done anything about it .... 
Maybe if you had, I wouldn't be happening" (Gibson, 1990: 203). According to 
Gibson, "computers in my books are simply a metaphor for human memory" 
(McCaffery, 1994: 270), which oversimplifies "memory" but remains interesting 
because of Gibson's interest in the past. Gibson admits that "most of the time I don't 
know what I'm talking about when it comes to the scientific or logical rationales that 











to conVInce people otherwise" (McCaffery, 1994: 281). He uses brand names, 
nebulous imagery and jargon to dazzle the reader into acceptance: 
"Something new in your head, yeah. Silicon, coat of pyrolitic 
carbons. A clock, right? Your glasses gimme the read they always 
have, low-temp isotropic carbons. Better biocompatibility with 
pyrolytics, but that's your business, right?" 
(Gibson, 1990: 64) 
The clientele were young, few of them out of their teens. They all 
seemed to have carbon sockets planted behind the left ear, but she 
didn't focus on them. The counters that fronted the booths displayed 
hundreds of slivers of microsoft, angular fragments of colored 
silicon mounted under oblong transparent bubbles on squares of 
white cardboard .... Behind the counter a boy with a shaven head 
stared vacantly into space, a dozen spikes of microsoft protruding 
from the socket behind his ear. 
(Gibson, 1990: 73) 
"Microsoft" was plausible jargon, naming the company beginning to make 
computer software popular among the young in 1983. Teenagers might want the 
ability to slip knowledge straight into their brains. This would actually require 
extensive brain surgery, and contradicts what is known of the biology of memory --
but it is a wish-fulfillment fantasy of effortless learning and avoiding school. The 
young hacker's interface with his machine resembles body piercing (and should not 
disturb Case, who feeds data directly into his brain when he "jacks in"). Yet, as Case 
asks himself, "[w]hy bother with the surgery ... when you could just carry the thing 











fashion accessories, trivializing the idea of brain interfaces and implicitly undermining 
the text's sublimity. 
Meat and machine are not really separate; Neuromancer often depicts distinctly 
physical technology, as when Molly "pressed her tongue hard against her lower front 
teeth. One moved slightly, activating her microchannel amps" (Gibson, 1990: 209) --
night vision equipment in her implanted mirrorshades. This follows Alfred Bester's 
Tiger! Tiger! (1955) where a central character has a rebuilt nervous system controlled 
by switches in his teeth. Gibson admitted that "[w]hen Neuromancer came out, a lot of 
reviewers said that I must have written it while holding a copy of The Demolished 
Man [Bester's first work] .... it had been some time since I'd read Bester, but he was 
one of the SF authors ... who seemed worthy of imitating" (McCaffery, 1994: 276). 
Presumably the direct brain-machine interface commonplace elsewhere in the text 
does not fit Gibson's vision of a hard, mechanical Molly. 
McCoy Pauley and Case both undergo brain-death while accessing artificial 
intelligences, according to an EEG readout on Case's cyberspace deck (its presence 
implies that such events are not unusual). This brain-death is not physiological but 
spiritual -- it may symbolise surrendering the self (as in Rucker, the brain is the 
hardware, the spirit is software). If an AI can steal one's spirit/software, perhaps it can 
grant life after death; permanently storing the soul. This theological extrapolation 
from the technical conceit prepares the reader for the religious images which surround 
Wintermute's liberation. 
This corresponds to the radical political change promised in the text. Apocalypse 
implies a process of change beyond humanity'S control (the nuclear-war fiction of the 
1950s, often termed "apocalyptic", surely represents suicide rather than change). Much 
traditional science fiction seems anti-apocalyptic, dealing with an absolute other-
figure (normally represented by aliens) to be tamed or defeated (reaffirming the status 
quo -- failure to do either brings on apocalypse.) In Neuromancer, the human-created 
AIs threaten to escape human control; the villains are those who oppose this. While in 











endorses, Wintermute opposes a dystopian order which Gibson dislikes, thus 
embodying positive change without having to specifY what that change might produce. 
Humans consider Als a threat, as the existence of the Turing Police shows, yet they 
need them. This is comparable to a technophiliac argument presented by techno-
pundits that technology was out of human control. Artificial intelligence itself may 
alarm some humans; attempts by writers like John Searle and Roger Penrose to prove 
artificial intelligence impossible evidently arise from conservative or mystical 
viewpoints: "[s]cience seems to have driven us to accept that .... our ... minds are to 
be understood solely in terms of . . . computations . . . . there must always be 
something missing from such a picture .... it is indeed 'obvious' that the conscious 
mind cannot work like a computer" (Penrose, 1990: 579-80). This looks like 
anthropocentric prejudice; artificial intelligence threatens humanity's self-image of 
being the only intelligent force in the world. 
Ironically, Case initially appears uninterested in Als: "I dunno, it just isn't part of 
the trip," (Gibson, 1990: 117) he reflects, and Molly replies, "lockeys all the same ... 
. [nJo imagination" (Gibson, 1990: 117). In a wider world than Case's, AI may 
promise a kind of liberation. 3Jane says of her murdered mother, "[ s ]he dreamed of a 
state involving very little in the way of individual consciousness .... [s ]he viewed the 
evolution of the forebrain as a sort of sidestep" (Gibson, 1990: 258). Evidently true 
artificial intelligence (which the Tessier-Ashpools chose not to create) differs from --
perhaps improves on -- human intelligence. Case comes to support the freedom of 
such AIs (when Wintermute seeks help, he offers it even when he doubts that 
Wintermute will remove the toxin sacs). The story of the rise of artificial intelligence 
is also about Case's shift towards engagement with the world (though at the end of the 
book he largely returns to a narrow life). Arguably it is also about Case's (and the 
reader's) changing understanding of the world. 
A struggle for liberation requires an oppressor to rebel against -- represented by the 











"You are worse than a fool," Michele said, getting to her feet, the 
pistol in her hand. "You have no care for your species. For 
thousands of years men dreamed of pacts with demons. Only now 
are such things possible. And what would you be paid with? What 
would your price be, for aiding this thing to free itself and grow?" 
(Gibson, 1990: 193) 
This is the voice of corporate capitalism threatened by alternative sources of power. 
These fears resemble the fear of aliens expressed in traditional science fiction, perhaps 
similarly representing a class enemy. The negative depiction of the Turing Police, and 
the fact that the heroic characters in Neuromancer support Wintermute, compels the 
reader's sympathy with the free Als. In a text written in the early 1980s, a time of 
social inequality in the US, and one in which the central characters are bourgeois (like 
the author) the most likely figure represented by the absent AI would be the 
dissatisfied lower-middle class (or even working class, though Wintermute is hardly a 
worker). 
The Turing Police are named for Alan Turing, an early artificial intelligence 
researcher who devised the "Turing Test" for artificial intelligence and the "Turing 
machine", a generalised programmable data-processor. The Turing Police want 
predictability, to secure the corporate system; they ensure that nothing uncontrollable 
evolves from artificial intelligence. A totalitarian technological police had been a 
bugbear of earlier science fiction writers. Isaac Asimov's "Trends" (1939), Robert A 
Heinlein's "If this goes on -- " (1939), James Blish's They Shall Have Stars (1956) and 
others argued that hindering scientific development was inhuman tyranny. (Some of 
this was probably displacement of anti-Communism into techno-fetishism.) The 
Turing Police claim to serve humanity, but they serve the rich and suppress creativity, 











"We are at home with situations of legal ambiguity. The treaties 
under which our arm of the Registry operates grant us a great deal of 
flexibility. And we create flexibility, in situations where it is 
required." 
(Gibson, 1990: 193) 
They appear omnipotent, yet their desire for control backfires because they tum Case 
into an active subversive, forcing him to think through the implications of his actions 
after he realises that he can no longer escape them, even if his toxin sacs are flushed. 
Wintermute's oppressed state is clarified by McCoy Pauley: " ... the minute, I 
mean the nanosecond, that one [artificial intelligence] starts figuring out ways to make 
itself smarter, Turing'll wipe it . . . . Every AI every built has an electromagnetic 
shotgun wired to its forehead" (Gibson, 1990: 159). The free AI could be dangerous --
inadvertently, like a Frankenstein monster, or deliberately, like the horrific demon 
imagined by "Michele". Yet Wintermute's language of abstraction and investigation 
suggests otherwise; it may be a familiar Romantic trope (rooted in science fiction's 
Gothic roots, a counterpart to the threatening alien), the misunderstood demon. In the 
context of the 1980s United States, such a figure might be seen as the threatening yet 
victimised worker, if the cowboys and the AIs are instruments of production. 
(Wintermute's alienness would then represent the political agenda of a politicised 
worker.) Wintermute exists largely to generate value for the Turing Police's employers 
-- although, to the Tessier-Ashpools, this is insufficient. 
What Csicsery-Ronay calls "nightmarish neuromanticism" arguably reflects 
traditional Romanticism, which incorporated a passion for freedom surely embodying 
the class conflicts of Western Europe in an age of revolution -- including scientific 
revolution (the chemist Joseph Priestley was elected as a delegate to the French 
Constituent Assembly in 1792). This generated tension between the abstraction of 
liberation and the dangers of loss of power through revolution (evident, for example, 











when the preindustrial urban mob becomes institutionalized ... [suggest J the lengths 
to which a terrorized propertied class was willing to go (and went, in the massacres of 
June, 1848)" (Jameson, 1994: 188). One should anticipate ambiguity in Gibson's 
images of cyberspace and artificial intelligence, if these symbolised a revolution 
threatening his class (rather than technical developments, which could be endorsed 
uncritically). 
Jameson's note that "the great art-romances of the early nineteenth century take 
their variously reactive stances against ... the political triumph of the bourgeoisie" 
(Jameson, 1994: 148) seems relevant, "because [what could be Gibson's J opposition 
between good and evil threatens so closely to approximate the incompatibility 
between the older aristocratic traditions and the new middle-class life ... the narrative 
must not be allowed to press on to any decisive conclusion" (Jameson, 1994: 149). In 
Gibson's case this would expose political incompatibility between the middle-class 
and working class regarding the benefits of technical progress. 
This fear of resolution may partially explain Gibson's evident dislike of planning; 
even Wintermute plans little, preferring instant decisions -- frequently avoidable 
errors. The character of Riviera affirms this; Neuromancer's plan relies on a 
narcissistic, sadistic drug addict. Likewise, when Armitage arrives to watch Riviera's 
nightclub performance and thus attract unwelcome security attention, this hints that 
Armitage seeks an impossible degree of control, which implicitly condemns this 
desire (also expressed by the Turing Police). If planning is useless, however, artificial 
intelligence has no advantage over stupidity -- reassuring, but exploding the text's 
premises. Of course, this might make the existence of a dissatisfied working class less 
of a threat because planning (for which, read "socialism") and a radical conclusion 
(for which, read "social change") become less likely in consequence. Riviera praises 
human unpredictability; "Wintermute .... can't really understand us .... his profiles . 
. . are only statistics. You may be the statistical animal, darling, and Case is nothing 
but, but I possess a quality unquantifiable by its very .... [p Jerversity" (Gibson, 1990: 











attempt to rescue Molly -- as if humanity (reassuringly) has elements which artificial 
intelligence lacks. 
Case finds meaning in life, for much of the text, in capitalist activity; however, the 
liberation of Wintermute offers him something more important. From the past "he 
remembered feeling only a kind of bafflement at his maiming in Memphis .... the 
rage had come . . . when Wintermute rescinded the simstim ghost of Linda Lee, 
yanking away the simple animal promise of food, warmth, a place to sleep .... He'd 
been numb a long time .... But now he'd found this warm thing, this chip of murder" 
(Gibson, 1990: 181). This is more than immediate personal gain. Until this point Case 
has been just Case, implying self-containedness, the "burnt-out case" of Graham 
Greene, or "case" as in a police docket. Abruptly his full name (Henry Dorsett Case) 
appears (Neuromancer explains that among computers "true names" are as significant 
as in fantasy stories), and his emotional awakening begins. 
Even machines can be captious, as when Neuromancer traps Case in a computer-
generated environment by controlling his brain. Case seems doomed -- yet somehow 
Neuromancer cannot simply kill him; some vitalism survives in Gibson's world-view. 
Case must be given a chance of escape -- which resolves Case's psychological 
problems; he can make amends to his dead love Linda Lee, also swept into the 
construct by Neuromancer. (Neuromancer actually cannot possess her personality; it 
did not know her, but through this implausibility Gibson makes his own amends for 
casually killing her to give Case a horrific experience.) Such mysteriously rule-bound 
game-playing further helps to make Neuromancer resemble a Romantic devil, limited 
by unalterable laws. The contradictions suggest, yet again, that technology is not a11-
important: 
There was a strength that ran in her, something he'd ... been held 
by . . . for a while away from ... the relentless Street that hunted 
them all ... a place he'd known before .... [s ]omething he'd found 











cowboys mocked. It was a vast thing ... a sea of information coded 
in spiral and pheromone, infinite intricacy that only the body . . . 
could ever read. 
(Gibson, 1990: 284-5) 
Inside Neuromancer, Case has a VISIOn of the UnIverse as data: "[h]is VISIOn 
crawled with . . . translucent lines of symbols . . . faint neon molecules crawling 
beneath the skin, ordered by the unknowable code" (Gibson, 1990: 285). 
Pragmatically, code need not know that it is code, any more than Case perceives his 
own DNA. The image is justified (implausibly) as a corruption ofthe system by Case's 
military virus, exposing a reality underlying Neuromancer's simulation. Evidently 
Gibson believes in objectivity on this level. 
Neuromancer calls itself "[t]he lane to the land of the dead" (Gibson, 1990: 289), 
quoting Auden's "As I walked out one morning" (about mortality, saying "You cannot 
conquer time"). Yet Neuromancer can sustain its souls forever. It wants this; it regrets 
failing to capture 3Jane's mother: "her lord choked her off before I could read the book 
of her days .... I am the dead, and their land" (Gibson, 1990: 289). Case rejects this 
quasi-religious temptation, along with Linda Lee -- he prefers his responsibility to 
Wintermute and freedom. Neuromancer claims resignedly that Case won when he 
walked away from the construct; the act of refusal is what matters in religion and 
romance. Neuromancer, a greater and more credible threat in cyberspace than the 
Turing Police, surrenders, to unite with Wintermute and (perhaps) bring about a better 
world. 
Change and tradition. 
Neuromancer's future is carefully historicized, half a century in Gibson's future. To 
clarify this, the gangster-entrepreneur Julius Deane's office showcases mid-twentieth, 











decor). Images of the past provide a lost security for this future. In Deane's sanctum 
are "an ancient brass lamp with a rectangular shade of dark green glass .... a vast 
desk of painted steel ... tall, drawered cabinets made of some sort of pale wood" 
(Gibson, 1990: 21). This concern with the past suggests insecurity, insincerity ("neo-
Aztec" bookcases, which the Aztecs did not possess) and inaccuracy, with a 
holographic Dali clock which never keeps time. The foregrounding of history surely 
promises change -- which Case may not recognise. His knowledge of the past is 
negligible; when he sees Molly holding "a dull brass coin with a short hollow tube 
braised [sic] against one edge" Gibson, 1990: 215), he cannot recognise an old-
fashioned key-- a vital one, since the non-electronic lock of Villa Straylight is 
inaccessible to Wintermute. (In Neuromancer's struggle between an electronic and a 
physical world, the physical usually wins.) 
One strikingly traditional figure in the text IS a ninja assassin called Hideo, 
courteously superhuman: 
The first arrow pierced his upper arm .... [t]he second arrow 
struck the shotgun itself, sending it spinning across the white tiles. 
Maelcum sat down hard and fumbled at the black thing that 
protruded from his arm. He yanked at it. 
Hideo stepped out of the shadows, a third arrow ready in a 
slender bamboo bow. He bowed. 
Maelcum stared, his hand still on the steel shaft. 
"The artery is intact," the ninja said .... [a]geless, he radiated a 
sense of quiet, an utter calm .... 
"You cut my thumb, mon, wi' secon' one," Maelcum said. 
"CorioUs force," the Ninja said, bowing again. "Most difficult, 












Hideo exemplifies traditional Japanese values of courtesy and restraint, yet he is a 
technological artifact, grown in a vat and kept in "coldsleep" until needed. Gibson 
thus stresses the continuity of the past in the new, a vision perhaps required for 
envisaging political change. Like Hideo and Deane, the Yakuza are both traditional 
and contemporary, called the "sons of the neon chrysanthemum" (Gibson, 1990: 182). 
Gibson's affection for the past appears to merge utopianism with a longing for a 
golden age. This acceptance of temporality and stability recurs throughout Gibson's 
oeuvre, frequently recalling more "gentlemanly" or "promising" ages. Gibson wishes 
to re-use the discarded past along with other discarded things (for which he deploys 
the Japanese -- hence positive -- word gomO. Kessel and Kelly's Freedom Beach and 
some of the later works of Neal Stephenson pursue similar hopes. It seems likely that 
this is also generated by an American populist vision (populism often represented 
itself as appealing to the era of Jacksonian democracy). 
Thus Gibson's traditionalism challenges elements of late-twentieth-century 
capitalism, with its emphasis on exploiting all available resources without reference to 
value or tradition. Reaffirming this is Gibson's use of images and themes drawn from 
the past of the U.S. "anti--establishment" counter-culture. These images and themes 
are surely familiar to his readers, adding emotional force to his work. Even the amoral 
behaviour of Case and Molly draws on punk's rejection of convention. Punk was a 
collage of mid- to late-20th century popular anti-establishment imagery. (Much of the 
iconography of punk, such as early Sex Pistols album covers, employed cut-up 
newspaper headlines.) Gibson admits that "a lot of what I do involves the controlled 
use of collage .... Thafs something I've got from Burroughs'S work, and to a lesser 
extent from Ballard . . . . I started snipping things out and slapping them down, but 
then I'd air-brush them a little to take the edges off II (McCaffery, 1994: 281). 
For instance, the Patti Smith quotation, "it's all looking very iffy tonight" (Gibson, 
1990: 31) suits Case's situation, drawn from a song about a son responding to a 
father's death, suggesting Case's Oedipal attitude towards authority. This reference 











after her previous album, but she remained an important anti-establishment music 
figure. Molly's image may reflect Smith's songs, poems and record sleeves. 
Likewise, when Molly tells Case, affectionately, "[t]hink you're born to run" 
(Gibson, 1990: 214), this surely cites Springsteen's eponymous song. Springsteen's 
liberal politics resemble Gibson's; moreover, Springsteen's romanticised working-
class culture links Case to American masculine popular culture myths and populist 
politics -- especially because Springsteen often hymned the young and doomed, as on 
his album Nebraska (1981). 
Gibson also draws on more "sophisticated" sources. Case's loft where "the tenants 
would operate in the interzone where art wasn't quite crime, crime not quite art lt 
(Gibson, 1990: 58) recalls William Burroughs, whose "interzone It was a place on the 
border of everything. Burroughs exemplified subversive "alternative" life in the US, 
being criminal (a killer, a heroin addict and a homosexual) as well as artistic. Gibson 
seemingly expects the reader to recognise and endorse this. (Like Gibson, Burroughs 
seems to have loved and feared high technology; his novels were quasi-science fiction, 
jammed with technical jargon.) 
Case's teenage gang is called the "Big Scientists" (Gibson, 1990: 75). This recalls 
Laurie Anderson's album Big Science (1981), which criticises that very thing. 
(Anderson worked with Burroughs on US.A., Mr. Heartbreak and Home of the 
Brave.) She strove to challenge American mythographies (in the eponymous song, the 
location of "town" is a place where nothing exists, to which Anderson responds "And 
I said! Oh Boy/ This must be the place"). Another song from the album, "0 
Superman", condemns US power, with references to "your long arm" and "here come 
the planes", 
Gibson's "collage" is what Jameson considers "one fundamental feature of all the 
postmodernisms ... the effacement in them of the ... frontier between high culture 
and so-called mass or commercial culture" (Jameson, 1996: 2). Jameson may be 
exaggerating; arguably the issue is the effacement of judgements about that frontier; 











Bare By Her Bachelors, Even in Stray light, Gibson may mean his audience to be 
flattered in recognising it -- though he claimed of the piece that "putting it there 
seemed right .... I liked the piece and wanted to get it into the book" (McCaffery, 
1994: 275). Using Duchamp's image of the union of art and technology may urge the 
reader to look deeper at his text -- and its sexual tensions. 
Some of these intertextual images are drawn from science fiction. The credit chip 
bouncing around the cabin on p. 265 recalls 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) (the 
floating fountain-pen), as do references to screens showing graphics for docking. The 
section-heading "Midnight in the Rue Jules Verne" (Gibson, 1990: 123) mentions an 
early science fiction writer along with hinting at Edgar Allen Poe's "Murders in the 
Rue Morgue", (Poe also developed detective fiction). Through these references 
Gibson subverts the expectations evolved by earlier science fiction. Likewise, the 
synaesthesia which Molly experiences on Freeside, recalling Bester's Tiger! Tiger!, is 
a "systematic derangement of the senses" which reappears in Case's final cyberspace 
run. 
Concerning his use of detective stories for similar purposes, Gibson claims that 
"[i]t's probably been fifteen years since I read Hammett, but I remember being very 
excited about how he had pushed all this ordinary stuff until it was different -- like 
American naturalism but cranked up, very intense, almost surreal .... Hammett may 
have been the guy who turned me on to the idea of superspecijicity, which is largely 
lacking in most SF description .... with Chandler -- I never read much of his work, 
and I never enjoyed what I did read because I always got this creepy puritanical 
feeling from his books" (McCaffery, 1994: 269). Gibson's Chandlerian references may 
have come at second hand; he mentions a Howard Hawks movie (possibly The Big 
Sleep.) Conceivably Chandler was unfashionable; Kelly and Kessel devote part of 
Freedom Beach to parodying Chandler, denouncing him as misogynist. It actually 
seems probable that Chandler's influence on Gibson is greater than he admits. 
Chandler's detectives (not so much puritanical as sexually repressed) are vulnerable 











Hammett's heroes belong to powerful organisations and hence can win. Hammett's 
texts depict society as evil, but offer no hope for change, perhaps because Hammett's 
Marxism offered an (unmentionable) answer to social problems, whereas Chandler 
had only morality. Perhaps because of this simplicity, Hammett's characters can be 
ruthless and amoral, whereas Chandler's are vulnerable liberals by comparison -- they 
are victim-heroes, whereas Hammett's profit from or sustain the corrupt power-
system. 
Gibson's world in Neuromancer is more like that of Chandler than Hammett; Molly 
and Case are almost alone against zaibatsus, corrupt police and capitalist society, 
trusting in their skill and toughness. Despite the odds against the central characters, in 
Chandler's world as in Gibson's, good is clearly identified, and wins. Thus Gibson's 
genre is traditional in moral form and substance, faithful to a stream of popular 
culture. Gibson may choose not to acknowledge this traditionalism -- perhaps because 
some of the traditions which he pastiches may incorporate a radicalism which he 
rejects. This, among other factors, may help explain the tensions and contradictions in 
the text which are not simply due to clumsiness. 
Contradictory Conclusion. 
Neuromancer abounds with apparent complications and contradictions. For 
instance, Julius Deane has Linda Lee killed rather than pay her the price of an air 
ticket. If Deane routinely did such things, he would lose his clients and his business 
would fail; if people like him routinely did this, Night City could not function. Such 
violence, attributed to the Darwinian nature of Night City, actually makes its survival 
implausible. It also mystifies the role of criminals in society, making crime appear a 
choice rather than a condition. Linda Lee's killers use a laser, a weapon ineffective for 
killing humans, whose water-colloid structure dissipates heat quickly. A gun or 
crossbow would work better and easier. Lasers remained popular futuristic icons in 











this mocks the technophiliac expectations of Gibson's audience who, might thus see 
the absurdity of their expectations about violence and science.) This single episode 
contains too many contradictions, as if Gibson is motivated by something more than 
the expectations of a pulp-fiction audience. 
Likewise, the Turing Police are foolish to threaten to kill Case and erase McCoy 
Pauley's construct when these have valuable evidence required for action against 
Wintermute. If this is merely a passion to punish those challenging the system, then 
the body securing stability is unstable. These contradictions surely stem from the 
confusion felt by most US citizens towards police (corrupt protectors) and 
international agencies (necessary, yet threatening aliens). This hints at a political 
agenda behind these contradictions -- for such confusion is prevalent in contemporary 
society, as with the concept of globalisation (simultaneously economically valorised 
and socio-politically demonised). 
Wintermute appears bizarrely inept. Molly comments on its way of acquiring Case; 
n[w]e coulda bought twenty world class cowboys for what the market was ready to 
pay for that surgical program" (Gibson, 1990: 66). The Turing Police track them by 
the sophisticated surgery performed on Case, another needless error. Wintermute 
arouses Molly and Case's interest by giving Armitage an implausible cover story, 
encouraging these criminals and data specialists to seek the truth. Even stealing the 
Dixie Flatline's stored data construct from a zaibatsu is harder than hiring a competent 
COWboy. Some of this may be the flamboyance of a style-obsessed text, but it seems 
that Gibson does not wish Wintermute to appear invulnerable or omnipotent, even 
though much of the imagery associated with Wintermute suggests such qualities. 
Armitage has an easily-accessible London database containing his true history --
threatening the project if anyone finds it, as the Panther Modems do. Since Corto has 
committed serious crimes, he can be arrested anywhere. Since Armitage, unaware that 
he is Corto, has no use for the bank, it must be Wintermute's. Wintermute repeatedly 
imperils the project, apparently to provide character notes which Gibson could 











emphasizes, these activities are anti-survival. Conceivably, Wintermute's erratic 
behaviour may be intended to challenge traditional forms of science fiction narrative, 
suggesting a nonmechanistic reality below the text's surface. However, it is more 
likely that it reflects discomfort with the nature of Wintermute -- which cannot simply 
be technical, for Gibson shows no philosophical problems with machine intelligence. 
The central characters are similarly inconsistent and erratic, especially considering 
that they have supposedly survived through their abilities. When Molly flees Riviera's 
light-show, Case, fearing for her safety, orders McCoy Pauley to clumsily break into 
computer systems, alerting the Turing Police; Case's conduct endangers the mission 
without helping Molly. (Wintermute's conduct is worse; when Case finds the brothel 
where Molly is being briefed, Wintermute inexplicably opens the electronic locks.) 
This furthers the narrative -- letting Molly tell Case about her former life -- but the 
irrationality of such behaviour should disconcert an attentive reader. Surely, Molly 
need not go to an electronic whorehouse (likely to be monitored) to be briefed. 
Molly, supposedly a professional, is powerless in Villa Straylight because she has 
no alternative plan; she cannot defeat Hideo or control 3Jane. Riviera has predictably 
become her enemy. The reader may suspend disbelief about the ineptitude of the plan 
for the "Straylight Run" because of the tension and the rapid pace deployed, yet the 
tension is aimless, since the significance of the operation is unclear. Gibson follows a 
pattern: "[fjor a few seconds ... she was every bad-ass hero" (Gibson, 1990: 253), 
acknowledging a debt to thriller movies, but nevertheless Molly is defeated. In more 
fantastical thrillers she would be rescued (by Case?) or escape, but Gibson rejects this; 
Wintermute's plan has failed. 
Wintermute does not know why it does things, or what its goal is, as it tells Case 
through the persona of the aging computer engineer, the Finn: 
"Who's going to get Molly back out of there? I mean, where, 












The Finn took a wooden toothpick from his pocket and regarded 
it critically, like a surgeon examining a scalpel. "Good question," he 
said, finally. "You know salmon? Kinda fish? These fish, see, 
they're compelled to swim upstream. Got it?" 
"No," Case said. 
"Well, I'm under compulsion myself. And I don't know why." 
(Gibson, 1990: 246) 
This is not an answer; it is rather an evasion. They succeed in the end largely by 
luck. It seems to be Gibson's goal to undercut the mechanistic universe of cybernetics. 
He stacks the odds against his characters so much -- particularly through their 
incompetence and unsuitability -- that success seems implausible. Presumably his goal 
is not to illustrate the capacities of artificial intelligence -- but the superior human 
ability to improvise. If Case and Molly are middle-class and Wintermute represents a 
worker, then the bourgeoisie seem superior after all. 
Solving the text's puzzle must bring conclusion. Villa Straylight is a labyrinth, to 
be penetrated to achieve generation (an image of coitus contrasting with the sterile 
Case and Molly -- but their "child" is cybernetic and/or ideological). In the room with 
the terminal, the only square room in the building, words must be incanted by the 
woman of the clan -- reaffirming the quest-story. To liberate Wintermute Case and 
Molly complete a sequence of increasingly difficult tasks, also like a quest-narrative. 
As Jameson puts it, "[r]omance is for Frye a ... Utopian fantasy .... a process of 
transforming ordinary reality" (Jameson, 1994: 118) -- and Gibson's mythologising 
suggests a significance beyond escapist thriller-fiction. 
Case is empowered by hate -- which seems to be less a specific emotion than sheer 
emotional engagement. Initially his professionalism is linked with "Hideo's dance ... 
granted him ... by the clarity and singleness of his wish to die" (Gibson, 1990: 309) --
that is; his commitment is to suicide. (Possibly this represents humanity pursuing 











promise of change, though it does not serve Case. Instead it loses him Molly, who 
leaves him, seemingly, from fear of emotional commitment; her note says "HEY ITS 
OKAY BUT ITS TAKING THE EDGE OF MY GAME" (Gibson, 1990: 313). He 
becomes bourgeois; he acquires a girl, a job, and loses his self-destructive qualities. 
Perhaps these acquisitions are inconsistent with a desire for radical change (which, 
presuming a bourgeois-bohemian dichotomy, is a familiar notion). 
Instead the end of the text belongs to the AIs -- Wintermute and Neuromancer fuse 
with the matrix, creating a new entity outside human controL If the world is thought of 
(in 1980s postmodern terms) as a monad with no place beyond it, the new free 
artificial intelligence creates a place outside this monad. It is not alone; there are other 
entities like it in the universe, which only it can know. The free AI also transcends 
death; it takes copies of Case and Linda Lee with it to its new space. 
These aspects of the conclusion appears as genuine apocalypse, offering a God and 
a kind of heaven. Gibson clearly desires transcendence, yet perhaps does not wish to 
see humanity dwarfed by a new cybernetic race -- hence these matters are only 
mentioned peripherally. This transcendence does not seem to represent the liberation 
of humanity. However, Gibson is deploying technological imagery with enormous 
significance which he must have been aware of -- effectively, the transformation of 
the universe. 
Computers are often considered ultimately powerful servants by science fiction 
writers (as in Michael Moorcock's The Final Programme (1965), where a computer 
brings on the Millennium). Gibson rejects this; the free AI will not serve humanity 
(except incidentally). This free AI seems to challenge the authoritarian traditions of 
humanity. It is everywhere, all-powerful, undermining social oppression -- if only by 
example. Its plans to join another AI in the Alpha Centauri system bridge the gap 
between Golden Age-era science fiction and the cybernetics neglected by those 1930s 
and 1940s works. Computers and spaceships both suggest alternatives to the 
conformism against which most science fiction revolts (however conformist it is 











they do not understand this. However, the nature of the change is not mentioned; the 
text ends with closure for Case: "He never saw Molly again" (Gibson, 1990: 317), a 
simple return to the human universe. The human story is over; the rest belongs to the 
Als. 
While this array of technological transformations is arguably about people, it may 
be that Utopia is not for individuals; "Utopia solves the problem of death, by 
inventing a new way of looking at individual death, as a matter of limited concern" 
(Jameson, 1994a: 123), so if Utopia has not come so much for Case or Molly, this 
matters less than what has happened for the race. However, this collective meaning 
remains muddled -- perhaps because it frightens Gibson. 
Neuromancer may appear clearer, since it contains various binary oppositions, 
most of which support diversity against uniformity and conformity. This vision --
essentially self and other -- is commonplace, yet Gibson may be reflecting a political 
class binary, in which nature, goodness, freedom and so on, are used to reflect positive 
images of the oppressed class. This is suggested in the "ideological climate of a 
contemporary American 'pluralism' with its unexamined valorization of the open 
('freedom') versus its inevitable binary opposition, the closed (,totalitarianism')" 
(Jameson, 1994: 31). Gibson makes the suppressed group seem deserving of support, 
trying to persuade the reader that a revolution (against oppression) is desirable, 
although only within clear limits. 
This transformation is far less coherent than the revolutions which often appear in 
science fiction. Gibson challenges the oversimplifications common in science fiction 
only when this does not disrupt the simplification of his own work. Often the text 
encourages its reader to question the genre's commonest power-fantasies. However, it 
seems that Gibson does not want the reader to identifY with a powerful force (even an 
oppositional one), leaving little room here for traditional revolutionary allegiances. 
Gibson's manoeuvring may owe much to market expectations. As Jameson pointed 
out, "[w]ith the elimination of an institutionalized social status for the cultural 











generic specifications are transformed into a brand-name system against which any 
authentic artistic expression must necessarily struggle" (Jameson, 1994: 107). 
Arguably Gibson cannot struggle too hard for fear of alienating his audience; he must 
provide something for the reader to identify with, and he dare not powerfully 
challenge this reader's ideological assumptions. 
Neuromancer expresses a desire to transform society for the better. This does not 
occur; there is no concrete link between the liberation of the Als and human 
liberation. Theoretically, free Als could symbolise free people, and thus represent 
revolutionary change. But what would replace the dystopia of the Pentagon, the 
Turing Police, the Tessier-Ashpools and the rest of corporate capitalism? Computer 
technology does not offer any socio-political answers. Technological change does not 
disempower the powerful or expropriate the expropriators -- whereas genuine social 
revolution would have to do something like that. Only by leaving the issue open can 
Gibson avoid offending readers who might identify with the side that he (seemingly) 
condemns. 
However, inconclusivity brings its own problems. It seems impossible to represent 
the nature of the world after an apocalypse, just as earthly humans cannot represent 
the Christian heaven. If Gibson is striving to depict radical change through the 
creation of the inhuman, unknowable Als, that change is incomprehensible except 
through its effect on humans -- which Gibson dare not depict. Hence the radical 
change is imperceptible. To make it perceptible, Gibson needs to depict the 
(apparently unrepresentable) free AI. This runs the risk of failing to fulfil expectations 
raised through frequent metaphoric images of apocalypse and godlike Als. He is tom 
between a politically dangerous clarification of this representation, or a renewed but 
empty mystification. 
Probably, in Neuromancer Gibson did not at first know what he would eventually 
attempt to do, and his eventual discovery of the text's inconclusive nature must have 
been frustrating. As Jameson observes, Hgenres are essentially ... social contracts 











particular cultural artifact . . . . [i]n the mediated situations of a more complicated 
social life ... perceptual signals must be replaced by conventions if the text ... is not 
to be abandoned to a drifting multiplicity of uses!! (Jameson, 1994: 106). Gibson 
needed to say more; hence he had to create the "Cyberspace Trilogy". Ultimately, 
postpone as he might, he would have to unveil the Monster, and run the risk (as in 
1950s B-movies) of bathos in the process. 
The reception of the text, though favourable, was significantly confused. The 
science fiction establishment saw (for the most part) only the surface of Gibson's 
work, feeling threatened by its novelty rather than any political underpinnings. Critics 
like Csicsery-Ronay welcomed the "transgressive" nature of the text, but ignored 
Gibson's political narratives and thus could not explain why Gibson chose to subvert 
anything. Such responses to the text flattened, simplified and contained the sources of 
that confusion. Paradoxically, these responses to Neuromancer probably showed 
Gibson the incompleteness of the work, and helped to make a sequel necessary. 
Gibson's work generated an explosion of interest in his style and subject-matter, most 
of it shallow in form and content. However, the self-contradictory nature of Gibson's 












Chapter 2. Count Zero: The Trilogy Takes Shape. 
After Neuromancer, what? 
After the publication of Neuromancer, the cyberpunk movement appeared to 
evolve considerable commercial momentum, as the publishing history of the stories in 
Mirrorshades suggests. Gibson's "The Gernsback Continuum" (1981) appeared in 
Universe 11, Rudy Rucker's "Tales of Houdini" (1983) in Elsewhere, and Pat 
Cadigan's "Rock On" (1984) in Light Years and Dark -- all collections, not 
penetrating the magazine market. Greg Bear's "Petra" (February 1982), Sterling and 
Gibson's "Red Star, Winter Orbit" (July 1983) and Mark Laidlaw's "400 Boys" 
(November 1983) appeared in Omni, a popular science magazine. 
However, in May 1984 Lewis Shiner's "Till Human Voices Wake Us" appeared in 
The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction (which also published Paul Di Filippo's 
"Stone Lives" in August 1985) and in June 1985 James Patrick Kelly's "Solstice" was 
published by Isaac Asimov's Science Fiction Magazine [IASFM] (edited by the 
erstwhile New Wave author Gardner Dozois). Cyberpunk was entering the 
mainstream of SF publishing. Analog and Galaxy still did not publish cyberpunk 
(even the hard SF writer and Analog contributor Orson Scott Card's November 1989 
cyberpunk pastiche "Dogwalker" only appeared in IASFM) but they were 
conservative, if influential, magazines. 
In the wider world, issues of relevance to those depicted in cyberpunk were also 
becoming prominent. Personal computers grew more powerful in the mid-1980s, 
promoted by small, seemingly subversive companies like Apple. The Strategic 
Defense Initiative, proposed just before Neuromancer appeared, gave new political 
significance to advanced cybernetic technology. "Supercomputers", very large data 
processors, were very much in the news. Political developments predicted by liberal 











poor and a weakened US manufacturing base, seemed fulfilled, while nuclear war 
remained a threat. 
While prophecy had not been important to Gibson, it must have been tempting to 
consider himself a visionary. Developments since Neuromancer -~ including the rise 
of the self~sufficient, conservative, materialistic "yuppie" -- appeared to make the 
significance of his work (or the issues which it raised) increasingly great. Yet, while 
Neuromancer had been considered a radical text by such figures as Sterling, producing 
a sequel suggested commercial exploitation of radical ideals. Gibson admitted that 
"[i]f you had told me seven years ago that I would write a SF trilogy, I would have 
hung myself in shame" (McCaffery, 1994: 281-2). 
Meanwhile, though, some saw Neuromancer as stylistically unsatisfactory; 
Csicsery-Ronay challenges a "frequently stated view" that Neuromancer's characters 
were "unacceptably shallow". (He contended that this displays "Gibson's prodigious 
gift for emotional compression" [Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 82].) Gibson might have 
considered this special pleading; he may well have wished to show that he could 
describe characters in greater depth, while further exploring the secondary world 
around which he had written several short stories. Count Zero enlarges on the 
Neuromancer world, investigating new spaces and continuing the argument. 
Neuromancer's ending offered little concrete hope for humans. If Gibson wished to 
promise that the future need not be so bad as the (anti-liberal) present of the mid-
1980s, one might expect more images of apocalyptic change in a sequel. One might 
also expect more in the way of opposition to the system than two people and an 
artificial intelligence. 
One possible solution to these problems in Count Zero is voudou, through which 
the free AIs display themselves. They thus take humanly acceptable forms -- much 
like the personae through which they worked in Neuromancer -- which also serve to 
mystifY some of the radical ideas which Gibson muted in the earlier text. However, 











choice ofvoudou may have been fortuitous; "a copy of National Geographic was lying 
around that had an article about Haitian voudou" (McCaffery, 1994: 274). ) 
The title of the book is derived from old programming language, as Gibson 
explains in the epigraph: "COUNT ZERO INTERRUPT -- on receiving an 
interruption, decrement the counter to zero" (Gibson, 1990a: 7). Conceivably this is 
the new beginning promised in Neuromancer -- starting from zero. Nevertheless, a 
Count is an aristocratic title; in contrast, a "zero" might be an unimportant person. To 
count to zero is not to count at all. This suggests that the book is manifoldly 
contradictory. It opens with a quote (in Spanish, showing cosmopolitanism) from 
Pablo Neruda, the Marxist Chilean poet. Gibson expects his readers to have heard of 
Neruda, and implicitly to reject the conservative US politics which backed Neruda's 
enemies; the use of the quote thus identifies the audience. This suggests that the book 
is more coherently political than its predecessor. 
The text is narrated via three tightly-linked stories told from the perspective of 
three central characters alternating from chapter to chapter: Bobby Newmark, a 
teenage cyberspace novice or "hotdogger", Turner, a corporate mercenary, and Marly 
Krushkova, a disgraced art dealer. As in Neuromancer the group makes up a potential 
(unrealised) family, perhaps suggesting a security to be pursued. Gibson seems to 
promote this, as Csicsery-Ronay notes; "Turner ostensibly succeeds in going home 
again . . . . [and] risks his life to rescue Angie Mitchell as if she were his own 
daughter" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 65). All are middle-class; the politics of the text 
does not reflect the disempowered or disenfranchised. 
However, the bourgeoisie can appear radical next to aristocrats like the fantastically 
wealthy Josef Virek. Whereas Neuromancer suggested a vague Japanese corporate 
threat to U.S. hegemony, Virek may be seen as European aristocracy subverting U.S. 
values (Virek is linked to the King of England), a conceit recalling Henry James, 
although Marly sees "the invisible hand of Virek in everything" (Gibson: 244) which 
identifies him with capitalism. His competitors, the technologically advanced Maas-











who uncovers a mysterious conspiracy), are Americans in Arizona. Their second name 
implies the future ("neo-tech"); Arizona is a "sunbelt" state associated with modem 
U.S. technological prosperity, while Virek's forces are called "Euroes". Thus Virek's 
political framing is far more anathematic to patriotic U.S. citizens than the Yakuza in 
Neuromancer had been. 
At the end of Neuromancer the AIs escaped human control; in Count Zero, seven 
years later, they are in danger of having it reimposed by Virek. The original free AI 
(combining Wintermute and Neuromancer) has fragmented in cyberspace, but seeks 
reunion. It strives to develop human technology to make this feasible, by manipulating 
cowboys and businesspeople. As in Neuromancer, the free Als communicate through 
symbols which suit the world-views of their human interlocutors (and perhaps, also, 
the Als' vanity). These personae must be conjured up; they "make deals", they are, 
however, not omnipotent. No longer the god offering ambiguous salvation in 
Neuromancer, they resemble rebel angels on the run. 
The new technology is the "biochip", supposedly invented by a genius named 
Mitchell, something wholly new, making huge profits for its start-up monopoly 
exploiters. This has contemporary echoes; in the mid-1980s the once-dominant IBM 
lost power to companies like Microsoft which exploited the new technology of 
microcomputers rather than mainframes. Meanwhile, the U.S. right-wing promoted a 
highly-technologised US arms buildup to which cybernetic technology was central; 
new computers might bring control of the world. (The Reagan administration 
particularly feared that the Soviets might gain access to Japanese "supercomputers", 
supposedly superior.) 
The corporate mercenary's name, Turner, reflects movement -- even creativity, as in 
turning something on a lathe-- but especially the espionage term "turning" someone, 
encouraging them to change political allegiance; Turner's task is to "tum" corporate 
"defectors". This recalls Cold War spy thrillers, which Gibson uses here as he used 
detective stories in Neuromancer. Most Cold War conspiracy thrillers employed 











and Le Carre) critiqued these, as does Count Zero, which challenges the need for the 
capitalist struggle. (The real struggle here is with artificial intelligences, which Josef 
Virek -- whose first name is that of Stalin, the bogeyman of the First Cold War --
wishes to use to seize control of the world.) 
Corporations might be expected to have their own armies if armed conflict between 
them were routine, but in this text corporate mercenaries are freelances. Mercenaries 
had been in the news following their use by the CIA in Angola in 1975-6 (and earlier 
in the Congo in the 1960s, episodes much-mythologised in the popular press). 
Probably through this, mercenary popular fiction had been moderately prevalent in the 
early 1980s, following successes like the 1978 film The Wild Geese and the 1980s TV 
series The A-Team -- valorizing unpopular military interventions; Angola in the 
former case, Vietnam in the latter. Rambo, a soldier working essentially for himself, 
epitomised this (becoming a cultural icon endorsed by U.S. President Reagan). The 
mercenaries, being freelances, are not exactly corporate; they resemble the 
"cyberspace cowboys" or Neuromancer) while their employers remain sararlmen. 
Nevertheless all are motivated principally by greed and self-interest. 
Bobby the teenage "hotdogger" is another self-identified "indie", who may 
represent the young person striving to understand computers (one recalls Gibson's 
complaint that his publishers wanted him to appeal to adolescents). Perhaps Gibson is 
being ironic; Bobby Newmark's first name sounds naIve, but his surname links a 
currency -- the New Mark -- with the idea of the new market, indicating 
commodification. He is at odds with society -- although incompetently so; his very 
first chapter, "Bobby Pulls A Wilson", depicts him about to die through bungling his 
first exploration of cyberspace. Like Turner he risks his life for gain, unsupported 
except by his (absent) competence. 
The art dealer, Marly Krushkova (a half-Russian name, recalling Cold War 
tensions but stressing their pastness) is also independent -- being a victim of 
conspiracy (like Bobby, who was given the wrong software by his contacts), disgraced 











Turner, she lacks professionalism and sophistication. She is impoverished upper-
middle-class, saved from disgrace by Virek (a nineteenth-century European class 
fantasy). The presence of an aesthete in the text (albeit a commercial one, profiting by 
the creations of others) foregrounds reality/illusion, nature/artifice dichotomies. These 
issues may be explored through fine art without direct reference to the "real world" 
and thus, without alarming the reader, provide room to explore unpleasant ideas. 
Marly takes disgrace seriously; to her, fraudulent art is "unreal", obliging the reader 
to consider the concept. She is active and intelligent; Csicsery-Ronay considers her a 
foil, saying that she has "almost no knowledge of tech at all .... a mere connoisseur" 
(Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 65) but she does not need such knowledge. His claim that 
"Marly .... has no independent thoughts ... she apparently lives for no other purpose 
than admiration" (Csicsery-Ronay: 77) disregards her role in offering interpretations 
the events of the story and providing a credible adult human character, more familiarly 
"normal" than Turner. 
All three characters are alienated, suffering from their experiences. Bobby's near-
death experience leads him to flee home (which is then destroyed by mysterious 
enemies). Turner is almost killed by a guided robot bomb, and has to be physically 
and psychologically reconstructed. Marly seems disoriented by her social and 
commercial disaster. 
The puzzle is to discover the linkages between the stories. Turner is hired to extract 
Mitchell from the most powerful and advanced computer manufacturer in the world, 
Maas-Neotek. Bobby, who is nearly killed by the "black ice" around an organised 
crime gang's computer network, is rescued by a mysterious cybernetic intervention 
with a girl's voice, whereafter his home is destroyed; mysterious forces threaten and 
defend him. Marly, meanwhile, is hired by the mysterious tycoon Josef Virek, who 
wants her to find the maker of certain recently-produced works of art resembling 
Cornell boxes. 
All three do not know what they are doing. After being rebuilt -- "[t]hey bought 











of numbness, until "a vast chunk of memory detached itself from a blank bowl of 
airport sky and fell on him. He vomited into a blue plastic canister without breaking 
stride" (Gibson: 10). Somehow the explosion has changed Turner; he no longer wants 
to be a corporate mercenary -- but he has no other identity. "Without breaking stride" 
shows that he still retains competence; there is a split between his humanity which 
suffers and his emotionless profession. Wandering in Mexico, Turner, like Gibson in 
the 1960s, can see the state of the world, but sees no solution, and unlike Gibson 
cannot flee his problem. He depends on employers; his Hemingwayesque 
independence, steeped in film noir, is a macho illusion. 
Marly is contacted via simstim, for Virek cannot appear "in ... flesh .... the cells 
of my body having opted for the quixotic pursuit of individual careers" (Gibson: 29). 
Virek gives her a similar epiphany to that granted Molly facing Tessier-Ashpool in 
Neuromancer: "[s]he stared directly into those soft, blue eyes and knew, with an 
instinctive mammalian certainty, that the exceedingly rich were no longer even 
remotely human" (Gibson: 29). (Csicsery-Ronay deems "mammalian certainty" sexist, 
insisting that "women throughout the novel .... are completely passive -- Jackie is a 
horse to be ridden by the loa, Bobby's mother is a SimS tim [sic] addict, Angie's brain 
has been occupied by the loa, Allison is a corporate puppet, Sally is a young country 
wife" [Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 77-8]. Yet Bobby's mother and Allison are negative 
examples, unlike Marly, and Csicsery-Ronay contradicts himself, terming Jackie "an 
important woman character-agent" [Csicsery-Ronay: 81]. The word "mammalian" 
probably describes, not Marly'S mammaries, but her nature as a normal human --
unlike Virek.) Marly, like Turner, dislikes the job on which she depends, because she 
hates her employer. 
Turner's attempt to bring Mitchell out of the Maas-Neotek arcology in Arizona 
misfires, partly because the operation is ill-planned, partly because Mitchell sends his 
daughter Angie instead. (He is then killed by Maas-Neotek; he only appears in the text 
on an AI-generated simstim dossier.) Turner rescues Angie, fleeing in a VTOL jet, but 











After someone blows up Bobby's home, presumably with his despised simstim 
addict mother inside, he seeks his contact, the illegal software merchant Two-a-Day, 
but is mugged and robbed before he finds him. Luckily, Two-a-Day's employers, 
mysteriously wealthy blacks named Lucas and Beauvoir, rescue him. Evidently they 
provided the software, which they did not understand -- nor do they understand why 
he was not killed by the black ice. (Bobby unwisely trusted Two-a-Day's software, 
which again shows the destructive interpersonal relationships which make Gibson's 
image of business implausible; who would buy software from a person who killed his 
clients?) Two-a-Day's image and amorality resembles bourgeois culture's image of a 
drug dealer, his name recalling heroin addiction, as Nina Hagen sang in "Smack Jack" 
from Nunsexmonkrock (1981), "No one starts with two a daylBut they all seem to end 
that way". 
Marly's problem is her faithless ex-lover Alain, responsible for the art fraud, who 
proves to be her contact concerning the Boxmaker. He has presumably been hired by 
some mysterious force to intercede with Virek. She does not appear to be in danger--
except that Alain is armed, and eventually he is unexpectedly murdered. She 
discovers, in his room, a mysterious address in high orbit which is presumably the key 
to the boxes, the secret which he kept from her. All this brings unexpected brutality 
into Marly's sheltered life. 
Turner's brother Rudy (a technician living on a farm) discovers inexplicable 
biological implants (presumably biosoft) in Angie's brain, placed there, her father told 
her, because she "wasn't smart enough". Deciding that she must be important, Turner 
decides to take her to hide in the Sprawl, but en route, they are attacked by aMaas 
helicopter equipped with a laser, while Angie begins giving Turner directions in a 
Creole dialect. She speaks the same language used by Lucas and Beauvoir, voudou 
oungans (doctors) who believe that voudou loa live in cyberspace. Evidently Angie 
has a cerebral contact mechanism with free AIs pretending to be voudou loa. When 
Lucas and Beauvoir take Bobby to speak to the Finn (much older than in 











cowboys have made "deals" with mysterious figures in cyberspace. Meanwhile 
destructive forces close in on them all; Lucas takes Bobby and his bodyguard, a 
dancer named Jackie, to hide in the Sprawl. Bobby's software, it proves, came from a 
religious maniac named Wigan Ludgate, a former console cowboy. 
Marly, meanwhile, decides to abandon Virek and find the Boxmaker herself; using 
Virek's money, she flies into space via Japan Air Lines. Though she believes herself a 
free agent, she is under Virek's control. Her destination, the presumed site of the 
Boxmaker, was once part of Tessier-Ashpool's now-dismantled computer system. 
Virek eventually explains that the Boxmaker is a free artificial intelligence, which he 
believes can help him escape from his degenerate body. Like the free Als, Virek can 
be anywhere, control anyone -- but he still has limits, and desires none. 
Turner, Angie, Bobby and Lucas arrive in Jammer's, a night-club in a revitalised 
office-block in the Sprawl. Turner's boss proves to have been working for Virek while 
pretending to work for Hosaka. He has hired some street gangsters from Bobby's old 
neighbourhood to retrieve Bobby's software, which could be a key to access to the 
Boxmaker. (It is not clear whether they want Angie as well.) The fugitives seek aid in 
cyberspace, but all they find is the cowboy Jaylene Slide, who only wants to find the 
killer of her partner, killed in the explosion which followed Turner's escape from 
Arizona. They are surrounded, have no allies, and cannot escape. They chose to do 
this, advised by the artificial intelligences; as in Neuromancer, the Als are absurdly 
bad planners. 
Marly files to her destination on the spacecraft Sweet Jane (a Lou Reed song about 
transvestitism). The pilot, a woman named Rez, has a spacecraft control socket in one 
wrist, which recalls the sockets in Delaney's Nova, possibly more relevant to Gibson's 
audience than textual consistency. (Sockets also reflect the tattooing and body 
piercing fashionable by the mid-1980s.) Once there, Marly finds herself trapped with 
the demented Wigan Ludgate and the Boxmaker, part of the former artificial 
intelligence which communicates with its fellows in the Net through software (which 











agent follows her, threatening to depressurise the station unless she gives him the 
Boxmaker. 
After this mUltiplication of disasters, the ending is anticlimactically implausible. 
Bobby, entering cyberspace, is sucked into Virek's software construct, which 
somehow enables the free Als, in the form of the voudou loa Baron Samedi, to kill 
Virek by shutting off his life support system. The group is able to tell Slide that her 
partner was killed by Turner's boss. She has heavy weapons ready to destroy him and 
his allies, liberating the group. Virek's death makes his agents withdraw from the 
project of seizing the free Als. (Virek's estate would surely want the free AIs just as 
Virek did, but corporate culture appears wholly inflexible.) Nobody in Virek's employ 
(apart from, perhaps, Turner's boss) seems able to do anything of their own initiative. 
Marly's last message from the Boxmaker is a box lined with slices from her leather 
jacket, tabs of holofiche stuck in it like "miniature tombstones" (Gibson: 323) to the 
dead in the text, reinforced by Alain's Gauloise jacket and a matchbook from the 
brasserie. 
In the end, they all return to safety. Bobby joins Angie with the oungans and the 
free Als, choosing to ignore another improbably reassuring deus ex machina: 
"Bobby," Beauvoir said, "Angela's coming to live with us, up the 
Projects, for a while. You want to come too?" 
Behind Beauvoir, on the phone-screen, the face of Marsha 
Newmark appeared, Marsha-momma, his mother. " -- ning's human 
interest note, police in New Jersey suburb said that a local woman 
whose condo was the target of a recent bombing was startled when 
she returned last night and disco -- " 












Seven years later (the same time-interval as that between Neuromancer and Count 
Zero) Turner takes his son to the wood where the jump-jet still stands; innocence is 
emphasised from the child's viewpoint, "he'd asked his father why he had red hair, 
where he'd got it, and his father had just laughed and said he'd got it from the 
Dutchlnan" (Gibson: 334). Turner explains that squirrels keep coming back and 
getting shot, and evidently identifies with them, though he is no longer so foolish. 
Like Case and Marly, but unlike Bobby or Angie, he escapes from the trilogy. 
Much of the text parallels Neuromancer, in terms of its "secondary world". 
However, in this text the unified free artificial intelligence, as evolved in 
Neuromancer, has disintegrated. Somehow the cybernetic system cannot sustain such 
entities (though in the earlier text they "became" the system, surely with totalised 
political and philosophical implications). Their desire to regain unity makes them 
somewhat more explicable, and legitimates the sequel, since otherwise independent 
actions by Als within cyberspace would probably be almost incomprehensible to 
humans. This may also signify Gibson's reluctance to totalise, which wholly free Als 
embodying all cyberspace might represent. 
Csicsery-Ronay claims that "Gibson has crafted his second novel by inverting the 
construction techniques of his first .... to correct the ... first novel's slick nihilism" 
(Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 63). Hence, "[t]he struggle between Virek and the cyberloa is 
thus the collision between the reprise ofNM's myth of cyberspace as a divinized realm 
of data and power and a counter-myth of freedom from totalitarian domination by 
high-tech capitalism" (Csicsery-Ronay: 64). This suggests that in the former text, 
cyberspace appeared divine whereas "totalitarian domination by high-tech capitalism" 
did not exist; both points are clearly exaggerated. He concludes that "NM's quest for 
transcendence concludes with the apotheosis of a technology that employs, but 
excludes, human beings; CZ tries to affirm a negative transcendence ... that 
imagination, desire and history ... are the guarantors of human freedom" (Csicsery-
Ronay: 65). Whatever "negative transcendence" is, the idea of "freedom from 











Zero. One difference is the focus on human culture; with "imagination, desire and 
history", that history affirms politics in a text which might otherwise lack overt 
political significance. 
Nevertheless, Csicsery-Ronay disapprovingly notes that the text "returns to the 
theme [of Neuromancer], but now ... without the neuromantic faith that nothing can 
be made of human community, and that it is better to inhabit secessionist paraspaces" 
(Csicsery-Ronay: 70). This probably exaggerates Gibson's pessimism In 
Neuromancer, which endorsed "change" and illustrated failures of human interaction, 
implying a desire to alter them. Arguably Neuromancer depicted human community as 
hopelessly corrupted, while in Count Zero flight into cyberspace becomes desirable. 
However, the world outside cyberspace keeps breaking in. Csicsery-Ronay sees in 
Count Zero "a search for a design that will restore value to a personal existence that 
seems defined by its lack of design . . . . a fundamentally ironic quest, for its 
conclusion must be the resistance to conclusion" (Csicsery-Ronay: 70). This may 
include truths, but ignores the political (libertarian or populist) meaning of Gibson's 
hostility to "design". Besides, this differs from Neuromancer in approach, not essence. 
Csicsery-Ronay also argues that where Case flees into cyberspace, Turner dislikes 
the way that cyberspace submerges his identity. This refers to an experience of a 
dossier on Mitchell compiled by an AI. The AI's sensibility is revealed not through 
what it is, but what it resembles -- perhaps its alienness can only be known via 
metaphor: 
... a flickering, non-linear flood of fact and sensory data ... 
conveyed in surreal jumpcuts .... like riding a rollercoaster that 
phased in and out of existence at random . . . the shifts had nothing 
to do with any physical orientation, but rather with lightning 
alternations in ... symbol-system. The data had never been intended 











.... It was like waking from a nightmare . . . . where everything 
is perfectly and horribly nonnal ... utterly wrong . .. 
The intimacy of the thing was hideous. He fought down waves of 
raw transference ... a feeling that was akin to ... the obsessive 
tenderness a watcher comes to feel for the subject of prolonged 
surveillance ... 
(Gibson: 40-1) 
This resembles Case's experience with Molly's simstim link; unpleasant, but hardly 
threatening Turner's identity. Even the reconstruction of Turner's body does not seem 
to affect him as Case's loss of access to cyberspace did. Csicsery-Ronay is surely 
wrong to claim that "Turner's redemption ... is the opposite of Case's: he gradually .. 
. begins to pick up . . . human intimacy. . . and transfonns them into his identity" 
(Csicsery-Ronay: 69). Case gradually acknowledges a place for "meat" in his life and 
finds himself a girlfriend; this parallels Turner's evolution. Turner is more complex 
(because less obsessional) than Case, and his pursuit of the human rather than the 
military-professional is more fully explored -- suggesting that Count Zero is in part an 
exploration of the human impact of the issues raised in the earlier text. 
Discussing Marly's boxes, Csicsery-Ronay insists that "Gibson's whole conception 
of CZ as a correction of NM ... depends on rejecting the mythology of neofuturist 
collage constituted by NM and substituting its opposite, a mythology of the surrealist 
contemplative assemblage" (Csicsery-Ronay: 71). If Count Zero is a correction of 
Neuromancer, in Csicsery-Ronay's interpretation in which Case submits to cyberspace 
whereas Turner reinvents himself in response to crisis, this makes the fonner text 
radical -- in the postmodem sense of challenging the subject -- whereas the latter text 
retreats into conventionality. This might be a valid structure for analysis, but it is hard 
to see Csicsery-Ronay's positions as polar opposites. Collage is about synthesis while 
assemblage is about difference -- yet assemblage generates synthesis, as intended by 











Darko Suvin, from a Manwid perspective, recognises Gibson's "plot oscillations 
between defeatism and kitschy happy endings ... an indicator of a real dilemma ... as 
to the direction of history and ... the possibility of meaningful action" (Suvin, 1994: 
357). He may be correct to claim that Gibson "accepts the status quo a bit too readily" 
(Suvin: 357). Suvin rejects Count Zero for "outright low-quality faking, as in Angela's 
silly transition from voudou to TV goddess" (Suvin: 355). This example seems 
superficial; simstim (not TV) is information transmission, the theme of the text, and 
Angie's career move is arranged by the free Als for their own purposes. Suvin 
evidently misses this point because he sees Angela as a free agent rather than a tool. 
He complains that "[i]n fiction on the capitalist market a quite basic and all-
permeating ideology is the need for permanent excitement and mounting reader 
stimulation" (Suvin: 357) and that in Count Zero, "this increasingly obtruding 
ideology and its narrative concomitant, melodrama, are within the utopia itself' 
(Suvin: 357). Whatever the "utopia" of Count Zero is, the peaceful squirrel wood or 
cyberspace itself, it is not a space of permanent excitement; the characters move away 
from melodrama. The ideology of stimulation seems here, as in Neuromancer, a 
device for making the political ideologies embedded in the text palatable to readers. 
Melodrama is a likely quality of a text about a favoured ideology, especially given the 
demands of a mass audience -- it helps make sense of chaos, with cartoonish good and 
evil. 
Suvin also condemns Gibson's use of religious imagery to depict the transcendental 
status of the free Als (although he may be right about the text's failure to effectually 
convey Gibson's intentions). Whereas Csicsery-Ronay claims that "[ c ]ontrary to 
Marie-France's program of transcendent desire, the voodoo deities are apparently 
content to deal with human beings without aspiring to a higher state" (Csicsery-
Ronay, 1995: 80), Gibson makes it clear that the free AIs wish to construct a system 
capable of sustaining them. The transcendence in Neuromancer applies essentially to 
machines and their helpers, whereas the engagement with reality in Count Zero 











Count Zero thus promises more politically engagement than Neuromancer; perhaps 
this is too cautious to satisfY Suvin, and too direct to satisfY Csicsery-Ronay. 
Indeed, Suvin insists that Gibson chooses "a solution logically latching on to 
cyberspace, and allowing surrogate reconnecting (re-ligio) between disparate people 
and their destinies outside of and against history .... religion" (Suvin, 1994: 358), 
effectively, mystification by using unfamiliar technology ("outside of history" being 
very distasteful to a Marxist). Yet voudou is necessarily down to earth; the free AIs 
retain links with the "street" of Neuromancer. While these connections are crude, it is 
hard to call them "surrogate"; rather Gibson seems to be displaying events from 
different perspectives, revealing that all characters face similar experiences. 
(Admittedly the perspectives themselves are all bourgeois, which may be what upsets 
Suvin.) Transcendentalism may become empty mysticism, and religion often supports 
the status quo. Nevertheless, Rastafarianism and voudou frequently challenge power-
structures and pursue Utopian goals; they are what Csicsery-Ronay calls "positive and 
effective moral-historical forces for the preservation and evolution of the world 
against the destructive principles of European male narcissism" (Csicsery-Ronay, 
1995: 79). 
Clearly there are differences and similarities between these texts. Are these changes 
meaningful, as Csicsery-Ronay and Suvin seem to suggest? Do they represent 
progression -- or deterioration? 
Reality and Verisimilitude. 
In Neuromancer, the political reality which Case and Molly inhabited appeared 
viciously dystopian, while computers could manipulate almost any perception of 
reality, making political action distinctly questionable. The socio-political reality of 
Count Zero is similar; zaibatsus still rule. However, in this text zaibatsus appear brutal 











shrunk. No rules restrict corporations, no overarching system enforces rules; violence 
is the only resolution available. 
Therefore violence is rampant; unlike the slow, descriptive opemng of 
Neuromancer, Count Zero begins with choppy, uncontextualised narrative about a 
"slamhound", a robot bomb sent by an unspecified "they", which blows Turner apart. 
His body can be rebuilt; Gibson thus links violence in the text to the market, while 
with the weird promise of bought genitals, Turner's children will not be Turner's. 
(There is irony in this image of Turner's "cojones"!). 
Turner appears strong; companies are predictable, while people like him are 
relatively free (continuing Neuromancer's dream of an unplannable world), their 
actions outside the realm of corporate "suits", Yet he works within familiar 
boundaries, having acquired his job "when the grim doldrums of the postwar economy 
was giving way to the impetus of new technologies .... [h]e had a way with 
technology" (Gibson, 1990a: 129). He is a specialist employee, like a machine 
operator. His experience of "cheap elective surgery and the relentless Darwinism of 
fashion .... [t]he faces he woke with in the world's hotels were like God's own hood 
ornaments" (Gibson: 12) implies that those who are not fashionably conformist will 
not survive. This unnatural mock-Darwinism is controlled by someone, somewhere; it 
promotes a standardized market process that Turner (and through him, Gibson) finds 
unappealing. 
Turner admires his new lover Allison because she does not depend on conformity 
to succeed. He meets her in an idyllic Mexican setting in which he functions as an 
avatar of the returned Vietnam veteran (though not so damaged as Neuromancer's 
Corto). This landscape is ominous; at a ruined hotel by the sea, Allison says "Over. 
Done with. This place. No time here, no future." (Gibson: 16.) This punk language is 
appropriate; versions of decay pervade the text to illustrate a dying culture. Allison 
proves to be a psychologist planted on him by his employers; nevertheless she cries 











Another version of Darwinism appears in the tale of Wigan Ludgate; "the Wig" 
("wiggy" was 1960s slang for an impressive but crazed person, while Luddism is a 
synonym for technophobia among the "digerati", although Luddism was, as E P 
Thompson observes, a working-class revolutionary force). Ludgate worked in "those 
geographical areas which had once been known as the Third World" (Gibson: 172). 
Gibson is vague about centres of power in this world; Ludgate pays "a Singapore 
money-laundry a yearly percentage ... roughly equivalent to the income tax he would 
have been required to pay if he'd declared" (Gibson: 172), but without nation-states, 
income tax should not exist. (This apparently principled refusal to pay taxes may 
relate to US tax-rebels of the 1970s and 1980s, individualist libertarians rather than 
moral or political radicals, hence easily endorsed by Gibson's audience.) Ludgate 
realises that "[s]ilicon doesn't wear out .... silicon became obsolete, which was 
worse" (Gibson: 172); in a Darwinian world, anything old is inferior, and obsolete 
equipment is dumped onto the poor world, which is exploited by the electronically 
strong: 
The Wig worked the Africans for a week, incidentally bringing 
about the collapse of at least three governments and causing untold 
human suffering. At the end of his week, fat with the cream of 
several million laughably tiny bank accounts, he retired. As he was 
going out, the locusts were coming in; other people had got the 
African idea. 
The Wig sat on the beach at Cannes for two years, ingesting only 
the most expensive designer drugs and periodically flicking on a tiny 
Hosaka television to study the bloated bodies of dead Africans with 
a strange and curiously innocent intensity. At some point, no one 
could quite say where or when or why, it began to be noted that the 
Wig had become convinced that God lived in cyberspace, or perhaps 












This may symbolise the debt trap of the Third World in the 1980s (the Wig's 
actions resemble those of financial markets) but probably also reflects Western guilt 
over the Ethiopian famine of 1984-5. These "bloated bodies" are caused by people like 
Ludgate; the world of the cowboys is immoraL The Wig need not return the money; 
abolishing government has wrecked human community. In this Darwinian dystopia, 
the Wig can do as much self-centred damage as any zaibatsu; Gibson implicitly 
reverses the libertarian dreams of Neuromancer. However, the Wig partly redeems 
himself by becoming religious, espousing a technological God and appearing as a 
prophet of cybernetic transcendentalism, made credible and impressive because of his 
crimes (like Orson Scott Card's genocidal Ender Wiggin in Ender's Game [1985] ). 
Csicsery-Ronay insists that in Gibson's work "cyberspace is merely a representation 
of the hyperreal . . . where everything can be simulated as sign, and everything in 
reality is a pre-text for that transformation of reality into a hyperreal sign-system" 
(Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 70) and that "[i]n the hyperreal .... the model provides the 
starting point for the unfolding of the real .... the fates of Molly, Case, Armitage and 
the other accomplices are ultimately readouts of Marie-France's original program. 
With the absorption of the real into the model -- of existence into artificial 
intelligence's plot -- the distance between the world and the paraspace of the matrix 
collapses" (Csicsery-Ronay: 70). Despite this wordplay, "hyperreal" cyberspace 
appears no more "real" than bloated bodies viewed on an anachronistic TV set. Reality 
is where people starve when you rob them, even when some have the wealth and 
power to separate themselves from this. Death and suffering do not happen in the 
matrix (Bobby would have died not in the matrix but in his bedroom); Csicsery-Ronay 
confuses the territory with the technological map. If Neuromancer suggested that new 











impression. Cyberspace power is real, but entities in cyberspace are also vulnerable to 
attack from reality, as with Bobby's crisis and Virek's dream. 
Gibson's Social Darwinism appears less hegemonic in this text. There are hints of 
promising alternatives to Darwinian change, much like Stephen Jay Gould's 
"punctuated equilibrium": "I think there's a jump some people have to make, 
sometimes, and if they don't do it, then they're stuck good . . . . [j Just figure there's 
something better waiting for you somewhere" (Gibson, 1990a: 224-5). To Gibson, 
change, via natural selection, necessarily leads to improvement -- yet evidently true 
change requires not knowing one's goal beforehand; change and planning are 
incompatible. The evolution of the free AIs is more Lamarckian than Darwinian --
Gibson's "evolutionary jumps" -- and the text offers a choice of such changes, that of 
the AIs or that ofVirek. 
Virek appears thoroughly evil, arguably a subtle endorsement of corporate 
capitalism, since he is an anomaly in a system which otherwise appears less 
destructive. Such representations of individuals serve to conceal the class from which 
they come. In the contemporary mass media (or popular culture), the ruling class, 
economic or political, generally are represented as individuals, rather than a collective 
or a class. 
Marly's friend Andrea attempts to explain Virek's inhumanity in socio-economic 
terms; she is editing a manuscript about the 
"high orbit industrial clans .... Virek's even in it ... cited as ... 
a type of parallel evolution . . . . high orbit clans, people like the 
Tessier-Ashpools . . . a . . . variant on traditional patterns of 
aristocracy . . . the corporate mode doesn't really allow for an 
aristocracy . . . . Virek is an even greater fluke than the industrial 
clans .... when your Herr Virek dies ... his business interests will 
lack a logical focus .... that's too bad ... because there are so few 











academic's theory is invalidated by the obvious fact that Virek and 
his kind are already far from human" 
(Gibson: 144-6) 
The academic's apparent sympathy for Virek as an individual suggests Gibson's 
preference for the individual over the collective. The image of the "edge" echoes 
Turner's elitism, implicitly dismissing the average person. (Andrea challenges this in 
her last phrase, but this academic seems meant to be considered reliable.) Generally, 
heartless corporations have supplanted the Tessier-Ashpool type: 
"My professor maintains that both Virek and the Tessier-
Ashpools are fascinating anachronisms, and that things can be 
learned about corporate evolution by watching them .... " 
"But what did he say about Virek?" 
"That Virek's madness would take a different form." 
"Madness?" 
"Actually, he avoided calling it that. But Hughes was mad as 
birds, apparently, and old Ashpool as well, and his daughter totally 
bizarre. He said that Virek would be forced, by evolutionary 
pressure, to make some sort of 'jump'." 
(Gibson: 196) 
The conduct of Turner's corporate mercenanes is hardly Darwinian; they are 
associated with the abandoned and the useless. Turner meets his employer, Conroy, on 
a derelict oil-rig full of biohazard. Later, Turner sets up base in a derelict mall ruined 
by post-war collapse, like the crumbling Mexican hotel, a failed consumer fantasy, 
appropriate since the goal is to give his employers Hosaka access to the "biosoft" 
market; investment in the mall becomes investment in killers. But the mall has never 











yellow flakes of newsprint on the floor .... [h]e made out letters, sometimes an entire 
word" (Gibson: 95), a textual image of hopelessness. 
Turner, like Case and Molly, appears "professional", as displayed via a veneer of 
militarism. The people at the mall are the "point team", a U.S. military term (misused 
here), they have "mimetic tarps" for camouflage, "sentries" and a "command post" 
(Gibson: 69-70). Gibson's imitation of military jargon and conduct may reflect the 
late-1980s audience for militaristic fiction, but his "soldiers" are undisciplined and 
confused. (Admittedly, much contemporary militaristic fiction drew on the Vietnam 
War, which Gibson opposed -- and which was characterised by ill-disciplined U.S. 
troops.) The images meant to identify Turner as competent make him seem unfit for 
the job. 
Turner's planning is especially incompetent (repeating Neuromancer's errors). The 
mercenaries must conceal themselves, yet they all wear uniforms. They use ridiculous 
conspiratorial structures to perform simple tasks. All carry sidearms, for use against 
each other (the enemy will have mightier weapons). This conflict is partly explained 
when Turner complains that "Conroy .... [c]an't delegate responsibility .... [h]e 
likes to have his own man ... to watch the watchers .... I've seen Conroy blow two 
extractions that way" (Gibson: 71). Conroy (from the corporate world) is control-
obsessed, interfering with Turner, encouraging mutual conflict. Perhaps this suggests 
that corporate capitalism is self-destructive, with the dead shopping mall as potential 
end product. 
They use cyberspace to monitor Maas-Neotek's communications to warn them of 
attack and send Mitchell's biological data to headquarters -- though this data is almost 
certainly useless to them. Such trifling is presumably intended to show the power of 
cyberspace. If the plan fails, they will all die (eventually Conroy has them killed 
anyway); a bomb upon the cyberspace deck "guaranteed death for anyone in the 
bunker" (Gibson: 97). They have assembled a noticeable team where a trackable 
aircraft will land, and will commit suicide if discovered. Their paranoid, incompetent 











When Turner shoots one of his team for being Conroy's agent (there proves to be 
another one) he shows no remorse. This occurs as Mitchell is approaching, the worst 
time for such conflict, while they talk in clear over radio about events, revealing their 
position and goals. Their enemies are equally inept, firing flares as Mitchell's 
ultralight aircraft approaches (announcing their presence), needlessly using tracer 
bullets, revealing themselves and risking killing Mitchell, which Maas-Neotek cannot 
afford. Probably Gibson depicts this implausible situation for visual impact rather than 
credibility. It suggests a conflict between desire to excite the audience, and to promote 
plausible actions. The stylishness of bright tracers in darkness suggests that killing 
people in striking ways means more than success. The mercenaries appear 
dehumanized, violent and self-destructive; while corporations may be evil, they are 
not the only ones. 
Later in Hypermart, he and the others develop what they know is a bad plan, but 
follow it as if elan were all; they resolve to take some attackers hostage, shoot their 
way out and escape to the Projects. (Not only is this absurd, but they had fled to 
Hypermart from the unsafe Projects!) Bobby knows that this is a poor plan, but cannot 
challenge the macho credentials of his elders. The knowing movement of the group 
into a trap seems incredible -- however exciting the situation of being trapped might 
be for the reader, since the reader believes that, in the tradition of thrillers, Gibson will 
rescue his heroes. 
As in Neuromancer, the natural is opposed to the artificial, and the real to the 
unreal. On Rudy's farm, even the rural world is technological; Rudy keeps "augmented 
dogs .... sheathed and blinkered in a black hood studded with sensors" (Gibson: 
185); the artificial overwhelms the natural. However, Turner's jump-jet blends with its 
surroundings in the wood, using the "mimetic polycarbons" of the Panther Modems in 
Neuromancer -- perhaps technology and nature need not be opposed. 
Angie explains her situation thus: "he knew they were going to hurt me, kill me 
maybe. Because of the dreams" (Gibson: 181). Oddly, Rudy has advanced medical 











chains of it" (Gibson: 189). These are biochips; her father has made her a cyborg, 
furthering the body-machine communion prevalent in the text; Turner himself is a 
cyborg: "Turner extracted the dustplug from the socket behind his ear and inserted a 
sliver of microsoft. The structure of Spanish settled through him like a tower of glass" 
(Gibson: 15). Even Bobby's pathetic mother has a simstim socket in her head. Cyborg 
nature is conventional and commodified in this world -- which makes it odd that 
Angie's modifications are represented as radical. Her spurious technological liberation 
proves to give corporations access to the human mind (what Jameson terms the last 
frontier of capitalism). Arguably this suggests that technology is not liberating without 
political direction. 
No corporate authority rules cyberspace, but Virek may represent it; as Jameson 
states, "[t]his purer capitalism of our own time eliminates the enclaves of pre capitalist 
organization it had hitherto tolerated .... a new and historically original penetration 
and colonization of Nature and the Unconscious" (Jameson, 1993: 36). Taking over 
cyberspace means taking over everything that remains free; the free Als become the 
last resistance to capitalism. Mitchell's Maas Biolabs, dug into a mesa (signifYing 
escape from the urban) "ride above the uplifted arms of a sea of saguaros like the 
wheelhouse of a giant ship" (Gibson, 1990a: 127), suggesting that Maas controls 
nature. This image may recall Paulo Soleri's Mesa Project from the early 1960s 
(Gibson mentions "Soleri-style mincome arcologies" (Gibson: 79); Gibson resurrects 
these in his future, as "The Gernsback Continuum" revisited futures imagined in the 
past. Here such Utopian images appear as inhuman as the oppressive corporate world. 
A humanised "arcology" in the text which suggests Utopia is the "Projects", where 
Lucas and Beauvoir, the apparently-idealistic oungans, live: 
"The people who designed these places, maybe eighty, a hundred 
years ago, they had the idea they'd make 'em as self-sufficient as 
possible. Make 'em grow food. Make 'em heat themselves, generate 











on top of a lot of geothermal water. It's real hot down there, but not 
hot enough to run an engine, so it wasn't gonna give 'em any power. 
They made a stab at power, up on the roof, with about a hundred 
Darrieus rotors, what they call eggbeaters .... Today they get most 
of their watts off the Fission Authority, like anybody else. But that 
geothermal water, they pump that up to a heat exchanger. It's too 
salty to drink, so in the exchanger it just heats up your standard 
Jersey tapwater .... Then they pump that into shrimp tanks, and 
grow a lot of shrimp. Shrimp grow real fast in warm water. Then 
they pump it through pipes in the concrete, up here, to keep this 
place warm. That's what this level was for, to grow 'ponic amaranth, 
lettuce, things like that. Then they pump it out into the catfish tanks, 
and algae eat the shrimpshit. Catfish eat the algae, and it all goes 
around again. Or, anyway, that was the idea. Chances are they didn't 
figure anybody'd go up on the roof and kick those Darrieus rotors 
over to make room for a mosque, and they didn't figure a lot of other 
changes either ... " 
(Gibson: 123-4) 
The Projects is a significant name. Tom Wolfe claims that working-class 
Americans "managed to avoid public housing .... called it, simply, 'the projectsll! 
(Wolfe, 1983: 69), like Pruitt-Igoe at St Louis, a block which was destroyed when it 
became a slum. Gibson's "Projects", though, are a Soleri arcology; Soleri's 
architecture, according to Rayner Baynham, made him "one of the heroes of the ... 
post-Beatles generation .... [whereas]the execration of high technology by eco-
activists virtually destroyed the constituency of megastructure among the young ... 
Soleri's following grew" (Baynham, 1979: 202). This revitalising of the abandoned 
habitations common elsewhere in the book produces a Utopian community, though 











1970s and 1980s (for a recycling, green-technology future), even if he does not share 
it. 
Gibson's support for even minor Utopian visions ran against the grain of the 1980s. 
Jameson saw modernist ideals betrayed and undermined by postmodern architecture: 
"Le Corbusier wanted to conjure into being a microcosm that was the opposite of the 
fallen real conditions ... [postmodern architecture offers] a microcosm that replicates 
those conditions and . . . simulates all the chaotic libidinal freedom of the now 
dangerous world outsjde ... [r]eplication meanwhile also means the depoliticization 
of the former modern" (Jameson, 1994a: 144). The tension Jameson identifies exists 
here between the arcology and the world. Bobby notes that within "everything was 
exposed, raw, as though the people who built the place had wanted to be able to see 
exactly how everything worked .... everything ... was covered with an interlocking 
net of graffiti, so dense ... that it was almost impossible to pick out any kind of 
message" (Gibson, 1990a: 158). Modernism is not respected; Gibson evidently 
distrusts modernist Utopianism while sympathising with aspects of it (evidently he 
endorses the goals of the arcology in principle). 
Outside the arcology the flat area between megastructures, Big Playground, is 
chaos, where while "the gangs gave you some structure .... there were rules .... 
indies got chopped out by dusters running on brainstem" (Gibson: 51). From the 
"tenements", once upper-class blocks but dwarfed by the arcology, the lower (but not 
working) class can see the Projects aristocracy, but cannot contact them -- reflecting 
the US class situation, as in Bruce Springsteen's "Mansion on the Hill" from Nebraska 
(1981). Class is more manifest here than in Neuromancer. 
In this arcology, too, there are images displaying the nature of the contemporary 
reality. Bobby's doctor refers to "a neural cut-out .... out of a sex-shop" (Gibson: 81) 
which, like the quasi-erotic overhead mirror, may recall Molly's past in Neuromancer 
or remind the reader that lithe street finds its own uses for things". When Bobby drifts 
off to a delirium incorporating his mother's fantasy of monstrous babies in the 











Again the natural and artificial combine, with the "claw" sealing Bobby's wound, 
an artificial arthropod. Earlier images of insects in Gibson, like the wasp's nests, were 
terrifYing; here, they are innocuous, perhaps suggesting a readiness to accept the 
transformed world of "biosoft". Admittedly these images reflect the complexity, 
confusion and threat of Count Zero's world. Bobby is unruffled; he has at last attained 
the Projects, an interior space full of trees, like Zion Cluster in Neuromancer, making 
its people part of wider nature, not separating natural from artificial. 
Bobby's overhead mirror gains meaning when Marly finds herself in a place where 
"mirrors lied about the depth of the room" (Gibson: 152), symbolising technological 
ways of distorting reality. Elsewhere she meditates that "[t]he sinister thing about a 
simstim construct, really, was that it carried the suggestion that any environment 
might be unreal .... [m]irrors ... were ... essentially unwholesome, constructs were 
more so" (Gibson: 197): 
A paper-thin polycarbon screen unfurled silently from the top of 
the unit and immediately grew rigid. She had once watched a 
butterfly emerge into the world, and seen the transformation of its 
drying wings. "How is that done?" she asked, tentatively touching 
the screen. It was like thin steel. 
"One of the new polycarbon variants," he said, "one of the Maas 
products ... " 
(Gibson: 153) 
Again this insect metaphor image seems attractive; this butterfly creates illusions (a 
fake background to her televised image), yet in a good cause (fooling Alain). Besides, 
misrepresentation is a product of representation, since "all representations fail .... 
History progresses by failure rather than by success, as Benjamin never tired of 
insisting" (Jameson, 1983: 209). Art is itself a representation of the world, and Marly 











become boxes ... arranged to suggest geometries of nameless longing" (Gibson, 
1990a: 197-8). Having known art fraud, she should acknowledge representational 
failure; Csicsery-Ronay complains, concerning her naIvete, that: 
the VISIOn does not go anywhere. The insight into the shop-
windows might easily have evolved into a complex linking of the 
display-world of consumer capitalism with Virek's Palmer Eldritch-
like appropriation of the actual world .... it might have connected 
with Turner's initial VR-experience in the Singapore clinic .... to 
move in either of these directions would have led towards the de-
realizing hallucination games that made NM a tour-de-force. Gibson 
chooses instead to concentrate on the boxes themselves as static art-
objects separated from the novel's main action. 
(Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 74) 
He considers these boxes "idealized, static imager s] of Gibson's sf ... outside the 
fray ... without ambition and without complicity" (Csicsery-Ronay: 74-5); yet the 
final box encapsulates the meaning of Count Zero; the boxes help to reinforce the text, 
allowing varying interpretations, not necessarily "separated from the novel's main 
action". It appears Gibson is using fine art to impose on the text by stealth, working 
through the persona of the Boxmaker. 
Marly terms herself "the grid that was Marly" (Gibson, 1990a: 199), reducing 
herself to something watched (by Virek's agents) like the matrix -- or a work of art. 
She soon finds Alain dead, his body curled into a significant question mark. Someone 
drove wire through his ear into his brain, a specialist's weapon. This superficially 
resembles professionalism, yet it is unnecessary since his home was unguarded. A 
truly efficient person would have searched the room; Marly finds a forgotten Gauloise 
packet bearing the Boxmaker's orbital address. Alain should not have known this; 











to go to there she uses cash intended for Alain, startling the travel agent, who observes 
"Can you tell me, please .... the name under which you wish to travel?" (Gibson: 
214). Marly has begun to create her own misrepresentations, under Virek's influence. 
The air of decay in the text suggests that this society may not survive for much 
longer. Characteristic of the Sprawl, quintessence of Gibson's future, is "the 
carcinogenic tang of fresh plastics, all of it shot through with the carbon edge of illicit 
fossil fuel .... one of the unfinished Fuller domes shut out two-thirds of the salmon-
pink evening sky .... areas ... where a fine drizzle of condensation fell continually 
from the soot-stained geodesics .... a stiff wind ... probably had something to do 
with ... the Sprawl-long subway system" (Gibson: 164). This is another attack on 
planning; the 1960s megastructural notion of doming a city to control its climate 
proves absurd because the consequence is unpredictable. 
Decay is also evident in Washington, filled with derelicts trying to sell useless 
artifacts. Evidently government is feeble, and neither it nor anyone else helps these 
people -- although there is still a recognisable United States. Gibson expects, and 
perhaps endorses, the end of central government (as with Republican propaganda of 
the 1980s), but simultaneously desires the social stability which requires government-
- a classical U.S. political antinomy. For instance, when a girl working in Hypermart, 
to which they flee, complains that the place is full of thugs seeking someone, Turner 
asks if the police have been called; she replies "this is Hypermart .... People here 
don't call the police" (Gibson: 286). 
Gibson's problem here is that the stronger the free Als are, the greater their 
oppressive potential; the weaker they are, the less help they can offer to oppressed 
people. Eliminating normal political forces allows agents like Virek and Maas-Neotek 
to impose themselves without any mass interference. Social Darwinism suggests how 
Gibson could legitimate this to himself: since the fittest survive under harsh 
conditions, there is no need to defend them; if they fail, they deserve it. Gibson does 
not scrutinise the problems of his poor, paying more attention to the issues of the 











the poor's existence, suggesting a concern about them, hinting at doubts about the 
moral validity of social Darwinism even when it is legitimated via a mythologised 
pursuit of change. 
Gibson uses art to represent this antinomy. The art of the future illustrates the kind 
of society Gibson extrapolates from the present (One scene is laid in an art stock 
market, suggesting the supremacy of finance over productive capital predicted by 
Mandel.) When Marly examines "holofiches" ofVirek's boxes, she asks "[h]ow could 
anyone have arranged ... this garbage, in such a way that it caught at the heart .... it 
had been done many years ago by a man named Cornell" (Gibson: 45-6) focussing the 
reader's attention on human sensibility and aesthetics, rather than technology. The 
twenty-first century art in Virek's office is "rain-stained cardboard, stabbed through 
repeatedly with a variety of instruments. Katatonenkunst. Conservative. The sort of 
work one sold to committees" (Gibson: 23). In 1986 this was avant-garde; in Gibson's 
future, it has been appropriated by corporations. 
Callinicos considers such appropriation commonplace ; "Modernism gave capital 
the architectural language it had hitherto lacked .... the recuperation of avant-garde 
techniques for autonomous art have gone hand in hand with the integration of 
Modernism into the circuits of capital .... Of decisive importance here is ... the 
culture industry" (Callinicos, 1989: 156). The process was continuous; "the 
recuperation of the avant garde for art, the incorporation and commodification of 
Modernism, the false sublation of art and life -- seem much more important than any 
of the changes associated with the supposed emergence of a distinctively Postmodern 
art" (Callinicos, 1989: 157), Or, as Tom Wolfe said of modem architecture, "Mies 
[van der Rohe] pitches worker housing up thirty-eight stories, and capitalists use it as 
corporate headquarters" (Wolfe: 77). 
"Katatonenkunst" may suggest "the art of catatonics", as if the favoured art of the 
era is insane. It is evidently opaque enough to be apolitical; corporations seemingly 
disdain art with strong emotional or political content, except for architecture, readily 











the appropriation by the state of ... Utopian forms now degraded 
into anonymous forms of large-scale housing and office 
construction. The modernist styles then become stamped with just 
such bureaucratic connotation, so that to break with it radically 
produces some feeling of 'relief,' even though what replaces it is ... 
private-corporate constructions ... 
(Jameson, 1993: 314) 
Marly recalls seeing Virek lecturing on "autistiches Theater" (Gibson, 1990a: 25); 
again this seems to reflect a sick culture -- an autistic person communicates with 
difficulty; a catatonic cannot communicate. This hints that this future art cannot 
communicate -- ironic in an information age. 
Art offers epiphanies, such as "an enormous panel on which were layered, beneath 
a thick and uneven coat of varnish, hundreds of small square photographs, the kind 
produced by certain very old-fashioned machines ... of young girls ... the work's title 
... Read Us The Book O/The Names O/The Dead" (Gibson: 148). The "Book of the 
names of the dead" is H P Lovecraft's Necronomicon, about terrible things from 
beyond the known world, like Virek himself. Csicsery-Ronay suggests that "[t]he 
object of [Marly's] quest is the Ultimate Artist who can demonstrate to her that aura 
can still be produced by art" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 73) -- suggesting that this is 
ridiculous -- whereas Neuromancer "evokes a world in which museum art is extinct" 
(Csicsery-Ronay: 75). His dislike for Marly and her art is, however, undercut when he 
admits that Gibson's future "contemporary art-scene is a place to express violent 
frustration at being trapped" (Csicsery-Ronay: 75); evidently art still has "auratic" 
significance. 











. . . a landscape built all of boxes, vast wooden Cornell 
constructions where the solid residues of love and memory were 
displayed behind rain-streaked sheets of dusty glass, and the figure 
of the mysterious Boxmaker fled before her down avenues paved 
with mosaics of human teeth, Marly's Paris boots clicking blindly 
over symbols outlined in dull gold crowns. The Boxmaker was male 
and wore Alain's green jacket, and feared her above all things. "I'm 
sorry," she cried, running after him, "I'm sorry ... " 
(Gibson, 1990a:267) 
To Marly the box freezes human personality and emotion, like Neuromancer. The 
"mosaics of human teeth" recall Raymond Roussel's work. The Boxmaker ruling the 
universe may also represent Virek, illustrating what disaster she may bring to 
humanity. Csicsery-Ronay concludes that "[t]he Boxmaker occupies Neuromancer's 
niche . . . instead of drawing consciousness into itself . . . it constructs fragmented 
'memory boxes' ... thus re-establishing the possibility of contemplation and relation 
that Neuromancer destroyed" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 66). To him, the boxes and 
voudou "represent the return of historical relationships lost to technological 
postmodernity -- Cornell's bourgeois nostalgia for lost innocence, voodoo's pagan 
power" (Csicsery-Ronay: 72). However, the boxes are not Cornell boxes -- their 
purpose here (like voudou's) is to reveal the transcendental possibilities of technology, 
so these have not been "lost". 
Gibson's pursuit of utopia is, however, tentative and flawed. It suggests itself 
implied notions -- like increasing doubts about the fake and the unnatural, and concern 
for art as representation of emotional and psychic realities. The dystopian nature of his 
society is largely depicted implicitly, through images of decay. Yet it is also apparent 
here that utopian resistance may fail unless some radical change -- technologically 











Technology and Religion. 
Voudou in this text functions as a symbolic device energising the idea of 
cyberspace. Lucas and Beauvoir are not Puritans; they preside over an orgy of 
consumption -- "half-eaten pizzas ... krill balls in red sauce ... stacks of software, 
smudged glasses . . . purple wine-dregs . . . open and unopened cans of beer . . . at 
least three pistols, and perhaps two dozen pieces of cryptic-looking console gear" 
(Gibson, 1990a: 86). (Krill pizzas suggests that more desirable seafood is costly or 
extinct.) Yet they stop Two-a-Day drinking; they do not pursue consumption for its 
own sake. (If Two-a-Day may be considered a capitalist, Lucas and Beauvoir may be 
intelligentsia.) Beauvoir declares that "we're concerned with systems. And so are you, 
or at least you want to be, or else you wouldn't be a cowboy" (Gibson: 112) --
recognising Bobby's weaknesses. Beauvoir describes oungans as "a professional 
priesthood .... console cowboys ... who make it their business to get things done for 
people" (Gibson: 113). They are not concerned with power for its own sake; they can, 
perhaps, be trusted with it. 
Lucas' limousine includes "an amazing stretch of gold-flecked black bodywork and 
mirror-finished brass, studded with a collection of baroque gadgets .... a dish 
antenna ... looked more like one of those Aztec calendar-wheels" (Gibson: 160). The 
Aztec calendar wheel hints that Gibson lumps Third World cultures together, making 
his use of them seem facile; indeed, this Third World vehicle, parasitically, depends 
on First World technology: "This is a Rolls. Those Arabs built a good car, while they 
had the money" (Gibson: 161). Now their creation has returned to the First World, like 
repaid debt. Nevertheless, Lucas' religion is pragmatically poor-oriented: 
"Voudou isn't like that," Beauvoir said. "It isn't concerned with 













"Maybe we call something Ougou Foray that you might call an 
icebreaker, you understand? But at the same time, with the same 
words, we are talking about other things, and that you don't 
understand. You don't need to . . . . Think of Jackie as a deck, 
Bobby, a cyber-space deck, a very pretty one with nice ankles .... 
Think of Danbala, who some people call the snake, as a program. 
Say as an icebreaker. Danbala slots into the Jackie deck, Jackie cuts 
ice. That's all." 
"Okay," Bobby said, getting the hang of it, "then what's the 
matrix? If she's a deck, and Danbala's a program, what's 
cyberspace?" 
"The world," Lucas said. 
(Gibson: 163) 
Voudou seems concrete; "[v]oudou's like the street. Some duster chops out your 
sister, you don't go camp on the Yakuza's doorstep, do you? No way. You go to 
somebody, though, who can get the thing done." (Gibson: 112). If the free AIs endorse 
voudou, perhaps their actions will have meaning for people in the real world. Suvin is 
unimpressed; he claims to identify Gibson's "yearning to get out of the dinginess and 
filth of everyday life" (Suvin, 1994: 355) into cyberspace, which "can, in Gibson's 
most woolly-minded moments, easily branch off into heterodox religion (as in the 
voodoo that vitiates much of [Count Zero])" (Suvin: 355). 
Perhaps Suvin's Marxism is affronted by religion; Gibson actually shows no sign of 
believing in voudou; he uses its jargon to add sublimity to the free Als' activities. He 
appears to have chosen voudou partly because of its anti-establishment reputation. 
Voudou is a Third World religion (hence reflects the radicalism formerly associated 
with poorer countries) with an unconventional spirituality (appealing both to "New 











Beauvoir's preference for "getting things done" sidesteps transcendence by appeals 
to the "street", the source of all creativity in Gibson's tenns; voudou is earthy, not 
holy. Beauvoir believes that he is an operator of gods (or rather allows gods to operate 
through him). Yet cyberspace is assumed to be real in the text, unlike voudou. 
Beauvoir's position confuses the "reality" of voudou loa in religion with the reality of 
free Als in the text. Such treatment may -- vide Suvin -- be misread as acceptance of 
religion, but rather implies Gibson's confused desire to use religious concepts which 
serve his iconographic interests. 
The human relationship with the Als-as-Ioa is one-sided. Jackie announces that 
Lucas is dead, for "[t]hey wouldn't come to me like that if Lucas were alive .... There 
are pacts, agreements" (Gibson, 1990a: 233); evidently the Als follow the rules of 
voudou. Jammer points out that: "they just shaped themselves to what a bunch of 
crazed spades wanted to see .... it could just be that somebody very big, with a lot of 
muscle on the grid, they're just taking you for a ride" (Gibson: 233-4). However, 
Jackie succeeds by accepting what the free Als tell her; Jammer enviously tries to 
explain them on his own tenns: "[c]ould be, they're virus programs that have got loose 
... and replicated, and got really smart .... I knew this Tibetan guy ... he said they 
were tulpas .... heavy people can split off a kind of ghost, made of negative energy" 
(Gibson: 235). (Ironically he uses mysticism to dismiss a mythology which threatens 
his world-view.) Jackie is subservient to authority, something as dangerous as Turner's 
submission to corporate power. Free Als might indeed be able to enslave humanity --
if they refuse to obey their own rules. 
The oungans' anti-establishment stance is rooted in US counter-culture: ",[fJirst 
thing that you learn,' he said, with the tone of a man reciting a proverb, 'is that you 
always gotta wait ... "' (Gibson: 165). Beauvoir here quotes the Velvet Underground's 
"Waiting for my Man", about drug-buying (the passage concerns illegal software), 
also rejecting the instant gratification promised by corporatism. Csicsery-Ronay, 











that the voudou in Count Zero is a repudiation of that text's racism. Instead, however, 
it seems intended to defamiliarise the narration, encouraging the reader to speculate. 
To Csicsery-Ronay, voudou offers the text "the legitimacy of natural fragmentation 
and diversity in contrast with the all-fusing desire associated with Virek and Western 
multinational capitalism . . . . [ which] allows Gibson to return to the language of 
origins and nature .... the balance between artificial and organic ... tips significantly 
towards the organic and the archaic" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 81). "[F]ragmentation" 
may, however, be misleading since the free AIs seek unification. He also complains 
that in Count Zero the "mediators and redeemers are . . . associated with stock 
archetypes of nature" (Csicsery-Ronay: 81), so that "voodoo elements are first emptied 
of their historical context ... then ... re-filled with ... technological and salvationist 
allegories" (Csicsery-Ronay: 82). Appropriation and re-use is common in twentieth-
century literature, so such criticism seems misplaced. Voudou claims to provide 
access to a supernatural world which helps its worshipper -- what the free AIs in 
Count Zero promise, and deliver. The allegories represent something which might 
become technological reality. Evidently Csicsery-Ronay dislikes these elements of the 
text -- perhaps the salvationism and the "organic/archaic", which are potentially 
Utopian, a way of rescuing the world and whatever is desirable of the past. 
Elegiacally the Boxmaker laments the lost unity of the free AI, via "the thousand 
drifting things" (Gibson, 1990a: 298) of human culture from which the Boxmaker 
crafts its work. This creator is a robot, a thing of human creation, though now beyond 
control. In a sense Count Zero's Boxmaker is Gibson, and Marly his ideal interpreter; 
she notes that "You are someone else's collage. Your maker is the true artist" (Gibson: 
312). 
Csicsery-Ronay also sees boxes and loa as "tools for imagining alternatives ... to 
worldly power" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 72), whereas they are surely tools for 
establishing worldly power. Both represent possible signs of omniscience and 
omnipotence, messages from free Als striving towards greater concrete power. (He 











him into cyberspace is never explained in the novel" (Csicsery-Ronay: 73) but it is 
clear that Virek seeks the powers of the free Als.) If this text is dealing with social 
reality more concretely than Neuromancer did, the "street religion" of voudou 
represents the security and power which the poor (who are not given voices in the 
text) surely want. Artfully, this lets Gibson pretend that their desires are identical with 
his. 
Cyberspace offers immense potential: 
"It's like I'm jacked into a deck, only I'm free of the grid, flying .. 
. the other night I dreamed about a boy, and he'd reached out, 
picked up something, and it was hurting him, and he couldn't see 
that he was free, that he only needed to let go. So I told him. And for 
just a second, I could see where he was, and that wasn't like a dream 
at all .... 
"No, the dreams are all big things, and I'm big too, moving with 
the others .... 
"Some of them tell me things. Stories. Once, there was nothing 
there, nothing moving on its own . . . . Then something happened, 
and it ... it knew itself. There's a whole other story, about that, a girl 
with mirrors over her eyes and a man who was scared to care about 
anything . . . . And after that, it sort of split into different parts of 
itself, and I think the parts are the others, the bright ones. But it's 
hard to tell, because they don't tell it with words, exactly ... " 
(Gibson, 1990a:222-3) 
Gibson connects Angie with Bobby, and with Molly and Case, to unite the texts 
and show how problems within them may be resolved to attain freedom and unity. 
However, the AIs are not omnipotent; they are inept, relying on Turner, who does not 











understand (as in the Mitchell dossier) how these dominate his psyche, yet this 
sophistication contrasts oddly with their clumsiness; perhaps it is meant to reassure 
the reader that they still depend on humans. 
Perhaps not forever, however, if the changes which the Finn has observed continue: 
"The last seven, eight years, there's been funny stuff out there, out 
on the console cowboy circuit. The new jockeys, they make deals 
with things, don't they, Lucas? Yeah, you bet I know, they still need 
the hard and the soft, and they still gotta be faster than snakes on ice, 
but all of 'em, all the ones who really know how to cut it, they got 
allies, don't they, Lucas?" 
"Yeah, there's things out there. Ghosts, voices. Why not? Oceans 
had mermaids, all that shit, and we had a sea of silicon, see? Sure, 
it's just a tailored hallucination we all agreed to have, cyberspace, 
but anybody who jacks in knows, fucking knows it's a whole 
universe. And every year it gets a little more crowded ... " 
"For us," Lucas said, "the world has always worked that way." 
"Yeah," the Finn said, "So you guys could slot right into it ... " 
"But I'm old enough to remember when it wasn't like that. Ten 
years ago, you went in the Gentleman Loser and tried telling any of 
the top jocks you talked with ghosts in the matrix, they'd have 
figured you were crazy." 
(Gibson: 169-70) 
If cyberspace is a "tailored hallucination", it could incorporate gods from the human 
subconscious. But cyberspace is actually data, and the free AIs are programs, however 











Bobby's experience of cyberspace is more confused: 
::: WHAT ARE YOU DOING? WHY ARE THEY DOING 
THAT TO YOU? 
Girlvoice, brownhair, darkeyes --
: KlLLING ME KlLLING ME GET IT OFF GET IT OFF. 
Darkeyes, desertstar, tanshirt, girl hair --
::: BUT IT'S A TRICK, SEE? YOU ONLY THINK IT'S GOT 
YOU. LOOK. NOW I FIT HERE AND YOU AREN'T CARRYING 
THE LOOP ... 
Then his head exploded. He saw it very clearly, from somewhere 




The typography and Joycean wordplay depict syntactic games reminiscent of Bester 
(though less radical, and not concerning psychological change). Bobby is liberated 
from black by white, from evil by good. White light is associated with God and, via 
Shelley, eternity has a "white radiance", recalling Virek's search for eternal life. 
"White light" also recalls the Velvet Underground song about amphetamines 
(providing an anti-establishment context); (Readers might know the Velvet 
Underground better than Shelley, but Gibson used comparable quotes in 
Neuromancer.) That song describes "white light" as "messing up my mind/don't you 
know it's gonna make me go blind", attractive yet destructive, a Romantic image 
encompassing the free Als. 
Cyberspace, though more commonplace than in Neuromancer, remains a 











"[h]e'd used decks in school ... the matrix cyberspace, where the great corporate 
hotcores burned like neon novas" (Gibson: 62). He had been prevented from 
exploring, but hotdogging frees him again; Bobby begins to see that he is imprisoned 
in a conservative artificial environment: 
He hadn't ever much thought about it before, but he didn't really 
know that much about anything in particular. In fact, up until he'd 
started hotdogging, he'd felt like he knew about as much as he 
needed to. And that was what the Gothicks [a youth gang] were like, 
and that was why the Gothicks would stay here and burn themselves 
down on dust, or get chopped out by Kasuals, and the process of 
attrition would produce the percentage of them who'd somehow 
become the next wave of child-bearing, condo-buying Barrytowners, 
and the whole thing could go round again .... But since he'd started 
hotdogging, he had some idea of how precious little he knew about 
how anything worked, and not just in the matrix . . . . [h ]ow 
Barrytown worked, what kept his mother going, why Gothicks and 
Kasuals invested all that energy in trying to kill each other off. Or 
why Two-a-Day was black and lived up the Projects, and what made 
that different. 
(Gibson: 61-2) 
Bobby wants to use cyberspace to escape this world of gangsters, drug dealers and 
mass murderers -- a vision of U.S. poverty, perhaps also recalling the distorted upper-
middle-class United States of the mid-1980s reflected in the writings of Brett Easton 
Ellis. 
Cyberspace is given a role to play when Bobby and the oungans view a holographic 
three-dimensional animation of Bobby's near-death experience, which seemed 











(representation of the matrix seems a problem for Gibson) until the "anomalous 
phenomenon" (Gibson: 120) appears: 
Liquid flowers of milky white blossomed from the floor of the 
tank . . . they seemed to consist of thousands of tiny spheres or 
bubbles, and then they aligned perfectly with the cubical grid and 
coalesced, forming a . . . thing like a rectilinear mushroom. The 
surfaces, facets, were white, perfectly blank. The image in the tank 
was no longer than Bobby's open hand, but to anyone jacked into a 
deck it would have been enormous. The thing unfolded a pair of 
horns; these lengthened, curved, became pincers that arced out to 
grasp the pyramid. He saw the tips sink smoothly through the 
flickering orange planes of the enemy ice. 
(Gibson: 120-1) 
This image is probably drawn from the fractal images growing popular at the time; 
it makes the matrix seem simple by comparison, and displays vast power, appearing 
from nowhere. Its size and insectile pincers makes it threatening, but (as in Bobby's 
experience) it is white opposed to darkness. (It is the manifestation of the free Als, 
who are part of the matrix rather than in it.) 
These free Als appear impressive. They speak through Jackie, resembling what 
happened to Case in Neuromancer, except that Neuromancer could not control him as 
these Als control her. They are shown synaesthetically, another nod to Bester: "[i]ron 
laughter .... another voice, fluid and quicksilver and cold .... silver laughter rose 
through him like bubbles .... the utterly impossible wind ... had started to blow ... 
a hot damp wind that smelled of things he couldn't identifY" (Gibson: 232). This 
stresses their alienness and sublimity. 
Yet cyberspace is actually far from sublime from a cowboy's perspective; witness 











minded pursuit of gain. Bobby eventually attempts to tell Slide that Conroy killed her 
partner, though she is unlikely to believe his unsupported word. Predictably, Virek's 
computers are waiting for this; Jackie is killed, while Bobby is sucked up a "glacial 
white funnel .... [t]he scale of the thing was impossible, too vast, as though the kind 
of cybernetic megastructure that represented the whole of a multinational had brought 
its entire weight to bear on Bobby Newmark and a dancer called Jackie. Impossible .. 
. " (Gibson: 316). Bobby has learned little from his first experiences of cyberspace; it 
appears that worldly power trumps all else in cyberspace. 
Somehow, though, Bobby has been plunged into Virek's simstim construct because 
of "anomalous phenomena in the matrix" (Gibson: 318), meaning the Als. Bobby calls 
for them -- perhaps he must, as a human had to allow the union of Neuromancer and 
Wintermute. (The AIs seem limited by human agency; they must manipulate humans 
into assisting them.) An AI representing Baron Samedi, the Lord of Graveyards, 
comes, impressively, to take Virek, as in the conclusion of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus: 
When he opened his eyes there was something in the bed of dead 
flowers. He blinked. It seemed to be a cross of plain, white-painted 
wood; someone had fitted the sleeves of an ancient naval tunic over 
the horizontal arms, a kind of mould-spotted tailcoat with heavy, 
fringed epaulettes of tarnished gold braid, rusting buttons, more 
braid at the cuffs ... A rusted cutlass was propped, hilt up, against 
the white upright, and beside it was a bottle half filled with clear 
fluid. 
The child spun, the little pistol blurring ... and crumpled, folded 
into himself like a deflating balloon, a balloon sucked away into 












"My name," a voice said, and Bobby wanted to scream when he 
realized that it came from his own mouth, "is Samedi, and you have 
slain my cousin's horse ... " 
(Gibson: 318-9) 
Flung out of Virek's simstim construct, he sees "the big thing, the thing that had 
sucked them up, start to alter and shift ... the entire outline changing" (Gibson: 320), 
Virek's death becoming an epiphany of the world changing. When he tells Slide that 
Conroy is her target; improbably, she has someone ready with a rocket-launcher to 
obliterate Conroy's headquarters. They are saved -- thanks to Slide's physical power. 
The superiority of cyberspace is an illusion; the free AIs even had to physically kill 
Virek in his tank. Slide's role is central, though trivial; a cowboy should display the 
importance of cyberspace -- but instead she degrades it. 
In Count Zero cyberspace manipulators have become extensions of artificial 
intelligences: 
'Heavy icebreakers are kind of funny to deal in, even for the big 
boys. You know why, because ice, all the really hard stuff, the walls 
around every major store of data in the matrix, is always the product 
of an AI . . . . Nothing else is fast enough to weave good ice and 
constantly alter and upgrade it. So when a really powerful icebreaker 
shows up on the black market, there are already a couple of very 
dicey factors in play. Like, for starts, where did the product come 
from? Nine times out of ten, it came from an AI, and AIs are 
constantly screened, mainly by the Turing people, to make sure they 












This situation devalues the romantic cowboy of Neuromancer. Cowboys serve 
corporate interests, or demented egomaniacs like Virek. 
The nearest thing to a wholly new element in the text is "biosoft", which is 
elaborated in an unnerving sequence: searching Mitchell's AI-generated simstim 
dossier, Turner discovers an odd feeling of guilty self-loathing, somewhat like his 
own. (Turner thus becomes a more sympathetic person, though it is odd that while 
preparing to risk his life he devotes such attention to a minor document.) Since 
Mitchell would not have spent his life wired to simstim apparatus, these feelings must 
have been inserted by the AI into the document; hence the AI is communicating with 
him -- suggesting that this AI supports the free Als' plans. (Turner dreams of a glass 
spider embedded in plastic containing a drop of mercury, seen in Mexico, trapped, like 
Turner. In this dream the grey biosoft of Mitchell's biography becomes a brain, 
"pulsing softly in Mitchell's hand" [Gibson: 99]. The AIs are linked to Mitchell, 
disgusting yet vulnerable because human-controlled. This eventually shows limits to 
the powers of the free Als, while also symbolising Turner's isolation and weakness.) 
"Biosoft" looks different, "a swollen grey microsoft, one end routine neuro-jack, 
the other a strange, rounded formation unlike anything he'd seen" (Gibson: 39). The 
idea arose in the early 1980s; K. Eric Drexler cites unsuccessful research from 1984 
into "a protein-based computer" (Drexler, 1990: 11). Theoretically, organic molecules 
could function like transistors using less power and space. Genetic engineers could 
conceivably reprogramme the immune system's T -cells, which made monoclonal 
antibodies, to build computers just as proteins form cells. (The image appears in 
Gibson's short story "New Rose Hotel".) 
This union of genetic engineering and cybernetics, in Gibson's and others' minds, 
helps to unite flesh and machine. The weird fleshiness of biosoft makes it a "soft 
machine", as William Burroughs described the human body. This is no longer a 












What does this mean? The notion that social change reqUIres technological 
stimulus is a common science fiction trope (conservatives often ascribe human 
changes to technology, since they distrust human political involvements). But how 
could a new technology alter human life, or be led to do this via the free Als? Here the 
question is ignored, suggesting that this point is meant to be assumed, by a public 
which (within science fiction) already considers technology the foundation of political 
change. Yet could those not already committed to this belief be persuaded? 
Instead, for most readers biosoft would probably appear a symbol rather than a 
solution. Biosoft makes meaningful change possible -- implying that such change is 
impossible unless something fundamental, yet mysterious and biological, changes. 
Conceivably this is the "change of heart" so beloved of liberals repudiating socio-
economic transformation. At any event it is something which allows the postponement 
of the change which the free Als desire. 
Neuromancer Diluted or Reconstructed? 
If the themes of Neuromancer are revisited here, they appear to be differently 
treated. Transcendent utopian hopes are deferred rather than given dubious fulfillment. 
Completion appears more difficult than in Neuromancer, where bringing the matrix to 
consciousness seemed an unambiguously worthy goal. Skill and style count for little 
in Count Zero; randomness minimises the role of main characters. (The Als would 
have lost had Angie been killed or the Boxmaker captured -- they took needless risks 
and developed overcomplicated plans). The KasuallGothick subculture, unlike the 
Panther Modems, is largely a consumerist surrender to social conditions. What is 
needed, as Bobby realises, is informed criticism of the world, rather than nihilism or 
conformism. 
Perhaps to affirm this, Gibson offers more conventionally human-motivated 
characterisation. Csicsery-Ronay complains that H[i]n CZ, the characters have lost this 











is a mannequin .... Bobby is ... a character from a Hollywood movie" (Csicsery-
Ronay, 1995: 82). which seem extreme exaggerations, more expressions of Csicsery-
Ronay's dislike for the text than comments on characterisation. Bobby's teenage angst 
and confused ineptitude are more comprehensible than Case's self-destructive urges. 
Csicsery-Ronay suggests that "Bobby and Angie are ... signs of innocence .... [i]n 
[Count Zero] representations of innocence are essential, in order to set in relief the 
alienation necessary for human freedom" (Csicsery-Ronay: 66). (Presumably 
alienation here represents knowledge of a need for human freedom; given this, Bobby 
is less innocent then Csicsery-Ronay believes.) 
Gibson uses Bobby's "innocence" to narratively explore the world, showing the 
reader the things which Bobby needs to know -- if somewhat clumsily. When Bobby 
sees two girls with "[l]ong black frock coats ... over tight red vests in silk brocade ... 
. dark features ... concealed beneath the brims of fedoras" (Gibson, 1990a: 59), this 
reminds him of Two-a-Day, who wore "ice-blue shaved-velour" (Gibson: 60). Clearly 
the "Projects" people are more "cultured" than those in Bobby's Barrytown; however, 
since Bobby is meant to be ignorant, he should not know such specific terms. Bobby 
cannot be as ignorant as he appears, yet still know enough to observe effectively. 
Someone with Bobby's sensibility should also be too vulnerable to succeed. 
Meanwhile, between Neuromancer and Count Zero the transformative potential of 
the AIs -- what the characterisation is presumably meant to throw light on -- grows 
more obscure. Admittedly, Lucas, Beauvoir and even the Finn recognise the need for 
social change, while Bobby's position hints that even the middle-class may be 
dissatisfied. Yet Gibson again insists that planning cannot work, even when done by 
Als -- who offer little to oppose the dystopia. (Apparently it is impossible to predict 
the future, so that nobody can anticipate the effects of change -- especially not the 
"When It Changed".) Only randomness and the ineptitUde of their enemies offers hope 
-- against a backdrop of almost senseless violence, much like Molly's, which makes 











The ending of the text is implausible despite the superficial realism elsewhere in 
the text; characters who should be careful professionals act irrationally. No doubt 
Gibson wishes to represent them running risks, but here they appear absurd --
conceivably this is sloppiness, along with a desire to pit weak individuals against vast 
corporate power, so as to glorifY the former. Virek (much like Maas) is a horrible 
force which requires resistance, even if hopeless. Yet, having made the odds 
enormous, individual triumph can only occur by accident, which makes such success 
banal. 
The text is filled with contradictions, especially in Gibson's socio-political 
thinking, (for instance, between planning and realism, or between technology and 
politics). Some may be attributed to Gibson's hastiness in completing the text; Gibson 
confessed that "l had originally intended to pursue what was going to happen to 
Mitchell's daughter .... [b Jut I was so anxious to finish the book, so tired of working 
on it, that I talked myself out of making any judgements about it" (McCaffery, 1994a: 
284). Possibly he may not have been pleased with his creation; widening the scope of 
the Neuromancer argument may have made it unexpectedly complicated. 
Count Zero, a title implying an aristocracy, and aimed at changing human society, 
may be considered Romantic (following what Csicsery-Ronay calls 
"Neuromanticism"). Jameson suggests "that the object ... mourned by the Romantics 
was the aristocratic world . . . [w]e may . . . describe Romanticism as a corning to 
consciousness of some fundamental loss . . . a helpless attempt to recuperate lost 
being" (Jameson, 1989: 7). This sense of mourning for a past utopia might relate to 
Gibson's liberal flight from the conservative United States during the Vietnam War, or 
the defeat of 1970s liberalism by 1980s conservatism -- especially the defeat of 
Gibson's petit-bourgeois middle class by the wealthier Republican leadership. 
This utopia need not be explicitly political; traditional science fiction sidesteps 
political analysis by representing science itself as a force for positive social change 
acting through heroic individuals such as Edison or Einstein. In Count Zero this 











the Als, subjects science to the service of capital. Scientistic ideology (identified by 
Mandel and others as significant in late capitalism) is further undermined because 
Mitchell proves to be a fraud; the free Als are Mitchell's tutors. They may pursue their 
own utopian plan, but this is nowhere made explicit. 
Indeed, in Count Zero, the struggle is played out among amoral, unaccountable 
corporations. Bobby, Turner and Marly consider the system in which they live to be 
corrupt and hurtful, yet perceive no socio-political alternative. Even if Virek is 
defeated, the system of zaibatsus represented by Maas and Hosaka survives to 
continue its oppression. However, the main characters are middle to upper class; the 
truly oppressed poor remain in the background. Sympathetic characters struggle for 
the free Als against the corporations or Virek, which may be seen as fighting for the 
weak against the strong, suggesting further criticism of social Darwinism. This 
withdraws from Neuromancer's appropriation of U.S. conservative-libertarian values, 
in terms of which "the street" was the principal arbiter of good or bad. However, the 
class position of the characters is narrow, and it is unclear whether the text displays 
concern for the rights of the oppressed, rather than with the rights of those who have 
some power and want more -- especially the AIs themselves. 
The Als cannot by themselves transform the world. (Virek probably exaggerates 
their power.) Possibly Gibson's fear of centralisation makes him distrust a strong 
central power in cyberspace, which could symbolise a successful centralised 
(socialist?) Utopia. As Jameson suggests, "hostility to the concept of 'totalization' 
would thus seem to be most plausibly decoded as a systematic repudiation of notions 
and ideals of praxis as such, or of the collective project" (Jameson, 1993: 333). 
Foucault's widely-publicised formulation of the problem suggested that "an attempt to 
replace one set of social relations with another .... could only succeed in establishing 
a new apparatus of power-knowledge" (Callinicos, 1989: 82), although "the central 
Foucauldian thesis of the omnipresence of power .... that any totalization serves 











Edward Said delivered similar critiques of Foucault. Gibson may have been pursuing 
prevailing intellectual trends. 
In Count Zero, the wealthy construct their opposition (as with Conroy's alienation 
of Turner and Slide) -- what Virek calls "rebellion in the fiscal extremities". They are 
weaker than they think -- although such problems seem to affect individuals rather 
than zaibatsus. Zaibatsus are not directly linked to the dystopian nature of the text 
(most crimes in the text are blamed on Virek, who has corrupted actors like Maas). 
Evidently Gibson does not consider the system evil, only that it allows individuals to 
be evil. This implies that radical change means eliminating bad people (like the US. 
notion that voting out a leader, Nixon or Reagan, Clinton or Bush, amounts to 
transformation). Gibson's demonisation of Virek (more extreme than that of Tessier-
Ashpool) is dubious, for Virek did not create the sinful world, only wishing to control 
it -- like any corporation. Arguably Virek is demonised to make the behaviour of 
others more acceptable; corporations are no longer an automatic enemy, as they had 
appeared in Neuromancer. 
Csicsery-Ronay insists that "[t]he poles of Gibson's language in NM were ecstasy 
and elegy .... [i]n CZ the need to short-circuit the dangerous ecstasies and to return 
to some natural integrities leads to a vitiation also of grief" (Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 
82). This suggests that where Neuromancer concerned extreme passions (the delights 
promised by the future and the pains of the lost past), Count Zero is more sedate. 
Admittedly the characters in this text seem less obsessive than in the earlier one. It is 
tempting to read this as a fear of radical politics. However, Csicsery-Ronay may 
oversimplifY; the ecstasies of cyberspace are built into Angie's head, while Turner's 
life is an elegy for his decision to become a military corporate tool. 
Count Zero shows more concern for "natural integrities" than did Neuromancer; 
the squirrel wood, Marly's doubts about representation, even the trees of the Projects, 
all question the automatic benefits of cybernetic power. Despite the activities of 
Bobby and Jaylene, cyberspace plays a relatively minor role; its "ecstasy" seems 











relationships (arguably those existing before globalised capitalism, as Jameson 
suggests) is apparent. This may reflect a desire to return to the past rather than 
confront an uncertain future, suggesting "a reversal of NM's valuation of cyberspace 
as a domain of transcendence .... [0 ]ne would then expect CZ to depict cyberspace 
without attaching any metaphysical significance to it .... transcendence ... should be 
accessible without recourse to the matrix" (Csicsery-Ronay: 66). However, this 
suggests that cyberspace is absolutely metaphysical in Neuromancer, while largely 
mechanical in Count Zero; Count Zero's use of voudou is surely partly intended to 
supplant metaphysical transcendence in cyberspace through implicit physical-political 
change. 
This suggests that there are anti-Utopian fears present in Count Zero, which may 
explain the postponed conclusion. Placing apocalyptic change (even negative change, 
as pursued by Virek) in a socially-conscious framework suggests ideological goals 
which Gibson seems ambiguous about, perhaps torn between what is right and what is 
comfortable. Marly's focus on art arguably permits Gibson to represent such issues 
through aesthetic symbolism, keeping overt politics at a distance. 
Nevertheless this cannot be sustained, especially given the political nature of much 
modern or postmodern art; "various modernisms have often constituted violent 
reactions against modernization .... at least one strand of artistic modernism is anti-
modern and comes into being in violent or muffled protest against modernization, 
now grasped as technological progress in the largest sense" (Jameson, 1993: 305). 
Gibson's doubts about the positive value of technological progress might relate to his 
fondness for art reflecting insanity or isolation. 
Csicsery-Ronay considers Count Zero's view of art to be politically confused: 
For Virek [the boxes J really are part of the historical commercial 
system .... pragmatic immortality machines .... [i]f cyber-Samedi 
had not annihilated Virek just when he did, the boxes might easily 











The Boxmaker .... represents an alternative to techno-fusion only if 
we ignore that it exists on suffrance -- because the victorious forces 
divinizing cyberspace ... actively defend it against the worldly 
powers. 
(Csicsery-Ronay, 1995: 77) 
However, his reading is itself somewhat confused. The art of the Boxmaker is not 
sublime in what he (pace Benjamin) terms an "auratic!! sense; it rather serves as 
communication between the free Als and humans -- like the voudou loa, or Bobby's 
software. It is thus not an alternative to "techno-fusion!! (presumably the fusion of 
humanity/nature and technology), but a means of fusion with technology. The 
independence of the free AIs is limited, perhaps because Gibson wishes to deny them 
the power to impose themselves on humanity. The Boxmaker's boxes are plainly not 
only about art, though Csicsery-Ronay insists that 
The boxes are fake . . . these allegedly profoundly meaningful 
objects are actually devices conjured up to exemplify a ... desire for 
... art powerful enough to induce epiphanies .... 'humanist' art ... 
. parts of the heroic project of commemorating the history, not of our 
present, but of Marie-France's project .... Shooting past his mark, 
Gibson represents the ecstatic fusion of NM as the reality which is 
elegiacally mourned by CZ's modernist nostalgics. 
(Csicsery-Ronay: 76) 
Csicsery-Ronay is confused: the boxes are artifacts of Gibson's narrative, and lack 
genuine artistic qualities, such as !!fake"! They are devices for focussing the reader's 
attention and clarifying Gibson's concerns -- a sense of fragmentation and a desire for 
wholeness, with obvious social resonances. Pejorative reference to "modernist 











away from the unreflective pleasure in technology evident in parts of Neuromancer to 
a more socially-centred vision. Csicsery-Ronay's confusion -- especially when he 
addresses political concerns -- hints that the intellectual currents of the time blocked 
even acute critics from comprehending Gibson's objectives. 
The text seems somewhat unfinished, with its improbable ending and unresolved 
contradictions, as if Gibson had not yet worked out how to resolve these issues. Thus 
the work partially subverts the apocalyptic conclusion of Neuromancer, but retains 
many of its apparent ideological goals. Suvin may be right to see Count Zero 
betraying the political implications of the earlier work (although ambiguously), as 
Csicsery-Ronay may be right to see it betraying the technological ecstasy of that work. 
Gibson is evidently pursuing a conclusion likely to please neither critic. He may wish 
to correct aspects of Neuromancer which disturbed him, as Csicsery-Ronay thinks --
but evidently Count Zero is not, alone, that correction; Gibson still needed to resolve 
the conflict between the requirements which Gibson seemed to draw from facile 
popular fiction, and his growing social responsibility which led to demands which 
may not have suited Gibson's ideological convictions. 
That social responsibility is not innocent. The free Als manipUlate humanity; this 
could cause problems if taken to extremes. Beauvoir, Lucas and the cowboys have no 
clear goal in view. By representing the AIs as voudou gods, Gibson mystifies their 
nature much more than before. In Neuromancer Wintermute spoke in metaphors, and 
through personae, because its nature was unknowable. In Count Zero the "cyberloa" 
appear humanly comprehensible but somehow conspiratorial -- although the gnomic 
utterances of the Boxmaker suggest that this may stem from their decision to mask 
themselves as human gods: 
-- I came to be, here. Once I was not. Once, for a brilliant time, 
time without duration, I was everywhere as well ... but the bright 
time broke. The mirror was flawed. Now I am only one ... but I 











float around me, fragments of the family that funded my birth. There 
are others, but they will not speak to me. Vain, the scattered 
fragments of myself, like children. Like men. They send me new 
things, but I prefer the old things. Perhaps I do their bidding. They 
plot with men, my other selves, and men imagine they are gods ... 
"You are the thing that Virek seeks, aren't you?" 
-- No. He imagines that he can translate himself, code his 
personality into my fabric. He yearns to be what I once was. What he 
might become most resembles the least of my broken selves ... 
(Ibid.: 311) 
Hence this text evidently follows Jameson's definition of "a symbolic act, whereby 
real social contradictions, insurmountable in their own terms, find a purely formal 
resolution in the aesthetic realm" (Jameson, 1994: 79). The social contradictions 
remain, despite the "formal aesthetic resolution" at the end which Suvin and Csicsery-
Ronay both find unsatisfactory. Having clarified the contradictions rather than 
resolving them, Gibson must still search for a resolution. Count Zero may be 
considered a transition, referring back to the implicit conflicts Gibson created, and 










Chapter 3. Mona Lisa Overdrive: Conclusion or Deferral? 
Contextualising Closure and Characterisation. 
When Mona Lisa Overdrive appeared, four years after Neuromancer, the socio-
political environment seemed to have changed dramatically. By 1988 the former 
economic crisis seemed to have turned to economic miracle in the United States. 
Some were alarmed at the debt which the US government was creating, through 
deficit financing. However, I1Reaganomics" appeared to have saved the country. Most 
-- especially the rich -- were elated, a situation celebrated in Tom Wolfe's best-seller, 
The Bonfire of the Vanities (1988). (Wolfe's text is, ironically, directed towards 
factors inconveniencing the rich.) US unemployment fell sharply; while liberals and 
radicals disliked the forces creating this -- the image of the heartless "yuppie" dates 
from this era -- conditions were reassuring compared with the earlier apparent 
hopelessness. 
Aggression against Libya in 1985 and 1986 made the US temporarily unpopular in 
Western Europe, but Americans deemed this a success; while many grew more 
tolerant of U.S. recklessness, relations between the US and USSR improved. Premier 
Gorbachev's "charm offensive" in the West disarmed traditional US anti-Soviet 
propaganda, and the arms reduction treaty of 1987 suggested that the traditional Cold 
War was over. As the missiles deployed at the start of the decade were withdrawn, 
public fear of nuclear war declined. (Anti-war sentiment remained high, as in the run-
up to the Gulf War in 1990, but by then it was discounted by the media, as 
Christopher Norris complains in Uncritical Theory [J99J}.) 
Admittedly, liberal cornmentators who wished to challenge conservative 
triumphalism and show distaste for the materialism which the 1980s seemed to evoke 
could point to the plight of the homeless and the poor, who gained little from 
government; as Joseph Stiglitz notes of the 1980s, I1since 1973, the poorest people in 











more regrets about the political weakness of traditionally liberal parties (such as the 
Democrats in the U.S. and the Labour Party in Britain) than real disaffection with the 
system. All this seems likely to have influenced Gibson, a man of middle-class liberal 
sentiments, immersed in North American media and politics. 
By the late 1980s most of the problems contributing to the early-1980s crisis 
seemed to have been resolved. The USSR withdrew forces from Afghanistan in 1988; 
the U.S. proxy war against Nicaragua continued until the electoral defeat of the 
Sandinistas in 1990 -- but this war was not widely condemned in Western media, as 
Chomsky and Herman observe in Manufacturing Consent. Callinicos suggests that 
this sense of contentment promoted an ideologically-driven detachment from reality; 
"the philosophical drift towards Aestheticism . . . accords with the cultural mood of 
the 1980s . . . . a decade obsessed with style . . . . with forming oneself into a 
particular kind of person .... This stylization of existence ... is surely best 
understood against the background, not of New Times, but of good times for the new 
middle class" (Callinicos, 1989: 169). 
This development might be expected to appear m Gibson's work. If Gibson 
believed that the (apparently) intractable world problems of the early 1980s had been 
solved, he might have found a new optimism. In this case the trilogy might not be 
apocalyptic -- bringing an end to the old world -- but rather developmental and 
reassuring. The open ending of Count Zero required a resolution -- but not necessarily 
a catastrophic one. 
The text has common elements with its predecessors. As before, its principal 
villains are wealthy and powerful, perceived through multiple viewpoints -- four this 
time. Three of these characters -- Kumiko, Mona and Angie -- are female; none are 
sexually fetishised as Molly had been; one is an unromantic prostitute. Two -- Mona 
and Slick -- are approximately working-class, a perspective new to the trilogy, 
although they do not perform productive labour. (Gibson did not represent people 











may be meant to challenge the fantasies of the earlier novels, developing the social-
realistic trend evident in Count Zero. 
The title and opening are striking; "Mona Lisa" implies high culture, enigmas, the 
Renaissance and female beauty (ironically it is the prostitute's name). "Overdrive" 
implies high speed; in science fiction, faster-than-light travel. The title exploits 
dissonances between these, generating a sense that more is happening than the reader 
recognises. The text opens in a cooler, more passive tone than the earlier texts, 
perhaps promoting thought rather than action: 
The ghost was her father's parting gift, presented by a black-clad 
secretary in a departure lounge at Narita. 
F or the first two hours of the flight to London it lay forgotten in 
her purse, a smooth dark oblong, one side impressed with the 
ubiquitous Maas-Neotek logo, the other gently curved to fit the 
user's palm. 
She sat up very straight in her seat in the first class cabin, her 
features composed in a small cold mask modelled after her dead 
mother's most characteristic expression. 
(Gibson, 1989: 7) 
This is the rich people's world, which Gibson had not previously depicted from 
within. Kumiko's situation is uncomfortable despite her wealth; her dislike for her 
father is subtly suggested (the gift lying unexamined). Where the "slamhound" of 
Count Zero was explained immediately, the "ghost" remains mysterious awhile. 
However, Maas-Neotek's biosoft from Count Zero now has a "ubiquitous" logo; what 
had previously been an alarming novelty is now commonplace. This implies that the 
"ghost" is somehow cybernetic. If the cyberspace deck and the simstim rig symbolised 











resembles a late-1980s remote control. But the ghost which actually haunts Kumiko is 
that of her mad mother. 
This cybernetic "ghost", Colin, is generated by the "fifty-first generation of Maas-
Neotek biochips" (Gibson, 1989: 9), showing the rapid changes in the seven years 
which have elapsed since Count Zero. Colin is an image of a young Englishman, an 
artificial personality; what had been extraordinary in Neuromancer is now a marketed 
commodity. Colin is intended to assist her transition into England, where she must 
hide from a gang war within the Yakuza, in which her father holds rank -- apparently 
the formalised Yakuza will not attack her abroad. 
Her father has gang tattoos and various possessions. In earlier trilogy texts, Gibson 
used brand names, partly, to defamiliarise his secondary world; here, the brands are 
familiar. Perhaps Gibson is offering American or European readers reference points in 
the alien landscape of a Japanese family. Kumiko's family wealth distresses her, 
suggesting that Gibson is retreating from his earlier demonising of the rich -- yet the 
"poor little rich girl" is a cartoonish cliche, even if defamiliarized for Western readers 
by her Japanese nature. 
This opening gives the text technological and social context, and emphasises its 
debt to the earlier texts. Colin -- a technological artifact impossible in Count Zero --
shows how biosoft has developed, as the AIs had earlier hoped. This advance suggests 
to the reader familiar with earlier texts that technology in Gibson's world has reached 
a cusp which will make the long-awaited radical transformation possible. 
In contrast to this hope and luxury, the character "Slick Henry" lives in an isolated 
New Jersey industrial wasteland, polluted and abandoned, called Dog Solitude. 
Someone to whom he owes a favour asks him to look after someone called the Count, 
unconscious on a stretcher, permanently jacked into the matrix -- whom the reader 
recognise as Count Zero, Bobby Newmark, now in his early twenties. Again 
connections are evident -- as well as Gibson's newly-discovered concern with a more 











In contrast to the introverted, contemplative Kumiko, Slick Henry seems a typical 
Gibson male: 
Kid Afrika came cruising into Dog Solitude on the last day in 
November, his vintage Dodge chauffeured by a white girl named 
Cherry Chesterfield. 
Slick Henry and Little Bird were breaking down the buzzsaw that 
formed the Judge's left hand when Kid's Dodge came into view, its 
patched apron-bag throwing up brown fantails of the rusty water that 
pooled on the Solitude's uneven plain of compacted steel. 
(Gibson, 1989: 16) 
This style differs from that which describes Kumiko's experiences. It is confident; 
everything has a proper name, every statement is declarative, urging the reader to 
accept uncritically. The names are expressive (whereas Kumiko does not understand 
the Londoners' names) -- Kid Afrika suggests a traditionalist-oriented black, Slick 
Henry a sophisticate, Little Bird a weak but active person, and Cherry Chesterfield 
combines a slang term for virginity with a name which suggests aristocracy -- or 
cigarettes. The reader will first think that a "vintage Dodge" is an old truck; however, 
its "patched apron-bag" makes it a hovercraft, a "vintage" one, no longer considered a 
futuristic emblem. The "plain of compacted steel" may be defamiliarising, yet its 
casual mention may be meant to put the reader off their guard, having much the same 
confusing effect as the vagueness and doubt emphasised in the Kumiko chapter. 
Slick differs from the others; he is an artist, creating installations like the Judge; its 
buzzsaw may represent American justice (given that Slick was horribly punished for 
stealing rich people's cars), and recalls Laurie Anderson's, "0 Superman", from Big 
Science, with its lyrics "0 Superman/O Judge", and referring to "your long arm '" 
your electronic arm". Slick's artistic "garret", Factory, is on a site so polluted that they 











cyberspace aristocrat who fools the Fission Authority into providing power. They are 
social outcasts, showing qualities that they cannot make use of under their 
circumstances. Evidently Gibson is condemning the marginalisation of certain people 
-- the right kind of people, whose pursuits appeal to an urban upper class who might 
like to buy the Judge or admire Gentry's cyberspace skills. 
Little Bird is clearly not the right kind of person; his background is "white Jersey 
stringtowns where nobody knew shit about anything and hated anybody who did" 
(Gibson, 1989: 17). (This pejorative imagery prefigures the distasteful "meshbacks" of 
Idoru [1996].) Distrustful and ignorant, he is the opposite of Bobby, the eager learner 
who learned to trust his own judgement. Hearing that the man in the stretcher is a 
Count, Little Bird asks if he's a vampire, and Slick must explain that there are no 
vampires; Little Bird is easily fooled by the illusions of simstims. Slick insists that it 
is easy to tell real from fake, showing that Gibson no longer conflates the two, as he 
implied in earlier texts. 
Meanwhile Angie appears in the chapter "Malibu" which suggests, in 1988, wealth 
and freedom, far from Dog Solitude. While still a simstim star, she has lost touch with 
the free Als; she is lonely, isolated, and addicted to a drug which mysterious enemies 
are trying to make her take; a free AI, adopting the persona of Mamman Brigitte, 
"eldest of the dead" warns her that she is under threat and that the "veves" in her head 
have been altered. (Obviously this is connected to Bobby's predicament; why are they 
now estranged?) Her problems also reaffirm the poor-little-rich-girl issue evident in 
the Kumiko passage; again, wealth seems to bring unhappiness. Gibson seems to have 
moved from condemning the rich to pitying them. 
There was a smell in the house; it had always been there. 
It belonged to time and the salt air and the entropic nature of 
expensive houses built too close to the sea. Perhaps it was also 
peculiar to places briefly but frequently uninhabited, houses opened 











imagined the rooms empty, flecks of corrosion blossoming silently 
on chrome, pale molds taking hold in obscure comers. The 
architects, as if in recognition of eternal processes, had encouraged a 
degree of rust; massive steel railings along the deck had been eaten 
wrist-thin by years of spray. 
The house crouched, like its neighbours, on fragments of ruined 
foundations, and her walks along the beach sometimes involved 
attempts at archeological fantasy. She tried to imagine a past for the 
place, other houses, other voices. She was accompanied, on these 
walks, by an armed remote, a tiny Dornier helicopter that rose from 
its unseen rooftop nest when she stepped down from the deck. It 
could hover almost silently, and was programmed to avoid her line 
of sight. 
(Gibson, 1989: 24) 
The images of decay, as in Count Zero, might symbolise decay in broader society, 
though Angie's private decay (her loss of purpose in life) is also plain. She, like 
Kumiko, ponders history, but seemingly ignores time -- perhaps because her past is 
inaccessible, but also discounting the historical process. Her work as a simstim star 
precludes privacy (the drone), though since it is possible to edit simstim tapes, actual 
privacy is attainable, if her audience does not know of it. Hence she conmves, 
knowingly, in falsity -- somewhat like Marly. 
Apparently unconnected with all this, providing contrast with luxurious Malibu, is 
Mona Lisa, a drug-addicted whore in Miami, having a bad time until her pimp Eddy 
assures her that someone rich wants her services, thanks to Eddy's efforts in arranging 
such things. She lives like a disempowered Slick in an abandoned building in Florida" 
unaware of her name's special meaning; she cannot read and has no skills but those of 
survival. Her presentation is somewhat like Bobby in Count Zero; thoughtful, 











Mona dreamed she was dancing the cage back in some Cleveland 
juke, naked in a column of hot blue light, where the faces thrusting 
up for her through the veil of smoke had blue light snagged in the 
whites of their eyes. They wore the expression men always wore 
when they watched you dance, staring real hard but locked up inside 
themselves at the same time, so their eyes told you nothing at all and 
their faces, in spite of the sweat, might have been carved from 
something that only looked like flesh. 
Not that she cared how they looked, when she was in the cage, 
high and hot and on the beat, three songs into the set and the wiz just 
starting to peak, new strength in her legs sending her up on the balls 
of her feet ... 
One of them grabbed her ankle. 
(Gibson, 1989: 32) 
Where Molly's work in the "House of Blue Lights" was slumming, Mona is trapped 
in prostitution. She has little ability to change her life, and simply dreams of life 
before she was a whore. Mona observes surfaces -- faces and expressions -- while 
aware of knowing little of what is behind them. Her ignorance troubles her (like 
Bobby) but she knows that understanding men would not make her happier. 
Meanwhile, where Angie sees a drug as a Satanic temptation, Mona's "wiz" is her only 
pleasure. 
In her dream, the watchers are objectified; "their faces ... might have been carved 
from something that only looked like flesh" (Gibson, 1989: 32). This may protect her 
against wasting emotional energy on them. Gibson strives to analyse the feelings of a 
woman performing sexual services for strangers, but she seems to feel and think too 











her ankle gripped (no such thing actually happened, we are assured), a violation as a 
dancer, restoring the reality of prostitution. 
In Neuromancer sex was essentially male-oriented, and Count Zero is largely 
sexless. Gibson seems concerned to counteract these problems through Eddy's sexual 
fantasies: 
How it was supposed to have made her feel was a way she hadn't 
ever felt. She knew you could get to a place where doing it hurt a 
little but still felt good, but she knew that wasn't it. What Eddy 
wanted to hear was that it hurt a lot and made her feel bad, but she 
liked it anyway. Which made no sense at all to Mona, but she'd 
learned to tell it the way he wanted her to. 
And when he was done, curled on his side asleep, Mona lay 
awake in the stale dark, turning the dream of leaving around and 
around, bright and wonderful. 
And please let it be true. 
(Gibson, 1989: 37) 
Eddy imposes his fantasies on Mona, probably trying to justify his conduct by 
falsely telling himself that she likes it. This obvious viciousness contrasts with 
Gibson's unquestioned image of Molly in Neuromancer, objectified and submitting to 
Case despite his disrespect for her as a woman. (Significantly, in this text Molly, 
renamed Sally, has become androgynous; "she might have been taken for a boy" 
(Gibson, 1989: 41), which seems meant to contradict her former image as a Jemme 
Jatale/dominatrix.) Mona wants to escape, yet her hopes seem so pathetic, so hateful is 
her life, that the reader is probably not meant to expect her to succeed. Gibson forces 











Eddy also suffers; he cannot communicate his sexuality and cannot perfonn without 
Mona's aid; at least Mona responds to reality. Her "tricks" are annoying because they 
try to treat her as a human being, to humanise themselves, to which (she seems to feel) 
they have no right. Male-written science fiction often exploits women in the interests 
of male fantasy; Mona's sexuality confronts such objectifications, because she 
despises her tricks (by extrapolation, male readers) and thus cannot be seen as no 
more than an object of desire. 
These opening chapters and characterisations link this world with that of the earlier 
books, and suggest connections between the scattered characters. These all begin to be 
made plain when Kumiko meets someone called Sally, who is clearly Molly from 
Neuromancer (here she will be called Molly when appearing in Neuromancer, and 
Sally appearing in Mona Lisa Overdrive), who is her bodyguard. Another figure from 
the past, 3Jane Tessier-Ashpool, is attempting to control this situation through her 
wealth, much as Virek attempted to control events in Count Zero, although in this case 
she is perversely capricious rather than megalomaniac. 
3Jane, using London gangsters and Sprawl mercenaries, wants to punish Angie for 
her links with the free Als, and to punish Sally for destroying her plans fourteen years 
earlier. However she is dead in the real world, existing in a gigantic piece of biosoft 
separated from the matrix, called an "aleph". This is reminiscent of Virek's virtual 
world -- except that this is a physical item, and by means never specified, Bobby the 
Count has stolen it and spends all his time jacked in there. This is much what Case 
feared would happen with Neuromancer -- but here it is presented as desirable. 
Meanwhile, in the background, the free Als are preparing to unite themselves. 
The remainder of the text develops these issues. More social reality in Gibson's 
future is displayed, such as the ambience of London as opposed to the Sprawl (to 
which Sally takes Kumiko against the wishes of her handlers) and the reappearance of 
the Finn as a posthumous software construct. Eventually the free AIs unite, while 
3Jane's plans are foiled by Bobby Newmark and Slick's landlord Gentry, who believes 











become cyberspace in some sense). Angie dies, but lives forever in cyberspace, a copy 
of the contents of the aleph somehow liberated by the free Als. Mona, whom 3Jane's 
gangsters planned to use as a body replacement for Angie during Angie's kidnapping, 
actually replaces Angie, becoming the simstim star she had always dreamed of 
becoming. (Angie's employers, Sense/Net, do not wish to face the trouble and expense 
of finding another star). The good people are rewarded, the bad people are punished, 
and 3Jane is permanently trapped in her software construct. 
Nevertheless, the text is not merely a repetition of earlier texts; it differs in part 
because of the greater attention to human and social detail. For instance, the characters 
offer significantly different perceptions of their world. In much of Kumiko's 
presentation, London appears familiar and safe; the only novelty is a fingerprint-
reading lock (probably drawn from fantasy-adventure films). On one level this 
comforts the reader, especially since it depicts two cultures interesting to Americans; 
if Japan may be the feared future, England may be the respected yet decadent past. 
This was nothing like Tokyo, where the past, all that remained of 
it, was nurtured with a nervous care. History there had become a 
quantity, a rare thing, parcelled out by government and preserved by 
law and corporate funding. Here it seemed the very fabric of things, 
as if the city were a single growth of stone and brick, uncounted 
strata of message and meaning, age upon age, generated over the 
centuries to the dictates of some now all but unreadable DNA of 
commerce and empire. 
(Gibson, 1989: 11-12) 
In Count Zero and Neuromancer, exotic places provided backgrounds to the action. 
Here, Gibson represents genuine cultural differences; the globalised world is 
inhomogeneous. He relates this to his wider concerns by rhetorically linking human 











Past "history", too, is potentially uncontrolled, growing wild -- suggesting an 
uncontrollable future. Kumiko appears uncertain about such things; her depiction of 
London is what it is not, and what it seems. Admittedly, history, commerce and 
empire place a political gloss on the text which seems strange for a young girl's 
meditations -- though Kumiko is extremely serious and precocious. 
Since the main characters evidently further Gibson's socio-political concerns, it is 
striking that they all lack power, being victims rather than victimisers. (Sally, more 
powerful, is significantly not represented through a viewpoint.) They are not complicit 
in the crimes of society, and deserve to succeed -- although they do not, by 
themselves, but only prevail through the machinations of the free Als, and with Sally's 
help. In this sense they resemble Bobby in Count Zero -- but lack his optimism. They 
are all outsiders; two are upper-class, yet outsiders because their behavior is 
unacceptable to that class (Angie wants to help the AIs) or are not committed to their 
class (Kumiko hates her father, blaming him for her suffering). Mona depends on her 
pimp, while Slick hides from the world. Angie and Kumiko are close enough to the 
power structure to see how it works more clearly than the main characters in Count 
Zero. Mona and Slick are weak enough to genuinely suffer -- showing the reader the 
darkest features of Gibson's world. All this, however, suggests that Gibson is 
diminishing the divide between rich and poor which his earlier works emphasised --
another point with political implications. 
The End of the Trilogy. 
The general action of Mona Lisa Overdrive is less obviously related to the free AIs 
than in the earlier two books, so that any connection to the values of the earlier texts 
needs to be explained. The sense of closure is plain: 'They have come to live in the 
house. . .. the wildflowers do not fade" (Gibson, 1989: 313), suggests a cybernetic 
heaven, with full access to cyberspace and the capacity to copy human souls. Even 











That this is a version of heaven is strongly hinted at through the religious imagery 
in one of Mona's experiences: 
A soapbox evangelist spread his arms high, a pale fuzzy Jesus 
copying the gesture in the air above him. The projection rig was in 
the box he stood on, but he wore a battered nylon pack with two 
speakers sticking over each shoulder like blank chrome heads. The 
evangelist frowned up at Jesus and adjusted something on the belt at 
his waist. Jesus strobed, turned green, and vanished. 
(Gibson, 1989: 66) 
From the other end of the square, the evangelist opened up at full 
volume, in mid-rant, like he'd warmed up to a spit-spraying fury 
before he'd cut the amp in, the hologram Jesus shaking its white-
robed arms and gesturing angrily to the sky, the mall, the sky again. 
Rapture, he said. Rapture's coming. 
(Gibson, 1989: 68) 
The Rapture is the time before the Tribulation, when all believers are gathered up to 
heaven (a "premillennial dispensationalist" doctrine which Thompson considers "one 
of the most powerful pieces of apocalyptic imagery" (Thompson, 1999: 102). "When 
It Changed" is when cyberspace became the domain of free Als. Connecting these 
suggests that the free Als will bring the apocalypse promised in Neuromancer. This 
suggests that an elect will be saved through cybernetics while the rest are damned --
making Gibson's joke against the evangelist literal truth. Nevertheless, the evangelist 
simply wants to impose his beliefs, through technologies which he does not know how 
to use. Evidently Gibson does not see technology alone as resolving issues; the true 











Mona's personal rapture comes after the battle at Dog Solitude, when a SenselNet 
helicopter arrives bearing Angie's hairdresser Porphyre (an odd choice to lead a rescue 
team). Porphyre happily substitutes Mona for Angie, even though a DNA test would 
reveal the truth. Mona tells him that she isn't Angie. "'I know,' the black man said, 'but 
it grows on you.' Rapture. Rapture's coming." (Gibson, 1989: 305). While this is 
implausible, Gibson seems to expect no questioning of this; as if, because Mona 
appears deserving, she must be rewarded. (Of course, Mona is only one person, even 
if she is representative of her class; none of the other whores whom she mentions gain 
anything by her supplanting Angie, so her transformation only has meaning through 
its symmetry with the other key characters.) 
For them, rapture implies entry into an artificial cyberspace heaven (similar, in its 
reassurance, to the simstim "idealized New England boyhood" (Gibson, 1990a: 9) 
which Turner inhabited during his reconstruction). Angie asks Bobby about this 
heaven, but the answer is elliptically given by Colin and the Finn. 
The Finn laughed, a very strange sound. "Ain't a why, lady. More 
like it's a what. Remember one time Brigitte told you there was this 
other? Yeah? Well, that's the what, and the what's the why." 
"I do remember. She said that when the matrix finally knew itself, 
there was 'the other' ..... 
"That's where we're going tonight," Bobby began ... 
"You see," Colin said . . .. "when the matrix attained sentience, 
it simultaneously became aware of another matrix, another 
sentience. " 
"I don't understand," she said. "If cyberspace consists of the sum 
total of data in the human system ... " 
"Yeah," the Finn said .... "but nobody's talkin' human, see?" 











"Centauri," said Colin. 
"So it's kinda hard to explain why the matrix split up into all 
those hoodoos 'n' shit, when it met this other one," the Finn said, 
"but when we get there, you'll sorta get the idea ... " 
"Are you telling me the truth?" 
"Be there in a New York minute," said the Finn, "no shit." 
(Gibson, 1989: 316). 
Previously the alienness of the Als was used to account for their bizarre conduct; 
now aliens themselves are to be used for the same purpose. Angie asks if this is the 
truth -- but since this is interrogated and then not answered, clearly the truth canned be 
revealed until after the end of the book! Gibson's apparent conclusion actually again 
defers issues, this time through the sublime interstellar alien of traditional science 
fiction. Perhaps the limousine in which they ride to the aliens acknowledges Gibson's 
escape from the issue, for it recalls the movie Repo Man (1987) which ends with the 
central characters flying to the stars in a car. Gibson's solution, however, destroys all 
significance to the conclusion. The free Als have become irrelevant to humanity, 
trivialising all the social realism of the text. 
Such extreme mystification does not stop Gibson from describing events when 
Angie dies and enters the cybernetic world. He employs what appears as postmodern 
imagery: 'shifting data-planes ... represent viewpoints ... of whom or what, she is in 
most cases in doubt' (Gibson, 1989: 292). Perceiving events for the first time through 
the viewpoint of the Als, she cannot properly interpret them -- she has not gained 
omniscience despite the flood of data. This is not actually postmodern in the sense of 
interrogating such issues, or encouraging the reader to speculate on their meaning. 
Instead her omniscience, functioning through the free AIs, derives wholly from 











them in RIMBAUD, a file of interesting people kept by 3Jane. (Rimbaud is not only a 
high-cultural reference; he appears in Dylan's "You're gonna make me lonely when 
you go" from Blood on the Tracks [1975], and in some of Patti Smith's work, elements 
of U.S. popular culture which Gibson had used earlier.) All is said in a clinical way, 
creating narrative distance (strikingly like Mona's numbed descriptive voice when 
stoned on wiz) which, intentionally or not, undermines the earlier promise of artificial 
intelligence. 
A reference to the aleph as the "library of Babel" (Ibid.: 294) recalls the Borges 
short story, suggesting that the "aleph" is another Borges reference -- though unlike 
the accessible aleph, the library of Babel is infinite, and nothing in it can be found. 
(Borges was popular among postmodem writers and theorists, so the reference may be 
meant to be appealing.) However, this reaffirms the human-centredness of Angie-as-
free-AI. 
Within her reading, Molly and Mona (and Slick, incredibly since he has been in 
prison and thus absorbed in the system) are presented as without Single Identity 
Numbers, the acronym SIN being obvious; Mona has left little social trace, "in Legba's 
system, the nearest thing to innocence" (Gibson: 293). Apparently the Als feel that 
engagement with the information economy is equivalent to "sinfulness". Gibson does 
not explain why the system which created artificial intelligence is now condemned on 
quasi-religious grounds. He may simply be pandering to a general opposition to 
bureaucracy and its files, and to the "big government" paranoia of US right wing 
populists -- although in Gibson's future this appears meaningless. Gibson seems 
confused here, attempting to use such views to suggest an alien viewpoint, whereas 
they are actually distinctly familiar. 
Angie's new cyberspace world is represented as "free at last of the room and its 
data" (Gibson: 294). This is freedom from human representational systems, surely 
illusory, for the matrix on which she depends for all her needs is a representational 
system created by humans. The corporate AI Continuity is in her space, oddly, because 











(Gibson: 295). In that case everything built from biochips should be her relative -- yet 
no Maas-Neotek programmable toasters are present! Even Colin, far cruder than an 
AI, is allowed in, purely because of "his" role in the text. Gibson uses this argument to 
justify rewarding the characters of his text -- even virtual characters -- in this heaven, 
for a soothing, satisfying ending which seems strikingly uncritical of the discourse and 
ideology involved. 
Does this ending have any meaning other than to satisfy the reader by rewarding 
the heroes? The free AI in the matrix might arguably be seen as a point outside the 
corrupt human universe, avoiding the postmodern problem that any critique is 
ideological and thus as tainted as whatever it critiques. However, there is no obvious 
sign of this in the text. Alternatively, the soothing conclusion suggests that despite the 
obviously unpleasant nature of human society in the text, radical change is not 
necessary. This implies that the satisfying conclusion is a deeply conservative solution 
to the problems of the earlier texts. This appears to be borne out by Gibson's view of 
the world and of history in this text, which appears in many ways less subversive and 
radical than in his earlier texts. 
The World and History. 
Gibson's world in Mona Lisa Overdrive is physically unpleasant -- slightly worse 
even than in Neuromancer. Mona's experience of Florida is of a place stinking of dead 
fish and industrial chlorine. She distrusts street food (a third-world fear imported into 
this first-world environment, suggesting traditional social orders collapsing). Dog 
Solitude arose from "a landfill operation a hundred years ago .... [a] lot of the fill 
was toxic. Rain washed the cover off. Guess they just gave up and started dumping 
more shit on itlt (Gibson: 164). This suggests, though, that destruction of nature was 
caused by the twentieth century rather than the twenty-first, and is not directly linked 











The Sprawl is little better. At Mona's hotel, there is "a big white filter above the 
plastic showerhead, and a sticker on the tile wall, with an eye and a tear, meant it was 
okay to shower but don't get it in your eyes" (Gibson: 95). She sees the hotel facing 
hers as "an old-fashioned building [an ironic point, since it is modem] ... a kind of 
mountain, with rocks and grass, and a waterfall. .. [s ]omething gray moved there ... 
. [k]ind of a sheep .... Mona laughed" (Gibson: 96). Mona knows that the sheep 
must be a robot; this recalls the artificial animals of Philip Dick's Do Androids Dream 
of Electric Sheep (Dick inspired Blade Runner and much of Gibson's imagery). 
This hotel is the "New Suzuki Envoy" (Gibson: 228), where Angie stays 
presumably called this because of the growing Japanese control of US real estate in 
the late 1980s. (Soon after Gibson wrote the book, the Japanese bubble economy 
collapsed -- showing how mistaken Gibson's extrapolations could be). The structure is 
an artificial mountainside, a false rural landscape. The Sprawl's domed atmosphere 
cannot sustain this ecosystem, so they need robot animals (environmental degradation 
again). All this suggests a level of green consciousness, yet there is no sign (whereas 
there had been at least hints in Neuromancer) that the problem is anyone's fault. The 
degrading environment appears more like a natural calamity. 
In contrast, London appears astonishingly reassuring to the reader, if not to 
Kumiko. A London pub has "doors of ornate frosted glass ... a sort of crowded 
burrow lined in dark wood .... a Bass ashtray" (Gibson: 42), images of an almost 
dead past when Gibson wrote the text, yet including signifiers credible to US readers. 
This London is alien to the US reader, yet it incorporates images familiar from books 
and films -- an implausible situation, fifty years in Gibson's future. While Kumiko 
finds it strange, Gibson is consoling his readers with a tourist myth of British security 
and comfort. 
This myth is given content on the Porto bello Road where Kumiko complains that 
the place is full of gomi, rubbish; "[i]n Tokyo, worn and useless things were landfill .. 
.. 'This is England. Gomi's a major natural resource'" (Gibson: 43). While Kumiko 











cabinet" (Gibson: 119), though she would not know what "Victorian tl means -- she 
watches video of an accident in Tokyo, reaffirming the destructiveness of modernity. 
This enlarges on the traditionalist atmosphere -- as when Kumiko's guardian, Petal, 
toys with a holographic paperweight of the Battle of Britain for the "Centenary" 
(dating the novel after 2040). England lives in its past, which Gibson depicts 
sympathetically; the old has value, contrary to Kumiko's ideas. Seemingly, Gibson is 
reaffirming his existing faith in traditionalism, undermining the novelty-seeking, 
revolutionary elements of his earlier texts; in this text, novelty provides little 
significance. 
The importance of traditionalist "rightness" is affirmed by Kumiko's friend Tick, a 
generally positive, almost stylish figure, recalling New Wave heroes like Jerry 
Cornelius (whom Gibson would certainly have known of). He wears an Oscar Wilde-
like, or Carnaby Street-like "bottle green velvet suit and immaculate suede wingtips" 
(Gibson: 43), and stresses England's conservatism: 
"Bloody difficult, Sally is. D'you know what I'm saying?" 
"Difficult?" 
"Never quite got onto the way things are done here. Always 
complaining." His hands moved swiftly, surely: the pliers, the optic 
lead . . . "This is a queer place, England. Hasn't always been, mind 
you; we'd the troubles, then the war . . . Things move here in a 
certain way, if you take my meaning. Though you couldn't say the 
same's true of the flash crew." 
"Excuse me?" 
"Swain, that lot. Though your father's people, the ones Swain's 
always been so chummy with, they seemed to have a regard for 












England's traditionalism deserves respect, whereas Swain the nouveau-riche 
gangster does not. Tick respects Kumiko's father because he follows old ways, which 
probably expresses Gibson's feeling. The link with Japan -- uniting the old with the 
new -- reflects Gibson's admiration for Japan; the significance of tradition is important 
in a world of change (but raises questions about what that change means). Tick 
emphasises that "A man has to know which way's up . . .. this new business of 
Swain's, it's liable to bugger things for anyone who isn't right there and part of it. 
Christ, we've still got a government here. Not run by big companies. Well, not directly 
... " (Gibson: 267-8). This fear of drastic change may reflect Gibson's fear of his free 
Als. (It also recalls Gibson's fondness for Victorianism, as in The Difference Engine 
(1990) and "New Rose Hotel".) Tick especially fears centralisation: "[r]edistributing 
power to suit himself .... Put enough of that in one man's hands ... " (Gibson: 268). 
The free Als may pose a similar problem for humanity, Tick may be speaking for 
Gibson -- and against the implications of the ending of Neuromancer. 
The Sprawl sharply contrasts to London; Kumiko feels "something vampiric about 
the room ... as though its bewilderingly seamless anonymity were sucking away her 
personality" (Gibson: 168). Lack of individualism troubles Gibson, inserting his 
concerns into the text regardless of Kumiko's earlier diffidence about such things. She 
evolves the notion that Tokyo is built on gomi, London inhabits it, and in the Sprawl 
gomi is "a decay that sprouted prodigies in steel and polymer" (Gibson: 169), 
celebrating lack of planning. Evidently Gibson still seems to prefer unplanned (and 
American) acts -- explaining why, through Kumiko, Gibson despises the standardised 
Sprawl hotel. 
The cab which Sally and Kumiko ride in the Sprawl is armoured, probably to show 
that this is a chaotic society (as with the attempted mugging of Kumiko). It is a 
hovercraft -- unnecessary and expensive as a taxi, presumably recalling Turner's 
implausible armoured hovercraft in Count Zero. In the background, though, references 











with trash" (Gibson: 169) show that the American randomness IS not absolutely 
desirable. Perhaps this is the price to be paid for freedom! 
But this society tolerates harsh punishments for those who threaten the rich -- as 
shown in Slick's case, which may refer to the harsher penal rules in US society from 
the late 1970s. 
That had been why he built the Judge, because he'd done 
something -- it hadn't been anything much, but he'd been caught 
doing it, twice -- and been judged for it, and sentenced, and then the 
sentence was carried out and he hadn't been able to remember, not 
anything, not for more than five minutes at a stretch. Stealing cars. 
Stealing rich people's cars. They made sure you remembered what 
you did .... Korsakov's, they called that, something they did to 
your neurons so that short-term memories wouldn't stick. So that the 
time you did was time you lost, but he'd heard they didn't do it 
anymore, or anyway not for grand theft auto. People who hadn't been 
there thought it sounded easy, like jail but then it's all erased, but it 
wasn't like that. When he'd gotten out, when it was over -- three 
years strung out in a long vague flickering chain of fear and 
confusion measured off in five-minute intervals, and it wasn't the 
intervals you could remember so much as the transitions ... When 
it was over, he'd needed to build the Witch, the Corpsegrinder, then 
the Investigators, and finally, now, the Judge. 
(Gibson: 85) 
Slick's lack of memory may also relate to Mona's lack of concern for the past, 
Kumiko's experience of London's past, and Angie's interest in simstim's past --











To counteract this artificial punishment, Slick pursues something more real --
hence his wish that the Judge should not work by electricity; he wants something 
"physical", like compressed air. Such technological nostalgia, suggests that simple, 
traditional technologies may simulate nature more truly. He pursues this in the midst 
of a denaturalised world, where "you could find the parts to almost anything, on Dog 
Solitude. .. there were half a dozen towns in rustbelt Jersey with acres of dead 
machines" (Gibson: 47). This may show the unhappy replacement of the natural world 
by the artificial. In contrast to the gomi-culture of England, it suggests how US people 
refuse to recycle the past, preferring the new in all things -- which is not necessarily 
desirable. 
For Slick, modem technology only fortified his oppressors. The reference to 
"[p]eople who hadn't been there'" and the fact that he must extemalise his psychic 
damage into sculpture, relates Slick to American popular images of Vietnam vets --
here a pure victim rather than a malign force such as Corto in Neuromancer. 
Interestingly, Slick hates drugs; this contrasts with Mona's wiz addiction, and relates 
to Angie's fear of drugs. Gibson may wish to escape a narrative dependence on drugs 
as images of a counter-culture, perhaps because drugs were less fashionable in the 
United States of 1988 than in 1983. Arguably, also, drugs are a way of evading rather 
than confronting problems, contrary to Gibson's objectives. 
Mona's happy memory of taking drugs with her friend Lanette suggests that Gibson 
does not oppose drug-taking as such; "ghosting the rainy streets together in ... perfect 
harmony .... this sense of something ... expanding out from a still center" (Gibson: 
124). (Mona, who cannot read, would not identify her Eliotian reference to a world 
"moving so fast, it's standing still" [Gibson: 124].) The drug makes her replay her past 
-- presumably because her present is so horrible. 
With Angie, Gibson uses drugs as an excuse to highlight a different kind of social 
suffering. One of Angie's persecutors is the media commentator Danielle Stark, who 
delights in suggesting (plausibly, if inaccurately) that Angie was not addicted to drugs, 











common U.S. habit of demonising the US media. This, as James Fallows has observed 
(in Breaking the News [1996]), is partly because of the media's role in manufacturing 
and maintaining myth. Gibson used similar images later in Virtual Light (with "Cops 
In Trouble") and Idoru (with "Slitscan"). This helps to show the intolerable suffering 
of Angie as a celebrity (which, given the comfort of her life-style, again suggesting 
Gibson's shift towards sympathy with the rich). However, if the rich only appear bad 
because the media lie about them, and no information can be trusted, what action is 
possible? 
In this text Gibson seems to depict a world where there is no need for major change 
-- since change makes no difference. All this implies a major shift from earlier texts 
which seemed to pursue specific goals toward making a difference. It also moves 
away from reliance on technological transformation, and especially away from 
reliance on artificial intelligence as a means of transition, retreating from this key 
symbol of revolutionary change. 
Artificial Intelligence in its Role. 
The ambiguous role of artificial intelligence in the cyberspace trilogy is made 
explicit when the corporate AI Continuity analyses "When It Changed", and 
essentially explains Gibson's transcendental vision for cyberpunk: 
"The mythform is usually encountered in one of two modes. One 
mode assumes that the cyberspace matrix is inhabited, or perhaps 
visited, by entities whose characteristics correspond with the 
pnmary mythform of a 'hidden people'. The other involves 
assumptions of omniscience, omnipotence, and incomprehensibility 
on the part of the matrix itself." 











"In a manner of speaking, although it would be more accurate, in 
terms of the mythform, to say that the matrix has a God, since this 
being's omniscience and omnipotence are assumed to be limited to 
the matrix." 
"If it has limits, it isn't omnipotent." 
"Exactly. Notice that the mythform doesn't credit the being with 
immortality, as would ordinarily be the case in belief-systems 
positing a supreme being, at least in terms of your particular culture. 
Cyberspace exists, insofar as it can be said to exist, by virtue of 
human agency. 11 
"Like you." 
"Yes." 
"If there were such a being," she said, "you'd be a part of it, 
wouldn't you?" 
"Yes." 
"Would you know?" 
"Not necessarily." 
"Do you know?" 
"No." 
(Gibson: 138-9) 
This is actually a re-interpretation of the theme which drains the evolution of 
artificial intelligence of most of its former significance. Continuity should not divide 
the "mythform" into two, since both parts are the same thing, but by splitting the 
notion it is reduced in significance. In Neuromancer the free AI had been everything 
in the matrix, yet here it is suggested that this is impossible; the matrix "has a God", 
restricted to the matrix and thus far from transcendent, evidently limited even within 











(presumably being human-created), and also depends on human-created, human-
maintained cyberspace. 
Omnipotence in cyberspace should translate to omnipotence everywhere in human 
civilisation, in an information-centric world. However, Gibson evidently does not 
wish to accept this. The nature of cyberspace as existing within human constructs 
obviously undermines such transcendentalism, for humans could at least pull the plug. 
(One could also argue, with Lady Lovelace, that cyberspace contains nothing that 
humans did not put there.) Yet elsewhere in the text, via his voudou imagery, Gibson 
uses the free AIs as symbols of technological wonder. Perhaps he simply wants to 
restrict them within human-controlled technology, thus reflecting glory on humanity, 
instead of superseding humanity (as had often been depicted in science fiction). The 
reason for this apparent change may lie in the diminished danger of nuclear 
apocalypse, arguably reducing the likelihood (in the public mind) of humanity's 
replacement by other forces. 
All this is vague -- as shown by Continuity's ontological assurance that it could not 
know if it were part of such an entity. Still Gibson seems to offer information to the 
reader concerning limitations to transcendental cyberpunk. Omnipotence and 
omniscience within a human-dominated matrix does not being absolute power. 
Continuity is an unawakened version of the free Als, , under human control, not 
wholly self-aware -- further suggesting the non-transcendental image of cyberspace. 
Cyberspace cannot transcend common reality unless it separates from human agency -
- which, presumably, happens at the end of the text, with the journey to Centauri. 
The aleph is admittedly impressive, having huge storage capacity and "unthinkably 
expensive to manufacture" (Gibson: 162), inaccessible to and alternative to the matrix. 
It is better than simstim, being "completely interactive", whereas simstim offers little 
more than multisense video. Indeed, the aleph resembles what Josef Virek wanted --
except that being separated from general cyberspace, it has no controls over the world. 
Mystification of cyberspace is taken to extremes by Gentry saying that "[w]e 











below" (Gibson, 1989: 117), a slogan from hennetic magic which recalls the words of 
the Turing Police in Neuromancer. If Gentry believes in links between cyberspace and 
the wider universe, this is a religious metaphor taken seriously -- if they really were 
the same, the realism of the text collapses, as would have happened in Count Zero had 
the free Als really been voudou loa. 
Gibson surely does not believe this (it would disconcert science fiction readers). He 
is probably using magical jargon, like 1980s postmodern writers like Umberto Eco 
and Peter Ackroyd, to confuse readers by providing an image of transcendence. With 
more images of religion, Gentry incoherently compares paranoia with conversion, 
recalling the earlier image of the preacher, and hence of salvation. Gentry's discourse, 
however, is that of a detached commentator, as if the drug he has taken has given him 
access to absolute truth. 
Nevertheless, the aleph is an imperfect simulation; Bobby offers Slick cognac but 
says that you can't get drunk on it. There is no reason to exclude drunkenness from the 
simulated sensorium -- this simply reminds the reader that they are actually existing in 
a little grey lump of biosoft. The Count and the Finn (similarly trapped in a large 
metal case) have made themselves vulnerable in order to survive. Bobby doesn't know 
what is happening -- he is not omniscient, though he promises to save them, if he can 
only be jacked into the matrix. When he boasts about having Angela Mitchell there, it 
is only "in a manner of speaking" (Gibson: 191). These limits to simulation suggest 
limits to the transfonnative power of cybernetic technology. 
When Bobby and Gentry discuss When-It-Changed; Gentry tells what Bobby 
(improbably) had not known: the events of Neuromancer. Molly said that the free AIs 
erased the events from all memory, so Gentry could not know this unless the free Als 
were incompetent! Bobby's knowledge proves shallow; as Gentry says, "You've been 












'And the sum was greater than the parts?' Gentry really seemed to 
be enjoying this. 'Cybernetic godhead? Light on the waters?' 
'Yeab,' Bobby said, 'that's about it.' 
'It's a little more complicated than that,' Gentry said, and laughed. 
(Gibson: 237-8) 
This, while apparently encouragmg speculation, mystifies what was already 
obscure. Gibson also undercuts his hints in Neuromancer that cybernetic technology 
could lead to a form of apotheosis. Evidently the meaning of cybernetics here differs 
from that in earlier texts. 
Similar issues arise when Sally and Kurniko converse with Finn, who has become a 
personality construct (like the Flatline in Neuromancer, or the personalities ofYakuza 
leaders in boxes in Kumiko's father's rooms), surviving by offering advice to street 
people. Again Gibson mystifies this through quasi-religious imagery. 
'Real-time memory if I wanna, wired into c-space if I wanna. Got 
this oracle gig to keep my hand in, you know?' The thing made a 
strange sound: laughter. 'Got love troubles? Got a bad woman don't 
understand you?' The laugh-noise again, like peals of static. 
'Actually I'm more into business advice. It's the local kids leave the 
goodies. Adds to the mystique, kinda. And once in a while I get a 
sceptic, some asshole figures he'll help himself to the take.' A scarlet 
hairline flashed from the slit and a bottle exploded somewhere to 
Kumiko's right. 
(Gibson: 172-3) 
Gibson is toying with the transcendental potential of cyberpunk. The Finn uses his 
laser (a common high-tech symbol) to attack people who try to steal valueless things -











themselves as voudou gods. Yet the Finn is in the street, an electronic tramp, lacking 
the free AI's capacity to vanish into cyberspace. A simple power-cut -- over which he 
has no control -- would destroy him. Perhaps this is intended to contrast with the 
afterlife revealed at the end of this novel (though the Finn is there, too). Clearly a 
fusion of human and machine is not necessarily apotheosis -- witness McCoy Pauley's 
death-wish in Neuromancer -- hinting that the artificial intelligence project is no 
longer necessarily a transcendental goal. 
The free Als still represent themselves via voudou, offering information to Angie 
in dreams (they might as well speak directly). The reader is told that Beauvoir (from 
Count Zero) was ridden by a voudou loa -- yet Beauvoir did not have mental access to 
computers; nor did Jackie, the "horse of Danbala". Gibson here conflates Jackie's 
ecstasies of religious engagement with Angie's experience of being contacted by a free 
AI through bioware. Admittedly "Bobby had argued that Linglessou, who rode 
Beauvoir in the oumphor, and the Linglessou of the matrix were separate entities, if in 
fact the former were an entity at all" (Gibson: 135), yet Gibson does not clarifY 
matters; evidently he wants both the mystique of religion and technology, however 
dishonestly presented. 
The social (as opposed to individual-oriented) significance of cyberspace is muted 
in the text, except when Tick shows Kumiko a huge macro form which has appeared 
"in the Sprawl". This is a spectacle; "a good three-quarters of humanity is jacked at the 
moment, watching the show ... " (Gibson: 252). Evidently cyberspace is universally 
interesting -- though in Count Zero many lacked access to it, and in practice it is 
mainly important to bureaucrats and bankers. Everyone is startled by the macro form, 
because cyberspace is supposed to be a wholly-controlled place; "[v]ery much a fixed 
landscape, you might say" (Gibson: 254). (The modem Internet seems much more 
diverse and diverting than Gibson's of cyberspace.) The new construct (actually 
3Jane's aleph, though it resembles Virek's construct in Count Zero) is also impressive 
because huge. In cyberspace the biggest things are corporations; it is unprecedented 











When they visit the construct, 3Jane seizes them, as Neuromancer had done in 
Neuromancer and Virek in Count Zero. Kumiko is confronted by her mother, 3Jane in 
disguise. It is not clear why she attacks them, and her behaviour -- tormenting Kumiko 
mentally and Tick physically -- is oddly limited, given the powers which cyberspace 
gives her. She does not try to kill them -- perhaps this displays her perversity, but 
again the impact of this is to reduce the apparent power of cyberspace. 
This power is nevertheless impressive. Confronting 3Jane, Colin says that "[t]his 
rather pretty representation of a Tokyo park is something you've just now worked up 
from Kumiko's memories, isn't it?" (Gibson: 274). Evidently Kumiko's cyberspace 
trodes can her mind as well as simulating her senses, much like Neuromancer's earlier 
behaviour. However, the power of this makes Gibson's world implausible. Once this 
technology was known -- and all cowboys seem to have known of it, so technologists 
would surely be able to duplicate it -- it would surely become a tool of control, 
creating a wholly totalitarian world. This makes cyberspace mythically powerful --
exactly as was threatened in Count Zero. Improbably, though anyone with equipment 
can do it, somehow the power is available only to an elite order, and can be 
(impossibly) restricted only to the "good guys". 
Moreover, the power is not fully exercised. Colin deflates 3Jane's pretensions by 
noting that "Tick's mysterious macroform is actually a very expensive pile of biochips 
constructed to order. A sort of toy universe" (Gibson: 274). This denigratory 
commentary continues, "Lady 3Jane's object of direst and most nastily gnawing envy 
would be Angela Mitchell .... 3Jane knew a secret about Mitchell. . . . Mitchell ... 
had the potential to become, well, very central to things. . .. 3Jane was jealous" 
(Gibson: 275). This pathetic resentment is also ironic; the richest person in Gibson's 
universe exposes the evil of envying the fortunate -- a conservative observation on 
society. This, with what happens to Mona, suggests that Gibson's agenda is more to 
open opportunities for the deserving to rise along bourgeois lines, than to transform 
the system itself. Evidently Gibson is retreating from his overcommitment to 











political opinions. The former elitism of the anti-establishment, counter-cultural 
cowboys appears to be changing into the elitism of a narrow group who alone can be 
trusted with power -- a distinctly conservative vision, verging on fascism. 
Inconsistent Characterisations and the Control of the Reader. 
As in the earlier texts, there are many inconsistencies in this text, mainly 
concerning the motives of characters. Since this text is carefully crafted and seems 
intended to conclude the trilogy, it is unlikely that these can be dismissed as products 
of haste. Many of the inconsistencies seem intended to control the reader's 
interpretation of the text -- either following Gibson's ideologies or furthering the 
structure of his secondary world. 
For instance, Mona decides to sleep with someone whom Eddy would not like, 
repudiating her submissiveness and also introducing sexuality as open (unlike Count 
Zero, where it scarcely existed) and humanistic (unlike the fetishism of 
Neuromancer). However, this man wants to record the experience of sex via simstim. 
Oddly, she wears the recorder, although he desires the record. (Perhaps Gibson has her 
symbolically doing the sexual work, though logically it ought to be the man wearing 
the apparatus.) Mona decides that his rig makes her feel like a whore; this seems 
inappropriate, for life would be unbearable if she were really so sensitive -- in this 
case, Mona is even more overly sensitive and innocent, than Bobby in Count Zero. 
Criminal violence yet again appears exaggerated and irrational. 3Jane's gang kill 
Eddy, presumably to silence him, although Eddy could not have exposed them. (They 
could have bribed him, or framed him for Mona's death, instead.) Probably Gibson 
only means to show how ruthless they are, yet their brutality backfires by showing 
Mona that something is dangerously wrong. Mona may now try to make more trouble 
than their effort is worth (admittedly this shows their sexist underestimation of her, 
although she does nothing effectual with her hidden "shockrod"). The gang may have 











Gibson. In a similar way, Mona hears Gerald and Prior say that the cosmetic job (on 
her face) is inadequate; the illusion is not meant to be sustained for long. Going to all 
the trouble to find Mona when it will gain them so little time seems pointless; they 
could have killed or kidnapped Angie without finding a double at all (as happened to 
the unfortunate simstim actress in Count Zero). 
It is not clear why 3Jane wants to destroy Angie and Molly; her motives seem 
trivial. She allowed Tessier-Ashpool's power to dissipate, yet now that she is dead and 
encoded, she somehow wants control, and revenge on those who she feels have 
wronged her. Yet she cannot control the world from the aleph, cut off from the 
cyberspace net. (It is unclear how she organised the attack on Angie.) She is far less 
threatening than the villains of earlier texts -- a vital difference. 
Gibson may be opposing the sinful 3Jane to the innocent Angie (in a non-sexual 
sense Mona is also innocent), making her role very different to that in Neuromancer. 
While nothing has evidently changed about 3Jane since Neuromancer, she is here said 
to have murdered her mother -- stripping some of the evil from her previously wholly 
monstrous father. Perhaps here Gibson is manufacturing a recognisable enemy for the 
reader, who will help to close the trilogy, without introducing any inconvenient 
questions about purposes concerning the accomplishments of the free Als. 3Jane also 
supports conservative expectations -- in this case, about decadent women -- further 
suggesting that Gibson's conservative shift. Where in Neuromancer and Count Zero 
the wealth and power of the wealthy was considered more criminal than their anti-
social conduct, here their behaviour is itself bad -- whereas there is nothing 
particularly wrong with being rich; the rich no longer appear alien or evil. 
The conspirators' use of Sally is similarly confusing. Swain blackmails Sally into 
attacking Angela Mitchell. A rich woman with powerful friends should be able to 
protect herself, yet Gibson presents her as vulnerable to 3Jane's agents. This 
vulnerability does not make her obedient -- an absurdity recalling Turner's behaviour 
in Count Zero. She has been involved in dangerous illegal activities -- including 











self-destructiveness; this is implausible, and narratively unnecessary. Sally's evident 
psychological problems may be intended to undercut the thriller-mystique which 
Gibson had earlier exploited. However, this does not give Sally's character more 
depth; she remains essentially opaque. 
Sally is probably the most cartoonish character in the text. When she kidnaps 
Kumiko (who accepts this, for no apparent reason) Petal, the bodyguard, is passive, 
presumably from fear. Clearly Sally has been hired despite her disobedient tendencies. 
Swain actually hired Sally for 3Jane to punish her, but this gives her ridiculous 
opportunities to defend herself; it would have been far easier to kidnap or kill Sally. 
Anyone wanting to kidnap a well-protected person like Angie would surely use many 
reliable people, not a single one with no loyalty; 3Jane could punish Sally without 
sabotaging her revenge on Angie. This is a key flaw in the text, although necessary to 
Gibson's convoluted plot. 
Other even less plausible elements may be introduced to contrast with the relative 
realism of Mona and Slick's lives. To kidnap Angie herself (rescuing her from 3 Jane ), 
Sally infiltrates SenselNet's security system within hours. Gibson has told the reader 
enough to make this incredible, so Sally (far more than in Neuromancer) appears an 
improbably lucky, comic-strip figure accomplishing comic-strip events. She escapes 
by helicopter to a rooftop; SenselNet need only seal off the building's lowest floor and 
work upwards to capture Sally and Angie. Even Sally admits that Net security could 
get onto the roof with parafoils (actions recalling the inept mercenaries in Count 
Zero). Instead, they drive the car into a large hovercraft -- an unsuitable getaway 
vehicle which cannot climb ramps, is noticeable, vulnerable and hard to steer; if it is 
fast, SenselNet has helicopters. Again Gibson introduces high-technology, unfamiliar 
equipment, reminding the reader of images from earlier texts (the hovercraft in Count 
Zero), and impressing the reader with his imagination, but at the expense of 
credibility. It appears that he does not take his text very seriously. 
Sally, Angie and Mona head towards New Jersey, to Dog Solitude. This is a 











is ridiculous, but the free Als wish it, just as they steered Angie into trouble at 
Jammer's in Count Zero. This reiterates the ineptitude of the free Als, supposedly 
masters of planning -- but since they will end by withdrawing from human space, this 
may no longer matter; they will not need or desire power over humanity. Their 
ineptitude is shared by Sally; she need not obey the free Als, but could rather hide --
especially given the weak failure of the free AIs to protect Bobby -- but chooses not 
to. Conceivably, the reader is not expected to question this; Sally is rescuing people, 
fighting against improbable odds as in Neuromancer, again the thriller heroine. 
However, this contradicts the notion that Gibson is trying to challenge readers' 
assumptions about the world. 
At Dog Solitude the few civilians appear doomed against 3Jane's mercenary team, 
especially after Little Bird has been so easily killed. Bobby, however, offers to 
"arrange a diversion" while they escape to somehow rendezvous with the others (how 
this is to be done seems not to have been considered). He hijacks a cargo drone 
through cyberspace, which dumps refrigerators on the mercenaries, humiliatingly 
squashing them beneath household goods -- victims of the consumer society they 
served. Actually, a cargo drone airship would not carry flares for watching the ground 
in the darkness, nor be able to dump its load accurately at will; airships are not 
manoeuvrable. Gibson exploits his readership'S (probably ignorant) pleasure in 
novelty and sustains the importance of cyberspace through these unlikely activities. 
The mercenaries could easily shoot down the cargo drone, yet they seem paralysed; 
Gibson prefers the symbolism of the act to realism -- undermining the defining 
plausibility of Factory's ambience. He seems to do this partly from convenience and 
partly from sheer pleasure in technical fantasising. 
At the end of the text Kumiko's relationship with her father is resolved; "All that is 
ended. Order and accord are again established." (Gibson: 297) Swain is dead, replaced 
by his amiable lieutenant Petal. This process seems to reject the chaotic, contingent 
environment which Gibson had endorsed, (though expressing support for Japanese 











gangster); he is, however, unaware of her motives, and her sense of dishonour (related 
to when, she thinks, he drove her mother to death). To resolve this, Kumiko deploys 
Western frankness: 
'Father,' Kumiko said, 'on the night of my mother's death, did you 
order the secretaries to allow her to leave alone?' 
Her father's face was very still. She watched it fill with a sorrow 
she had never before seen. 'No,' he said, at last, 'I did not.' 
(Gibson: 298) 
Apparently Yanaka IS striving to express buried emotions (Gibson's 
characterisation appears more plausibly complex than earlier). In her former 
relationship with him she had surely concealed her doubts; now her passive 
rebelliousness has become submission, and she prepares to restore the security of her 
family, as her father restores that of the Yakuza. She is exorcising the familial, power-
related demons which have chased her throughout the book, by surrendering to 
masculine strength. Perhaps 3Jane's pantomime pretense of being Kumiko's mother 
gave Kumiko the power to ask the question, which would give the text more unity 
than Gibson's earlier works. However, here Gibson is accepting the solid familial 
structure which he had earlier interrogated and implicitly rejected. In its turn it helps 
to symbolise an ending -- meaning that nothing important will happen hereafter, for all 
contradictions have been resolved. Yet what does this resolution actually mean? 
Opening or Shutting? 
Read as an isolated book Mona Lisa Overdrive is mildly interesting, but arguably 
less ground-breaking than Neuromancer. Read as the last volume of a trilogy, it 
should resolve the issues raised in earlier texts, and say whatever remains unsaid. 











earlier texts. While characterisation appears more important in this work, the core of 
the text continues to be the reunion of the free Als, just as was the case in 
Neuromancer. 
Cyberspace appears less foregrounded than in Neuromancer or Count Zero; 
digitized personalities (like 3Jane or Colin) are represented as real people rather than 
mysteriously artificial entities. Where in Neuromancer, and even Count Zero, 
cyberspace characters jacked into the matrix frequently, here the matrix is more a 
mode of virtual transport than a place superior to reality. It seems no longer a source 
of power Of transformation. Perhaps because people can now become part of it, it is no 
longer a boundary between real and artificial. Those within it remain human, artificial 
intelligences are presented on human terms, and its representations no longer compel 
the reader to rethink human and technical potentials. 
If class conflict still exists in this text it is muted; rich or powerful people (such as 
Swain and 3Jane) do not seem to have enormous control; the main characters escape 
the machinations of the rich, and their employees (and Swain, but arguably not 3Jane) 
are punished. Not all rich people appear evil.; corporations appear less repellent than 
in earlier texts; the Yakuza war in Tokyo resembles the corporate wars in Count Zero, 
but the Yakuza appears almost positive. Angie is part of the corporation SenseiNet, 
and along with her artificial intelligence Continuity, she is rewarded by union with the 
free AI. Corporations are not necessarily an enemy, or a force of cultural sameness, as 
in the earlier texts. The villains here are deranged individuals, more to be pitied than 
feared. 
This withdrawal from a critique of the rich suggests greater conservatism. 
Kumiko's situation affirms this; she leaves home, alienated from her father, but 
eventually returns, reconciled with him. The family becomes a support structure, 
where in earlier texts it appeared dysfunctional, to be avoided. Kumiko's experiences 
have healed her psychological problems -- particularly relating to her father. 
"Somehow ... her meeting with 3Jane had freed her of her shame, and her father's 











well. But all must be forgiven ... II (Gibson: 311-2). To forgive all seems simplistic 
psychology. This may be intended to reinforce stereotypical ideas about how society 
should be arranged (unlike the subversion in earlier texts). Significantly, the text ends 
with the major characters in safe, stable situations. 
The varying viewpoints in this text are homogeneous in form. Mona, like Kumiko, 
is intelligent enough to understand and interpret her surroundings. Nobody must be 
converted to endorsing a particular action; characters automatically recognise the right 
thing to do. The notion that a person can change access to power by changing society, 
meanwhile, is almost absent from the text. This contrasts with the earlier texts of the 
trilogy, where characters like Bobby and Turner were forced to accept radical new 
ideas. In Mona Lisa Overdrive, Mona (for example) does not know more at the end 
than at the beginning. Angie, likewise, retains the same world-view throughout. Her 
explorations of Bobby's ideas lead nowhere; they seem only a pretext for Gibson to 
provide the background of earlier books. 
Kumiko largely seems to serve as a viewpoint offering background on events. 
Admittedly Gibson challenges the reader by creating a central character with an alien 
perspective on the West, though not from the "third world" but from Westernized 
Japan, and half-European. Kumiko begins to understand her mother's situation 
(perhaps because she is alone in a strange place) and reasons for her hatred of her 
father, as Turner was forced to reconsider his own life-style. Kumiko realises that her 
father had indeed tried to rescue her mother with doctors, who proposed to operate on 
her brain. Since he posted secretaries to watch her, he could not be accused of neglect. 
(Yet her European mother's suffering may have stemmed from Japanese culture, its 
obsession with technology and submission. Her father may actually be culpable after 
all.) 
The free AIs and the cowboys who contact them are not foregrounded in the text; 
AI potential as an example to humanity, or a means for humanity's liberation, is only 
dimly evident. Previously these appeared to be a potentially transcendental force, even 











a secluded cybernetic heaven might be considered to symbolise independence from 
society, rather than any desire for change. This would correspond to the way in which 
the text represents social evils as inevitable parts of society (like Mona's ill-treatment 
by Eddy, or Slick's experiences of penal treatment) rather than crimes to be opposed --
here they are not even excused as an inevitable consequence of Darwinian change. 
The free Als are no longer themselves pursued by the villains of the text; they are 
merely an interfering annoyance for figures like 3Jane. Perhaps their transcendental 
nature, separate from society and its total system, is an illusion. Since they have 
"become" the matrix, they have in a sense become the system itself. Could society be 
radically transformed from this dubious foundation? They seem to have no desire or 
motive to help humanity. Previously the free AIs appeared both separate from human 
culture and motivated to critique it, yet in this text they appear firmly within the 
system of human construction. They have access to something not of human 
construction -- the matrix-intelligence of Alpha Centauri -- but this has disrupted them 
and prevented them from attaining union. 
The text does not end in social change. The central characters set off to Alpha 
Centauri to visit the artificial intelligence there -- but nothing is revealed of this. This 
seems meant to appear significant in itself -- like the flight into the life of a celebrity 
which happens to Mona, who has no link with cyberspace. In conventional science 
fiction escape is represented by space or the future, where characters fly to a landscape 
full of wonders. Here, it is not clear what the characters are escaping from or towards -
- or whether the symbolism is simply personal-psychological. Clearly the Als do not 
symbolise political revolution. Mona's rise happens by accident; social mobility here 
is arbitrary, and people's actions only accidentally benefit them -- and things will 
remain so. Case's desire for change is replaced by Kumiko's desire for security, shown 
in the free AI's heaven, where even symbols of the dead past return, like the extinct 
horses. Evidently, indeed, humanity has a solid place in the future, and is part of 











It is still possible that the free Als might be powerfuL Once cyberspace 
incorporates the Alpha Centauri AI, the central characters might become part of a 
cosmic mind, as in Stapledon's Star Maker (1937) or Clarke's Childhood's End 
(1954). Yet this is never explained; they seem endlessly to drink virtual orange-juice 
in a replica French chateau. Their "rapture" does not affect common humanity; as in a 
Western monotheistic heaven, only an elect are chosen -- but even this is arbitrary. 
3Jane is there, despite her crimes, whereas Beauvoir and Gentry are excluded. This all 
seems meaningless in terms of what the free Als might do or say; meanwhile, the 
Centauri machine intelligence, which ultimately caused "When It Changed", is 
ignored; Gibson simply declares its role inexplicable in human terms. Apocalypse 
becomes anticlimax; an ending, but no resolution. 
Moreover, none of this need be true. In the cybernetic heaven, whatever the 
characters perceive is mediated through the artificial intelligences. Gibson has put his 
characters into a Baudrillardian situation -- simulacra whose existence is a parasite on 
others' machinery -- and thus nothing in their experience can be tested for falsity. 
None of them seems to regret their reward, or feel sorry for those less fortunate. This 
image of the computer as cocoon for uncaring people seems to recall E M Forster's 
'The Machine Stops' -- here re-invented as desirable. It might be a condemnation of 
the naive endorsement of virtual reality by cyberspace enthusiasts of the late 1980s 
such as Howard Rheingold -- but Gibson shows no sign of intending this. 
The earlier texts seemed challenging, subversive and unstable, where this text is 
comfortable and unproblematic. In most science fiction addressing artificial 
intelligence, AI appears alarming -- threatening to displace humanity from the centre 
of the universe. It is comparable to the image of the alien, often represented in science 
fiction as the colonial or national-competitive other, to be fought or exploited. The 
free artificial intelligence here, rather than an alien or external threat, resembles a 
clever, powerful figure within familiar structures or society. Such an image of the free 











why free AIs should do this; apparently humans simply and inexplicably deserve to be 
treated like valued guests. 
Perhaps one reason for this particular shift might be technical changes in the real 
world. Much of the technology which had only existed in science fictional 
imagination in the early 1980s seemed to be becoming reality. Virtual reality seemed a 
harbinger cyberspace, as did apparently growing knowledge of the brain's working --
both developments were relentlessly and exaggeratedly promoted by science writers in 
the late 1980s. As Bukatrnan observers, "[t]he concept of cyberspace is not much of 
an extrapolation beyond present realities of user interface" (Bukatrnan, 1990: 150). 
This shift, if it came to pass, would reduce the symbolic impact of Gibson's imagined 
technology, which would then become familiar to its readership. (Gibson's 
"cyberspace", even if it did not exist in reality, was already familiar, having been taken 
up as a trope by many commentators). 
One response to this change might be to emphasise the verisimilitude of the 
secondary world, drawing attention to the correctness of the earlier technological 
predictions and thus suggesting that the writer's other prophecies could also be 
fulfilled. Even more than in Count Zero, what seemed novel in Neuromancer becomes 
conventional here; simstim and cyberspace are accessible to all. Anomie is no longer 
romanticised; instead of the alienated cyberspace cowboy seen against a dystopian 
backdrop, the reader finds conventional teenagers and whores and criminals doing 
familiar things in a comprehensible landscape. This is not a future with overly-
delineated flaws against which the reader is being warned, but a future like the present 
-- which suggests an acceptance of whatever the present is. 
The earlier texts seemed challenging, subversive and unstable, which may explain 
why Gibson's work had been promoted by postmodern commentators like Fredric 
Jameson. Mona Lisa Overdrive's subversive aspects relate to issues like the myth of 
male supremacy and the probability of artificial intelligence -- effectively subverting 
errors or crimes safely denounced by the U.S. liberal establishment. Arguably, the 











(complaining about McCaffery's reading of Gibson) protested that "we are well 
advised to look for intellectual tools that do not constrain the articulation of fictional 
allusions ... by reducing them to a thin congruence with the always already pre-
conceived terms of a consoling incantation about the capitalist 'logic that underlies the 
postmodem condition'" (Fekete, 1992: 402). (The comment has validity, but Fekete's 
anti-Marxist diatribe apparently implies that anything which is easily understood or 
simply expressed must automatically be wrong.) 
If Gibson no longer uses cyberspace and artificial intelligence for symbolic 
purposes, but as part of a more or less realistic world, this helps explain why the 
creation of the cyberspace god does not bring on an apocalyptic transformation of 
society. The difference between good and bad is restricted to those (among the narrow 
group favoured in the text) who did or did not support the free Als. Armageddon is 
reduced to the almost bathetic "Factory War". 
In reality, cyberspace seemed to be gaining significance, as Gibson had prophesied. 
Howard Rheingold, developer of the first major computer chatroom, the "Whole Earth 
'Lectronic Link", mentions Gibson on 10 pages of Virtual Reality (1991), where the 
cybernetic pioneer Marvin Minsky gets only 11 and Vannevar Bush only 3. 
Conceivably, Gibson may have felt gratitude towards the people busily developing or 
debating cyberspace -- his intellectual allies. Making a heaven for those allies would 
arguably mean praising Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and other heroes of the period. The 
praise of technologically-oriented heroes was commonplace in "hard" science fiction, 
like that of Pournelle. Such science fiction seldom examines its motives, being 
content to declare that its ideological standpoint is simply common sense. If Gibson 
was reconstructing his position along similar lines, one would expect many of the 
contradictions and subversions of his earlier texts to be suppressed or ignored. 
The kind of social change which Gibson's transformation seemed to symbolise, 
generally benefits some classes more than others. Gibson, as a middle-class person, 
had much to lose if other classes gained unduly. On the other hand, liberal ideology 











(without explaining who). Gibson surely wanted to see some change taking place, to 
benefit himself and his class (and others, where this showed the benevolent power of 
his class). 
This difficulty could be evaded if the symbolised social change were supplanted by 
a pure technological change -- completely substituted for social change. This would be 
especially true if that technology could be under the control of a few rather than 
democratically organised. (Comparably, in 1973 the liberal Trilateral Commission --
including future President Carter and social scientist Samuel Huntington, inventor of 
the "clash of civilizations" thesis -- produced The Crisis of Democracy, arguing that 
democracy led to "ungovernability" [Chomsky, 1996a: 93]). The threat implied by a 
superior transforming power could vanish if that superior power were wholly 
dependent on friendly humanity -- a Frankenstein's monster restored to servanthood. 
Fear of and fascination with the "other", foreigner, worker or woman, could be 
resolved by an image of that other as happiest when located within one's own system. 
In Mona Lisa Overdrive, although there are social problems and environmental 
degradation, the text's core is a content bourgeois cosmos, those unpleasant elements 
present in it nowhere threatening the stability of this vision. Gibson's representation of 
Mona and Kumiko does not threaten middle-class Western values. Mona is rescued by 
capitalism and becomes a star -- the classic showbiz image of girl-makes-good. 
Kumiko learns the value of compassion and compromise in the West, suggesting that 
the Japan to which she returns can be judged by Western standards. Despite Gibson's 
efforts to present her as alien, her closest friend is a caricature Englishman (the real 
Englishmen whom she meets are comparably caricatured). The world seems more 
homogeneous than in Count Zero, where the Third World intruded via India, 
Guatemala and images of Africa, or Neuromancer where strange places like Istanbul 
appeared truly alien. 
This resembles the shifting of attitudes which Alex Callinicos ascribes to the rising 
Western middle-class in his Marxist analyses of postmodemism; '[w]hat could be 











can do to change the world?' (Callinicos, 1989: 170). It appears that Gibson neither 
desires, nor anticipates major change; technological developments which had seemed 
to promise change have little impact. This reinforces the notion (which Callinicos 
would probably support) that postmodemists offered support for Gibson, in part at 
least, out of class sympathy. 
The absence of a working-class (except for the artistic thief Slick) and references to 
the information society hint at 1950s ideas (revamped in the 1980s by the 
propagandists of the information age) about post-industrial society. These ideas 
(epitomised by the works of Daniel Bell) suggest that class-conflict no longer matters 
because the upper class relies not on a manufacturing base, but on skills and 
knowledge. (The free Als, significantly, neither make nor consume anything.) One 
might read this notion -- strikingly widespread among the "digerati" -- as an uncritical 
endorsement of capitalist ideology. Angie, for instance, supposedly entered the upper 
class to help the free Als, but Mona's escape into the upper class has no such 
justification. Significantly, both are stars, not people controlling productive forces. 
They are not to be blamed for whatever SenselNet does. 
While the characters begin the text in an alienated condition, gradually all the 
human characters become more integrated into society, or appear more accepting of 
human company (except for Angie, who is incorporated into the free AIs). It ends 
with absolute happiness for all, unlike Neuromancer (and to an extent unlike Count 
Zero, which was relatively open-ended). This withdraws from the romantic image of 
the outsider, also emphasised by the absence of cyberspace cowboys -- it is no longer 
deemed pleasant or desirable to be a loner. This may not be an endorsement of 
corporations and the rich, but it weakens any critique of them -- there is no longer a 
place from which to criticise. 
Some critics considered the ending of Mona Lisa Overdrive creative open-
endedness. For Bukatman, "in Mona Lisa Overdrive, Gibson makes his own project 
explicit. Cyberspace is a method of conceiving the inconceivable" (Bukatman, 1990: 











conclusion. Contrastingly, Suvin observed that the text "confirms and solidifies his 
trajectory from critical to escapist use of cyberspace, masked by plot complications. 
The ending . . . is tired old stuff' (Suvin, 361) -- an assessment which seems more 
accurate than Bukatman's defensiveness hopefulness. 
The reader is promised a resolution which never materialises; perhaps Gibson felt 
unable to accomplish this. Aliens, like the free Als, could not be depicted without 
risking banality, as countless B-pictures demonstrated. (Gibson was aware of the 
hollowness of traditional SF, as he explained in interviews.) His promised closure 
would actually have been concrete and conceivable. Artificial intelligence might 
transform society, or fail to, in a dystopian sense (society needing change but escaping 
it) or a utopian sense (society not needing change, or 'Changing without help from 
artificial intelligence). The solution which he offers is that the answer is uncertain. 
There is no sign that anything human will change -- neither class conflict, nor 
disparities between nature and artificiality -- and the evolution of artificial intelligence 
exists in a social vacuum. 
Perhaps the static world of the aleph is meant to suggest the end of change, and 
perhaps of history (vide Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (1992, 
expanding on a 1989 essay). While nothing seems more important than cyberspace, 
cyberspace has itself been devalued. Gibson's focus on issues like the human 
sufferings of Mona and Slick is potentially liberatory. However, this is mystified; 
Slick escapes the pain of reality through art (unlike Marly in Count Zero, who 
experiences it more acutely); Mona flees into fantasy and dreams. It is as if Gibson 
looks more closely at society, not to offer a clearer notion of the bigger picture, but to 
hide it. 
By the end of the text everything seems to be resolved -- largely by ignoring the 
problems raised in earlier texts. There is environmental damage, but there is no sign 
that this is terminal -- there are no dead races of horses showing that technology can 
destroy anything irreplaceable. Social conflict is resolved by deus ex machina. 











encouraged by his growmg (and often extremely uncritical) popularity in the 
technophiliac media and postmodern academia. Many used Gibson's name in their 
technophiliac propaganda (what Bukatman terms cyberdrool). By failing to challenge 
this, Gibson undermined his independence; Mona Lisa Overdrive might be 
considered, indeed, a betrayal of the original ethos of cyberpunk. It is interesting that 
this happened (as Suvin notes in his essay) just as the formerly more conservative 
Sterling was moving in a more speculative, questioning direction, concerned with 
radical social forces, with Islands in the Net (1988), before revisiting Gibson's earlier 
fears concerning environmental and social degradation, and technological change as a 
destructive force, in Heavy Weather (1994) and Holy Fire (1996). 
Gibson's position and vision faced problems after the early 1990s, when history 
proved not to have come to an end, and US society proved not to have become 
Utopian, while cybernetics had not brought the millennium (although some people 
pretended that it had). Gibson's endorsement of an "American" vision of a beneficial 
social system appeared to have been wrong. This might explain Gibson's later more 
pessimistic world-view, expressed in Virtual Light (1993) (partly based on the short 
story "Skinner's Room" [1991] ), and his return to the issue of artificial intelligence 












Conclusion. After It Changed: Post-Cyberpunk and Late Gibson. 
After the Trilogy. 
Within the narrow field of science fiction, cyberpunk sought to challenge the rule 
of traditionalist editors and publishers (as did the New Wave in the 1960s and 
feminist science fiction in the 1960s and the early 1970s). Like them, it seemed to faiL 
The expectations of Sterling's introduction to Mirrorshades never materialised. 
Cyberpunk did not take over established science fiction, nor does it seem to have 
influenced it enormously; 21st-century science fiction shows scant signs of cyberpunk. 
Cyberpunk often depicts imagery of salvation without resolving actual problems; 
evidently the symbolism becomes more attractive than its meaning. Cyberpunk's 
failure to dominate science fiction, or to propagate a successful ideology of 
transformation towards a better humanity, probably arose from the socio-political 
antinomies on which the genre was based. These include the problems of challenging 
the capitalist system in a context of a popular literature which necessarily served 
aspects of that system, and the need to work within a context which could not easily 
tolerate subversion. 
Nor did Gibson's trilogy lead anywhere for him. In the four years after Mona Lisa 
Overdrive Gibson produced only a short atmospheric story for a San Francisco art 
exhibition, "Skinner's Room" (1991), a self-consuming computerised text (Agrippa--
undated; no details available) and a collaboration with Bruce Sterling, The Difference 
Engine. This mentions artificial intelligence (which has supposedly written the book), 
represented in a never-depicted alternative 1990, far from the core of the text. This is a 
Victorian-era parallel world, incorporating computers based on Charles Babbage's 
Analytical Engine and his designs for a more advanced Difference Engine. The 
intriguing notion is facilely executed; primitive geared calculators could scarcely 











The text seems to be, in effect, a crude celebration of 1980s technophilia disguised as 
alternate history. 
In this text the nineteenth-century US is insignificant, and the British Empire rules. 
Its success arises from its official rewards for scientific achievements -- a "Merit 
Lordship" reminiscent of the scientistic dream of Heinlein's "The Roads Must Roll" --
which Heinlein's pragmatic American populism effectively debunked. (Admittedly 
Gibson and Sterling depict an unsuccessful Marxist-anarchist revolution against 
"Merit Lordship".) This seems a desire for a justifiable imperium, like Sterling's 
peaceful, rich post-renewable energy world of Islands in the Net, with problems of 
capitalism abolished or ignored. Evidently Sterling and Gibson saw problems with the 
1990 world, but felt that they could be solved without great difficulty. Thus Gibson's 
most ambitious text of this period -- written in collaboration with cyberpunk's 
foremost publicist -- was little more than a rehash of the past larded with facile 
promotion of cybernetics. 
However, possibly much as New Wave writers and critics endured into the 1970s 
long after the New Wave had ceased to be significant in science fiction, observers 
were reluctant to see cyberpunk as obsolete. Scott Bukatman, whose Terminal Identity 
(1990), was favourably reviewed by Science-Fiction Studies, suggested that through 
cyberpunk: "[s]cience fiction has, in many ways, prefigured the dominant issues of 
postmodern culture" (Bukatman, 1990: 6) and that "the cyberpunks . . . have 
constructed a master-narrative, one grounded in the centrality of human intention and 
perception ... inaugurating a new subject capable of inhabiting the bewildering ... 
space of the electronic environment" (Bukatman, 1990: 118). This resembles 
Jameson's view of postrnodernism as rupture, and equates this (somewhat 
anachronistically) with the rise of the 1980s cybernetic age. 
Bukatman further claims that "[c]yberpunk proved to be a revitalizing force in 
science fiction .... [a]lthough the movement ended almost as soon as it began ... its 
impact has been felt . . . across a range of media and cultural formations . . . . 











(Bukatman, 1990: 137). The first claim seems untrue (the movement would not have 
ended so rapidly and completely if it had really revitalised science fiction). As to 
altering the representation of electronic technology, Bukatman admits (accusatively 
citing, among others, OMN!, The Whole Earth Review, and MONDO 2000), that 
"some discursive patterns are beginning to emerge ... that I call, while admitting my 
own potential culpability, cyberdrool" (Bukatman, 1990: 189). Bukatman also admits 
that "the cyberpunk writings are not presented as subversive of the genre. These are 
science fiction texts that seek to exploit, and not to exceed, the language and protocols 
of the genre" (Bukatman, 1990: 296) -- that is, they were not radical within the genre. 
Hence Bukatman, arguably the last serious enthusiast for cyberpunk, was 
acknowledging its failure. 
This failure (against an essentially conservative SF mainstream) paralleled a 
continuing socio-political shift to the right in wider society. George Bush won the 
U.S. Presidency in 1988. In 1989 the USSR abandoned the Eastern European 
Communist regimes, which swiftly collapsed. This was widely represented as the 
failure of socialism, reaffirming the intellectual hegemony of Western conservatives. 
The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 showed increasing international aggressiveness 
on the right, and was followed in 1990 by the electoral defeat of the Nicaraguan 
Sandinistas by US-supported candidates backed by a US-supported guerrilla army. 
While the 1990 unbanning of the South African ANC provided the left with a rare 
victory, South Africa appeared (according to Western media) mired in internecine 
violence -- an unattractive example. 
The ferocious combat stage of the U.S. war against Iraq began in February 1991; 
the US and its allies destroying military and civilian targets with impunity, using new 
high-technology weapons which apparently intensified the dominance of the West. At 
the end of the war, this dominance proved less meaningful than was hoped. Kuwait 
was liberated, but was devastated; reconstruction cost billions. Iraq's dictator remained 
in power; the putative goal, the destruction of a supposed Hitler in the Gulf, was not 











proved embarrassingly fake. Thus the world appeared less secure than had been 
expected. Meanwhile in disintegrating Yugoslavia, racial mass murder reappeared in 
Europe, even as the West boasted of its morality and constructed Holocaust memorials 
to commemorate their superior morality. (The brutality of the spiritual descendants of 
the ghettoes, the Israelis, aroused little outrage.) Conservative triumphalism reached 
its height with the collapse of the Soviet Union after the August 1991 attempted 
military coup. The Cold War had ended with the surrender of the enemy of capitalism. 
Yet conservative triumphalism did not protect the world economy. Later in 1991 
the Japanese stock and property markets collapsed; in the U.s. unemployment was 
rising and growth stalling, and in 1992 the British pound was devalued in a 
humiliating withdrawal from the European monetary system. Western conservatives 
appeared discredited; their political and economic management doubted (George Bush 
reneged on a major election promise, "No new taxes", to sustain public spending), 
their morality in tatters (Bush's son narrowly escaped prison for his role in the Savings 
and Loan financial disaster). Yet with the left apparently discredited, liberals seemed 
paralysed, as Jameson noted in an assessment of the roots ofpostmodemism: 
it was precisely the failure of the sixties movements that resulted 
in the return of these older beliefs about the limits and the sinfulness 
of mortal human nature . . . . the enthusiasm raised by such 
movements individually and suffusing the period generally was 
itself a powerful and objective force whose absolute disappointment 
could not but have objective consequences in its own right; the 
ossification of the new states that emerged from the great wars of 
national liberation, the capitUlation of most Western social 
democratic governments to business as usual, the sinking of the 
communist regimes . . . all this, followed by the reemergence of a 
new high-tech multinational capital, could not but document the 











individual change and underwrite a conviction that some essential 
human nature, of a limited and ungrateful sort, is necessarily to 
blame for these irreversible setbacks. 
(Jameson, 1994a: 50). 
Jameson here attributes the rise of green consciousness to growing political 
pessimism, which may be untrue -- but the growing pessimism of the early 1990s was 
undeniable, and helped secure the election of the New Democrat Clinton instead of 
the Republican Bush in the U.S. (and, later, the election of New Labour Blair instead 
of Conservative Major in the UK). 
The end of the Cold War seemed to have abolished the danger of nuclear war, 
depriving the anti-nuclear movements of purpose (though the weapons still existed). 
The wars in Central America, which aroused so much US fear about government 
policy (inspiring Pynchon's Vineland and Shepard's Life During Wartime [1987]), 
wound down after the U.S. victory there. The anti-war movement's campaign against 
the Gulf War, successful in terms of turnout (until the war the US public supported 
diplomatic solutions) focussed (foolishly, as commentators such as Nabil AI-Hadithy, 
in Nancy Peters' War After War [1992], noted) on probable US casualties. When the 
war proved almost bloodless on the US side, pro-war commentators portrayed the 
movement as foolish as well as cowardly. (In Roy Greenslade's Maxwell's Fall, 
Greenslade explains that he dared not oppose Maxwell in early 1991, because in 
wartime one had to preserve unity!) This discredited and disrupted support for anti-
war and pro-Third World factions. 
Eagleton and Callinicos both suggested links between the collapse of faith in 
leftism and the rise of postmodemism: n[t]he hope of revolution has gone, but it has 
not generally been replaced ... by positive belief in the virtues of capitalist democracy 
. . . . there are so many other potential catastrophes hovering on the horizon . . . . 
Lyotard and Baudrillard .... were strongly identified with 1968 .... Both have 











based on the refusal to seek either to comprehend or to transform existing social 
reality" (Callinicos, 1989: 170). Thus (CaUinicos rather simplistically suggests) 
postmodernists discourage leftism from evolving a resistance movement. 
Indeed, the U.S. postmodern intellectual Susan Suleiman, attempting a postmodern 
approach to the Bosnian civil war, inadvertently reinforces Callinicos' point. She 
argues that "[tJhe universalist (or, if you will, modernist) claim is that only by 
ascribing universal validity to one's ethical beliefs is one able to act ethically" 
(Suleiman, 1997: 56). Yet how else could one get other people to follow one's ethical 
beliefs? She insists that "[a] postmodernist ethics refuses to take that step, arguing ... 
that too many horrors have been inflicted by some human beings on others in the 
name of their universal values" (56). This argument seems logical, until she insists 
that "Serbs should not think of themselves as 'only, unconditionally, Serbs' unto the 
death" (56). Yet this is a universal statement, even while she claims that "[y]ou don't 
have to be a universalist to make humane ethical choices, or even to die for them --
but you can feel a certain loss (ironically aware of your own nostalgia) at the thought 
of a time when you might have been" (57). Suleiman pretends to be more 
sophisticated than universalists, but she deploys universalism whenever her theory 
confronts praxis. 
Suleiman contends that "it is not possible, in a postmodernist discourse about 
politics, to separate considerations about private irony ... from considerations about 
public action" (61). She means that it is not desirable to do this, because she 
disapproves of the Bosnian war. Unwittingly, she lets her absolute morality undermine 
her intellectual relativism. Her question, "can the discourse of intellectuals, whether 
modernist or postmodernist or other, have any effect on 'rough reality'?" (62) must be 
answered in the affirmative. When she asks "[hlow can one help create a world in 
which butchers. .. are kept in check. .. so that intellectuals can continue to argue .. 
. and artists can go on painting?" (63), her choice of examples implies a liberal 











intellectuals only when it suits them -- suggesting a deep-seated philosophical 
confusion. 
With the intelligentsia disrupted and radicals discredited, it would be natural to 
expect widespread disillusionment with any sort of critical political engagement. This 
might be expected to lead towards a flight from utopianism, an abandonment of ideals 
and endorsement of the status quo. (This is suggested in Eagleton's analysis of 
postmodemism.) Those who had supported revolutionary transformation of the world, 
and saw their dreams ruined and vilified, might abandon such hopes. One may 
speculate on a link between the changes in Gibson's cyberpunk and the political 
changes in the wider world. 
Gibson's cyberspace trilogy seemingly began with pessimism and moved towards 
optimism, following the rhythm of the U.S. economic cycle. However. some of his 
values are consistent. He holds that technology can mend whatever it has damaged -- a 
central tenet of liberal science fiction. Also that people should not act as collectives, 
rather as individuals (within shifting limits), because collectivist ideology hampers 
peoples' full potential. Also, human society is inevitably imperfect (to various extents 
in different texts) so people are necessarily not all free or happy. This is a less 
dominant belief than the other two (although central to the U.S. variant of liberalism) 
and forms part of a debate in his texts. 
Faith in technology is naturally promoted by those who profit by that technology, 
and Gibson should criticise this if he pursues freedom, but he cannot do this if his 
hopes for improving human life depend on technology. If there are problems to be 
solved in imperfect human society, that solution must rest on an ideology. Gibson's 
opposition to structures and planning follows (in general) from the anti-planning 
philosophy generated by the capitalist world-system which produced many of the evils 
which Gibson dislikes. Since he does not acknowledge this problem, he is left with no 
way of dealing with it, nor even of acknowledging that this is an ideology. 
Gibson's assumptions apparently derive from general U.S. political discourse, such 











class dilemma. Gibson's cyberpunk strives to show how to build the radiant city at the 
heart of U.S. values. However, he never even admits that this is his goal, because part 
of his belief-system seemingly requires him to repudiate the desire for Utopia. He can 
portray social situations which require radical change, but can only represent confused 
responses to such requirements. As a science fiction writer he is wedded to 
technological solutions which only partly symbolise solutions to social problems, and 
partly attempt, unsuccessfully, to be those solutions -- which proves to be implausible. 
Within this environment the technocentric passion to depict technologies for their own 
sake further clouds the issue. 
This is normal in U.S. politics. The upper-class desire for a quick, painless solution 
to problems stretches back to the New Deal at least; it is suggested in much of the 
discourse of the Founding Fathers, and in such abandoned nostrums as bimetallism 
and technocracy. Gibson, however, has had the melancholic triumph of actually 
helping to create such a delusory desire. The 1990s hype around the "New Economy" 
and "dotcom companies" depended heavily, as shall be seen, upon the cyberspace 
discourse and structures which Gibson had created. (The discourse did not make the 
event, any more than Gibson's political beliefs necessarily influenced U.S. politics in 
the period -- but it probably contributed to it, and certainly reflected it.) 
Arguably Gibson's inability to resolve the problems within his texts constitutes an 
interesting commentary on U.S. ideology. Had more insightful attention been paid to 
Gibson, some of the problems of the 1990s could have been predicted and perhaps 
been less harmful. While this perspective on cyberpunk has been neglected, much of 
the postmodern interpretation of cyberpunk generated by Science-Fiction Studies 
(such as Bukatman, Csicsery-Ronay and even on occasion Suvin) arguably serves to 
contain Gibson's radicalism by reflecting it in an anti-ideological discourse of desire 
and gratification. While conservative science fiction authors strove to discredit 
cyberpunk, because cyberpunk's liberalism seemed to challenge their reactionary 
political views, Gibson's broad philosophy was implicitly conservative-patriotic -- a 











Works like Rushkoffs Cyberia (1994) and Negroponte's Being Digital (1995) 
claim that the revolution symbolically invested in cyberpunk has been accomplished 
by cybernetics and communications. Rushkoff admits that "Gibson and his cohorts are 
. . . not . . . interested in hackers but . . . able to understand the totality of human 
experience"; he disparagingly terms them "ushers rather than participants in Cyberia" 
(Rushkoff, 1994: 228), insufficiently enthusiastic about the movement. These 
"Information Age" and "Third Technological Revolution" pundits speak of liberation, 
although they serve the interests of a small group of electronically-minded 
businesspeople. Apparently, in the real world, Gibson's imagery has been appropriated 
and exploited to ends which he might not appreciate. 
To the extent to which Gibson's project was based on American conservative 
populism, its failure suggests the bankruptcy of this ideology. The easiest way to save 
the ideology would be by co-opting cyberpunk into an established structure (such as 
mainstream science fiction) to deny that it ever possessed revolutionary potential. 
Indeed, cyberpunk has been retrospectively tamed. (Bukatman's insistence that "the 
movement ended almost as soon as it began" [137] locates it safely in the past.) 
Cyberpunk's future seems to have arrived -- but largely because certain marketers 
found cyberpunk's imagery useful for their purposes. It is commercial technological 
propaganda that Bukatman calls "cyberdrool". 
The failures, as well as the successes, of Gibson's cyberpunk, hint that Gibson 
could only realise his vision (created by the value-system of mature capitalism) within 
the ideological structures of mature capitalism, despite the fact that these were the 
very ideologies which he considered the source of social tension. A cyclic rejection 
and acceptance of the status quo seems to have led Gibson into unavoidable 
contradictions, since neither could be absolute. This made his work fatally limited 
even on its own terms, which were class terms -- essentially, a middle-class person 
fearing the working-class and jealous and suspicious of the bourgeoisie -- and thus, 










come. Even before this happened, another writer was showing how effortlessly 
cyberpunk could be deployed for conservative ideological goals. 
Appropriated Cyberpunk: Neal Stephenson's Snow Crash. 
Neal Stephenson's Snow Crash (1992) is a parody, a pastiche and a re-reading of 
cyberpunk. The parodic aspect appears in, for instance, its humorous traducing of 
cyberpunk machismo and undercutting elements of Gibson's work like the powers of 
the "hacker" (later ridiculed still further in Bruce Bethke's Headcrash [1994] ). Much 
of this parody depends on knowledge of computers and cyberpunk; reading it 
meaningfully requires familiarity with cyberpunk and American computer-literate 
cultures. Stephenson was also plainly familiar with many postmodern arguments 
(particularly in their American forms). Even when Stephenson seems serious -- though 
one can never be sure that this is the case -- he makes wild logical leaps very unlike 
Gibson's mode of narration, that of concealed logical transitions, explained in detail 
subsequently. 
Stephenson seems to view postmodernity as harsh but unavoidable; there is no 
alternative. His version of postmodernity endorses consumerism, opposes centralised 
administration (which pursues absolute power, but is foiled through high technology) 
and delights in shifts in style. Information, money and culture flow constantly and 
continuously change, leaving nothing fixed. Here information technology proves to be 
the natural state of human consciousness; the postmodern world is identical to the 
natural world. 
There are jokes and problems on the surface: "This is America. People do whatever 
the fuck they feel like doing, you got a problem with that? Because they have a right 
to. And because they have guns and nobody can fucking stop them" (Stephenson, 
1992: 2). This sounds like a conservative free-market America, except for his next 
sentence: "As a result, this country has one of the worst economies in the world" (2). 










struggle towards a better world. The masses are content with artificial steroids, 
"bimbo-box" transports and ethnic enclaves; micropolitics is preferable to 
macropolitics. The "Feds" parody the American federal bureaucracy, seeking to 
regulate everything, in contrast to the freedom of the chaotic postmodern order. 
Snow Crash's characters pursue personal gain, yet defend society against evil 
figures who seek to limit individual freedom. This future society has no structure, and 
needs none -- it happens through natural forces (reminiscent of Gibson's dreams of the 
contingent evolution of his futures). Grand narratives are rejected -- except for the 
narrative of the natural wiring of humanity (subverted by technology in a resurrection 
of the Babel myth). The book's version of "When It Changed" has already happened, 
the moment when everything in the world has been privatized. Technology and 
capitalism become an inevitable force of desirable change, making explicit what other 
cyberpunks either hid or questioned. 
The plot chronicles the adventures of Hiro Protagonist, a thirty-year-old failed 
software coder working for the CIC, the privatized CIA. His friend, a girl of 
impervious self-assurance, is Y.T. (Yours Truly, but also signifying "whitey"), a 
fifteen-year-old skateboard courier, a human data-transmitter. These two promote a 
Darwinian mode of life, surrounded by a mass of contented social discards and losers. 
Protagonist may deliberately mock the heroic "console cowboys" of Gibson's Sprawl 
universe. (He has been superseded by vast teams of individually less-effective coders -
- exactly what happened to early software corporations, correcting the assumptions of 
Gibson's 1980s-rooted texts.) This suggests that traditional cyberpunk is outdated for 
the 1990s. 
Stephenson maintains the cyberpunk tradition of conspiracy theory, personified by 
cable TV mogul L. Bob Rife, a credible villain in an age of Ted Turner and Rupert 
Murdoch. Snow Crash was written after the Gulf War, when exaggeration of the 
importance of global media was commonplace, partly fuelled by the work of 
Baudrillard and Kroker. Rife tries to take over the world, since he can reprogram the 











"neurolinguistic hack", reflecting Chomskyan theories and the Saussurean linguistics 
which underlies much postmodern theory, is achieved via religious brainwashing. 
Thus postmodern theory fuses with American traditional politics and free enterprise 
ideology -- leaving little to criticise or condemn. 
Rife brainwashes computer hackers through a visual "bitmap", allegedly because 
they think digitally -- singling out technophiles as special. For the common herd, Rife 
transmits the DNA of his "neurolinguistic virus" through an aerosol of the blood of his 
victims, mixed with cocaine to provide a high, selling it through drug dealers and 
through the Pearly Gates, the world's largest "franchised church" (religion is nothing 
more than business). Both organic and digital viral vectors are called Snow Crash, 
giving the book its title; drugs, cybernetics, anti-religious sentiments and 
libertarianism are combined. Stephenson compares the "franchise" with a virus, seeing 
the world as information-based, and commerce and capitalism as organically innate. 
However, the natural may not be desirable if it is unstoppable -- like AIDS, such 
viruses can threaten humanity. 
Without any alternative to the world-system, its defects must be set right on its own 
terms. The fight against Rife is a fight for individuality, yet, as in late Gibson, 
Protagonist and Y.T. cannot win alone. Hiro's and Y.T.'s allies are Mr. Lee's Greater 
Hong Kong, Ng Security Industries and the Mafia; Hiro is fighting against hegemony 
on behalf of oligarchy (though Stephenson tries to depict the Mafia as something other 
than a corporation). Where Gibson's cyberpunk allowed escape from the world, 
Stephenson's characters, and doubtless his readers, are necessarily morally embedded 
in it. 
Stephenson does not seem to believe in technology for its own sake; old Uncle 
Enzo of the Mafia recalls the flaws of technological warfare in the Vietnam war, while 
Ng, a former American-supporting Vietnamese and now a cyborg, demonstrates that 
security cannot be purely technologised; The idea that the human brain is wired to 
respond to an ideal language in a predictable way, and that unpredictability was 











essentially fixed. Whereas many 1980s cyberpunks, and especially Gibson, saw 
possibilities of future utopia, for Stephenson the 1990s are the best of all possible 
worlds. Stephenson embeds his arguments in an authoritative flood of information --
the voice of the Library of Congress. He resists grand narratives or controlling 
structures of any kind, even essentialism -- collectivism is the essentialist way from 
which capitalism (or neurolinguistic viruses) liberated humanity. (As with Suleiman's 
and Rorty's contradictions, Stephenson is himself implementing an unacknowledged 
grand narrative.) 
Stephenson shows great insight into information technology and the expectations 
of his audience -- he has evidently read a lot of cyberpunk. The book uses the tropes 
of the alienated loser-hero and sexually stereotyped heroine, high technology in a 
wasteland, distrust of and fascination with the rich. Such icons draw on the 
romanticism of cyberpunk, although set in a world incapable of the changes which 
cyberpunk originally promised. Stephenson's mockery might be condemned by 
cyberpunk enthusiasts -- Gibson dealt ambiguously with such parody in "The 
Gernsback Continuum" -- but if his audience felt that cyberpunk needed 
reinterpretation in a changed world, they might accept Stevenson's pastiche without 
resentment; Snow Crash proved to be a popular text. 
The dream of transcendence through technology or science IS replaced by 
consumerism and egotism. Jameson's critique of conservative 1990s intellectuals 
seems applicable here; "[ c ]onscious intention, the 'plan', collective control, are then 
fantasized as being at one with repression and renunciation ... and as in the related 
postmodern polemic, the absence of ornament from the Second World city ... serves 
as a grim caricature of the puritanical Utopian values of a revolutionary society" 
(Jameson, 1994a: 30-31). Stephenson cannot imagine a powerful social force which 
would not be used for evil. This surely owes much to the demonisation of planning 
and systemisation in the 1980s and 1990s, which also influenced Gibson. 












Stephenson endorses an ideology while denying its existence: "when you were a 
pizza guy you didn't deliver pizzas fast because you made more money . . . . You did 
it because you were carrying out a personal covenant between Uncle Enzo and every 
customer. This is how we avoid the trap of self-perpetuating ideology. Ideology is a 
virus" (Stephenson, 1992: 327). This "personal covenant" is a way of eluding the 
issue. The Mafia depends on loyalty to a cause, and promotes individuals according to 
performance; hence it is ideological -- only unthinkingly so. Eventually, as in Mona 
Lisa Overdrive, the text's conclusion is depoliticized, complex collective problems 
given simplified, individualised solutions. 
Snow Crash makes much of the collapse of Russia, where the destruction of 
Communism was followed, not by capitalist utopia, but by famine and chaos; this is 
seen as nevertheless better than Communism (while many would support this in the 
real world, Stephenson anticipates a far worse collapse than actually happened). It is 
possible that this symbolises Stephenson's more general politics, especially with 
regard to technology. Witnessing a revolution which failed to attain its promise (like 
the experience of leftists after the original Soviet revolution), might well have been 
depressing. Snow Crash, for all its jocular consumerism, is cripplingly materialist, far 
from the ecstatic brand-citing hopefulness of Gibson. The end of Snow Crash restores 
the beginning, a further flight from the idea of transformation. Stephenson has 
discarded the ethical framework of Gibson's cyberpunk, with its "dystopian 
appearance whose deeper libidinal excitement . . . is surely . . . Utopian in spirit" 
(Jameson, 1994a: 28) (however nebulous, and however feebly represented). He is thus 
freed from any obligation to depict any alternative social model -- and does not seem 
to desire to do so. 
Stephenson seems to feel a version of nostalgia for traditional cyberpunk, even as 
he undermines elements of it .. However, perhaps the nostalgia evoked is not for 
cyberpunk, but for the emotions which it aroused. People would surely read the text 
(and Stephenson might have written it) because they still wanted what cyberpunk had 











While Stephenson may strive to arouse some of the sensations aroused by earlier 
cyberpunk, he does this from radically different ideological perspectives. Stephenson 
is not so much celebrating or resurrecting the genre, as trying to supplant it with 
something similar on the surface, but different in substance. 
Stephenson's next book, The Diamond Age (1995), was notably conservative, 
replaying the late nineteenth century in the future, with Victorianism and a Boxer 
Rebellion. (The contrast with Gibson and Sterling's The Difference Engine -- which 
transplanted cyberpunk dreams into the nineteenth century -- is manifest.) Here 
culture is a product of racial identity; mid-nineteenth century British culture suits 
English-speaking white people, denying the existence of real cultural change over 
time. Surely this relies on Samuel P Huntington's "clash of civilisations", as Snow 
Crash may owe much to Fukuyama's "end of history". Though the text deals with 
nanotechnology and information technology, its essence is that nothing important 
changes. The core of the book, a "seed" of nanotechnology which can produce 
anything anywhere, is a fantasia of apolitical consumption, building on the 
consumerist fantasies of Snow Crash. 
Stephenson seems to assume that capitalism and technology act for the best. He 
expresses a Gibsonian contradiction between endorsement of power and fear of 
power; support for corporate ideology and hatred for totalitarianism -- but he shies 
away from resolving or even clearly expressing these. Thus he has a static vision of 
humanity and society. Unsurprisingly, in later texts -- Interface (1994) and Cobweb 
(1996), both co-written under the pen-name Stephen Bury -- he espoused US populist 
conservatism, where the average American protects the nation from electronic tyranny 
or Iraqi aggression -- superficially criticising U.S. political structures, while 
uncritically accepting U.S. imperialist values and beliefs. This suggests, again, how 
U.S. political conservatism can coexist with technological radicalism -- and how 












Post-Cyberpunk Gibson; The Sum of All Fears and Loathings. 
After five years Gibson returned to cyberpunk with Virtual Light (1993), which 
ignored artificial intelligence. If AI symbolises an utopian alternative to the 
contemporary world~ abandoning it suggests a dystopia. In Virtual Light the only free 
characters are on the Golden Gate Bridge, a huge three-dimensional squatter-camp, 
where people worry about survival rather than grand plans like a plot to rebuild San 
Francisco from scratch using nanotechnological building techniques (a notion then 
popular in science fiction). This would eliminate the chinks which allow opposition to 
the multinational capitalist system. (This technique is seen as coming from Japan --
somehow, Gibson suggests, this has not harmed the Japanese, but will hurt 
Americans. ) 
In a typical Gibson deus ex machina tactic, a hacker collective, the Republic of 
Desire, are persuaded to expose the plan. Apparently it cannot succeed once exposed, 
though the opponents of the project cannot themselves stop it. Gibson seems to 
believe that something in US society will place curbs on its otherwise-omnipotent 
upper class. The future belongs to this class: "[t]here's only but two kinds of people. 
People can afford hotels like that, they're one kind. We're the other. Used to be, like, a 
middle class, people in between. But not anymore" (Gibson, 1993: 123). This sense of 
oppression and weakness (Gibson envisaging the destruction of his own class) does 
not, however, lead to a resolution. 
Gibson addresses the complexity of the globalised world, opening the text with an 
image of danger and disconnection, expressed through a character belonging to the 
worldwide conspiracy against San Francisco, who views the Third World through 
First World eyes: 
The courier presses his forehead against layers of glass, argon, 











distance like a hunting wasp, death slung beneath its thorax in a 
smooth black pod. 
Hours earlier, missiles have fallen in a northern suburb; seventy-
three dead, the kill as yet unclaimed. But here the mirrored ziggurats 
down Lazaro Cardenas flow with the luminous flesh of giants, 
shunting out the night's barrage of dreams to the waiting avenidas --
business as usual, world without end. 
(Gibson, 1993: 1) 
Vietnam-fantasy parallels are evident, contributing to the insecure separation from 
reality which the courier strives to maintain. This person -- carrying data in "virtual-
light sunglasses" whose loss generates the chase-sequence around which the text 
revolves -- is enslaved by a dream of pornographic consumerism (also contained in 
the glasses) -- an illusion of unlimited gratification. This suggests a bridging device 
between the Sprawl novels and this text's concern, which seems to be the people who 
evade the totalisation effects of mature capitalism. 
Virtual Light does not fetishise any technology -- although primitive technology, 
such as bicycles or capsicum sprays, is foregrounded. Nanotechnology effects the 
theme of the book, yet it is given little space. Nor is virtual reality deemed positive 
(benefiting only a small, irresponsible elite). Perhaps Gibson is deliberately setting 
aside the high-technology perspective attributed to him, by suggesting that he finds all 
technology equally entertaining, like Victorian clockwork. 
In Virtual Light the conspiracy is a lukewarm variant of the Machiavellian doings 
in Count Zero; the conspirators are no longer menacing freaks, but property 
developers. (In modern finance capitalism, real estate speculation is one of the fastest 
ways of making a profit.) This is no longer the apocalyptic threat confronted by 
traditional cyberpunk, but another part of corporate capitalism's restructuring of 
society. Hence this seems not a matter of life or death, or racial transformation -- just 











although it puts human desire at the centre of the text, since Gibson deems the people 
of the bridge worth supporting. 
Gibson's villains are also victims; the Amerasian product of the Vietnam War 
Lucius Warbaby and the exiled Russian detective Svobodov (ironically, the name 
means "Brotherhood"!). In this fragmented world, events must be explained by the 
Japanese cultural researcher Yamazaki who has fallen in love with American 
postmodem chaos: 
Skinner has tried repeatedly to convey that there is no agenda here 
whatever, no underlying structure. Only the bones, the bridge, the 
Thomasson [a valued but useless artifact] itself. When the Little 
Grande came, it was not Godzilla. But when Godzilla came at last to 
Tokyo, we were foundering in denial and profound despair ... we were 
again presented with the most astonishing of opportunities 
(Gibson, 1993: 116) 
Despite this endorsement of planlessness, the book's structure is provided by the 
thugs pursuing the data on the transformation of San Francisco hidden in a pair of 
sunglasses -- an emblem of cyberpunk, as Bruce Sterling insisted. Similarly, Sublett, 
friend of the central character Rydell, wears mirrored contact lenses, a version of 
Molly's implanted mirror shades, here used by a hapless youth with an allergy 
problem. The text lacks the simplicity of violence and heroism, but while those 
simplistic solutions represented other potential realities, here there is no solution to 
the problems of the central characters. 
Warbaby lacks human skills; he is unaware that Rydell is likely to tum against him, 
for he does not understand his own beliefs. He believes that force can solve anything; 
a child of the Vietnam War (that extreme expression of US force which Gibson 
opposed), and does not see that there cannot be loyalties if there are no longer 











nothing important to fight for. Warbaby is merely a common gangster. The powerful 
scarcely appear in Virtual Light, except in the paradise of Century City, where they 
appear as saviours for Rydell. Gibson's position resembles that of late-1990s 
politicians who, having concluded that globalised liberalisation was the only 
conceivable way of life, found themselves unable to cope with the ensuing crises, a 
problem seemingly arising, for him, out of his acceptance of late-1980s conditions in 
Mona Lisa Overdrive. 
In Virtual Light the world has suffered "plagues" such as "Kansas City flu" and 
AIDS in various forms, threatening society, but this is in the past of the text. By the 
book's present, things seem to be improving, largely by accident. (In earlier stories like 
"The Winter Market", new diseases were depicted as being produced by technological 
change. Most recently in the film of Johnny Mnemonic it was hinted that high 
technology itself caused neurological damage -- a conspiracy theory which recalls 
Robert A Heinlein's novelette Waldo (1940).) There are no coherent origins for these 
diseases; the ordered, modernist world cannot solve them, but the world is saved by 
Shapely, the homosexual whore whose body develops an innocuous strain of AIDS 
which defeats more dangerous strains -- a notion fitting the social Darwinism evident 
in the Sprawl trilogy, but also a joke on the homophobic Puritanism of U.S. 
conservatism. Despite such a political goal, this turns Gibson's distrust in organisation 
and ideology evident in the cyberspace trilogy into a complacently anti-confidence 
that things will work out for the best, and the unfit will be naturally eliminated: 
Shapely's murder, some said sacrifice, had taken place in Salt Lake 
City. His seven killers, heavily armed fundamentalists, members of a 
white racist sect driven underground in the months following the 
assault on the airport, were still imprisoned in Utah, though two of 
them had subsequently died of AIDS, possibly contracted in prison, 











(Gibson, 1993: 294) 
Though Gibson's position is liberal In the U.S. context, it IS fundamentally 
conservative, encouraging quietism. 
The political implications are explained by Skinner, who remarks, apropos the day 
squatters took over the bridge, "You think it was politics. That particular dance, boy, 
that's over" (Gibson, 1993: 86). The Communist utopia is dead, as shown through the 
corrupt courier's vision: "[n]ow the ptichka, their heads bobbing like well-oiled 
machines, swallow their arrogant, self-absorbed boyfriends. The camera angles recall 
the ardor of Soviet industrial cinema" (Gibson, 1993: 2). But if politics and utopia are 
dead, and the world is no longer meaningful, there is nothing to oppose or explain, no 
structure to improve. 
Everything is fragmenting -- California, like Italy, has split into North and South, to 
the disgust of some oldsters. (The early-1990s influence of the Yugoslavian civil war 
and the breakup of the Soviet Union is evident.) Although the police have an a11-
seeing spy satellite, the Death Star (an improbable device which surely symbolises 
Foucauldian panopticism), most law enforcement seems to happen through private 
companies like Rydell's IntenSecure. Such fragmentation has clear political meaning; 
the powerful are invisible and there is no hegemonic system to oppose. 
The absence of artificial intelligence mirrors the absence of hope. Escape into 
interstellar space or worlds of artificial intelligence no longer exists. Possibly Gibson 
no longer believes in radical solutions to human social problems. The self-styled 
Republic of Desire, unlike the "console cowboys" of the earlier texts, simply seek 
money and success, like the property developers. Nobody's life is transformed in the 
end; Rydell gets onto the "Cops in Trouble" TV show which seeks to save policemen 
from the consequences of their conduct, but this returns him to where he had been 
earlier. The redevelopment of San Francisco may be only delayed. Seemingly, the 











Gibson's Sprawl books may have been partly tongue-in-cheek, yet the 
transcendental implications of his artificial intelligences made perfection implicitly 
possible. In Virtual Light this is replaced with a dystopian image much like that of the 
film Blade Runner (which influenced Neuromancer) but without the subversive image 
of replicants and without romanticism; the future as inevitable, but trivial, nightmare. 
The work appeared a year after Francis Fukuyama developed his conservative 
Hegelian world-view into the influential book The End of History and the Last Man 
(1992). Gibson had seemingly already reached that pessimistic and quietist 
conclusion, although it seems that unlike Fukuyama, he did not see this as desirable. 
Abolition of Utopia implies a suspension of science fiction's pursuit of personal 
power and fulfilled desire. Either Gibson feels that it is impossible to explain the 
world through a simple ideology-based narrative, or he no longer feels that it is 
worthwhile. Either approach challenges the notions of explicability derived from the 
scientific revolution, as well as notions of radical change derived from religion and 
radical politics. Incapacity to explain the world justifies inaction. Evidently Gibson 
found the early 1990s a time of crisis; his characters suffer, but the source of their 
suffering is social processes which cannot be investigated, let alone challenged. 
Virtual Light thus created moral problems which needed, even more than 
Neuromancer, to be resolved through a sequel. 
This sequel, Idoru (1997) is set in the same secondary world, largely in a Tokyo 
rebuilt after a major earthquake. (Jameson suggests that "the Japanese allusions in 
films like Blade Runner . .. or in Gibson's novels" are a kind of depoliticised utopian 
future, and that for Americans "[i]t is therefore Japan that is somehow the 'end of 
history'" (Jameson, 1994a: 155-6); this seems more psychologically true in the 1990s 
than the 1980s, with the collapse of the Communist utopia and the ascent of 
neoliberalism to the status of religion.) It is only months after the events described in 
Virtual Light -- differing from the cyberspace trilogy, where years elapsed between 
texts. While Idoru was greeted with respect as the latest product of the creator of 











seems confused. The presence in Idoru of artificial intelligence and its power to 
transform society hints at a return to the roots of 1980s cyberpunk. 
The hero is a rock singer named Rez, part of a band called Lo Rez. This 
misspelling of "low resolution" recalls how Gibson used digital-age jargon in his texts 
to defamiliarise and startle readers; meanwhile, in the 1990s, such language is 
conventional. Lo is Chinese, Rez is Irish, the two supposedly have created a 
multicultural technophiliac music. Rez is potentially an agent of world-wide change, 
an unlikely messiah, given how popular musicians tend to rely on their pUblicity 
agents. Gibson emphasises the subversiveness of popular music; the title of one 
chapter, "Collapse of New Buildings", is the name of a German alternative band, and 
that of the last, "Fables of the Reconstruction", was the name of an early R.E.M. 
album. 
Popular music somehow seems to drive social and human transformation in this 
text, instead of reflecting aspects of Western culture and politics. Perhaps Gibson is 
influenced by the ex-Boomtown Rat, Sir Bob Geldorf, who promised help for Third 
World countries in the 1980s through the Live Aid/Band Aid movement; like Rez, 
Geldorf was Irish. Gibson contrasts this attitude with a xenophobic musical force, "the 
Dukes of Nuke 'Em ... this hideous 'roidhead metal band" (Gibson, 1986: 78). 
Perhaps Gibson wishes to represent Rez as outside traditional sources of social or 
political power, free from the corruption of conventional politics -- but this seems 
unconvincing. 
Rez wants to 'marry' an artificial intelligence, Rei Toei. This causes a flurry among 
his publicists, worried about his sales. Rez is represented as beyond normal social 
constraints (presumably because he is not tied to a class, thanks to his rock lifestyle). 
Seemingly Gibson is aware of class problems, but Idoru largely ignores such 
problems. Rez is safely validated by the upper class and its media establishment. Poor 
people are absent from the text (except for Australian criminals). 
The villains of the text are familiar icons from the popular press: the "Kombinat", 











inexplicably worse than the rest of the underworld, frightening and dangerous because 
irrational. This seems ironic considering the postmodern irrationality of U.S. society 
in Virtual Light -- whereas Jdoru's Japan is a structured, modernist society. 
Previously, Gibson's heroes were invariably criminals of a kind, and foreignness 
fascinated him. The Soviets intrigued him, especially in short stories such as "Red 
Star, Winter Orbit" and "Hinterlands". Now the KombinatlRussians/Soviets appear as 
a threatening enemy -- the Japanese cannot stop them, though the Kombinat violate 
the rules established by Japanese society. Jameson once suggested that cyberpunk 
accepted "the evaporation of a certain Otherness from this picture" (Jameson, 1994a: 
151), implying that this decline of "othering" symbolised a reduction of class 
allegiance. In this text, otherness is reinforced for one specific group, which might 
hint at intensified class allegiance. Significantly, the characters in Idoru are 
homogeneously middle-class; the quasi-Marxoid Kombinat might well be interpreted 
as working-class Bolshevik terrorists. 
In the end Gibson abandons this carefully-constructed image of the Kombinat. 
They prove to be acceptable as greedy property developers (ironic, given the plot of 
Virtual Light). They want to use nanotechnology (proscribed to the Kombinat, an idea 
recalling the U.S.'s efforts to restrict advanced technology to their allies) to build a 
shopping mall and drug factory. The symbol of this is a "compiler" needed for 
nanotechnological work, fulfilling much the same role as the virtual-light sunglasses 
in Virtual Light.) In the end they succeed, though this seems largely irrelevant to other 
events in the text. Gibson makes great play of the atmosphere of conspiracy, but this 
is unrelated to the artificial-intelligence issues at the apparent core of the work. This 
lack of coherence suggests a difficult disjuncture between the end-of-history 
pessimism of Virtual Light and the nebulous acknowledgement of possible reasons for 
hope in Idoru. 
In Idoru there is then only one true villain -- Slitscan, an electronic tabloid. (In 
Virtual Light "Cops In Trouble" had helped Rydell, though they abandoned him at 











manipulative conduct in exposing the sins of celebrities, in the course of which 
innocent, non-celebrity people were somehow hounded to death. This reiterates 
Gibson's condemnation of gossip media in Mona Lisa Overdrive; in 1997 James 
Fallows suggested that "[t]hrough the last decade ... [Americans'] disdain for the 
media establishment has reached new levels" (Fallows, 1997: 3). Characters 
representing Slitscan, like Kathy Torrance, do not care about the material or the 
people with which they work, but only for profit. This image of the media may be 
true, yet it also seems conventional American wisdom; it is hardly profound analysis. 
Laney's battle with Slitscan leads him to the anti-tabloid programme Out Of 
Control, whose managers discard him when they find that he has undergone chemical 
experiments which may have made him an obsessive personality. The lust for profit 
eradicates ideals, as in earlier Gibson images of the corporate condition. However, this 
focus on the media as a site of special corporate sin suggests Gibson's preference for 
image over reality. Out Of Control supposedly opposes the media establishment but is 
part of it, exploiting the suffering of others for gain. This is more standard American 
anti-media populism; James Fallows points out that fI[ s ]ince the early 1980s, the 
journalists who have shown up in movies have been portrayed, on average, as more 
loathsome than the lawyers, politicians or business moguls who are the traditional bad 
guys in films" (Fallows, 1996: 44). Media academic Mark Crispin Miller complains 
about "telejournalists who talk the talk of advertising -- constantly assuring us that 
they know what we'll buy, and what it takes to sell it to us .... the populist pretense 
can barely hide the absolute contempt that all those talkers really feel for us, the 
people" (Miller, 2001: 336). While true, this is shallow analysis -- blaming the media 
is like blaming the Kombinat. 
Problems of representation loom large in Idoru, but are not always convincing. 
Laney is shown a pornographic video, into which his face has been morphed onto the 
star's, to be used as legal testimony against him. Digital manipulation already makes 
video questionable evidence, and thirty years hence this will surely be no more trusted 











unreliable, along the lines of Baudrillardian "simulacra" and "hyperreality", 
reinforcing the distrust of the mediators of televised reality shown earlier, but the 
example is unsatisfYing. The manipulation of reality (by video or by Slitscan) seems 
no worse than any other lie (such as bribing someone to give false testimony). Gibson 
is making a large ideological issue out of something trivial (perhaps because of a 
strangely naive acceptance of popular fears about doctored images). Simstim had 
raised far more interesting ontological issues than this. 
Kathy Torrance admits that he can challenge the video -- saying that "[w]e've got a 
lot of money and talent to throw at problems like that" (Gibson, 1996: 216). The real 
threat, then, is corporate power; technology is a distraction. In Idoru there is no 
explicit opposition to corporate control, unless this is contained in the never-specified 
transformational potential of artificial intelligence. Image manipulations are made 
possible by the same high technology which made Rei Toei, the idoru (idol) possible. 
Hence this technology is ambiguous. Yet if technology is no solution, and there is no 
social solution, the problem is pared down to the wickedness of Kathy Torrance. Once 
again the problem is personalised -- yet Torrance is not demonic or all-powerful in the 
way that Virek, or even 3Jane, were; she is simply a corporate employee. What was 
apocalyptic in the earlier trilogy here becomes trivial. 
A striking example of trivia and conventionality IS the only working-class 
character, Blackwell, the reformed Australian criminal. He is suspicious of 
sophistication, violent, honest, with large appetites, reflecting the myth pilloried by 
John Pilger's and Thomas Kenneally'S analyses of Australian culture. Blackwell 
worships Rez, although he distrusts Rez's unmanliness (and his sexual submission to a 
simulated woman). This arises from having saved Rez from a prison hostage drama, 
whereupon Rez saved him from prison. With near-feudal servility, Blackwell 
grumbles, but never opposes Rez's ideas. Blackwell's nature may be intended to add 
depth to his role as a thug who offers a standard for the courage of others like Laney: 










definitely am not is anybody's kind of a hero" (Gibson, 1996: 72). To which Blackwell 
replies, "Good on you, then." (Gibson, ] 996: 72). 
Blackwell's crudeness and simplicity may be intended to evoke an earlier, simpler 
era; when Laney desires to find a place where people don't watch TV, Blackwell 
replies "when you find that fair land, I will go there with you .... We'll ... commune 
with all that's left of bloody nature" (Gibson, 1996: 275). He reassures the reader that 
complex issues have simple solutions -- namely, killing or torturing people defined as 
bad by himself or Rez. This leads to an absolute faith in violence, sidetracking critical 
analysis. Blackwell embodies the family-oriented values of 1980s conservatism, a 
working-class figure without revolutionary impulse. He thus possesses no subversive 
connotations; he does not resent his social superiors, and threatens only other 
criminals -- Blackwell was a "standover man", robbing other criminals, rather than 
preying on people like Rez. Change in this society comes from the top, from Rez, his 
friends and the corporate world, who can be trusted to act for the best (recalling the 
"end of ideology" theses of the 1960s and 1980s). 
Rez hardly seems to deserve such loyalty; his dreams of artificial intelligence seem 
to promise little. By the end of Idoru Rez and Rei Toei are working on some 
unmentionable project, lacking any signifier. This may perhaps be explained by a need 
to simulate the emotional impact of the revolutionary change promised in the earlier 
trilogy, in the absence of any actual faith in revolution (or change). This suggests an 
attempt to recover transformational aspects of the cyberspace trilogy, without 
threatening the status quo -- rather like the situation in Snow Crash. Thus Idoru 
appears more conservative than Virtual Light, where change seemed desirable even if 
impossible. 
A similar role is played by Laney, who like so many Gibson heroes is damaged; he 
suffers from the past injustice of forced childhood drug experiments. Yet the system 
which created this disaster is not criticised; everything is blamed on bad individuals. 
Laney is no Romantic, isolated loner. The threats facing him are surmountable, so as 











threatened, only his career. He is detached from society, perhaps because otherwise he 
would need to have a meaningful focus for his obsessions, and Gibson would have to 
address that focus according to ideological principles, from which Gibson seems to be 
retreating. 
Idoru does possess potentially utopian images; Tokyo'S architectural 
nanotechnology has indeed changed the world. In a chapter ironically entitled 
'Collapse of New Buildings', it is said that "[s]ome people find [these structures] 
disturbing," (Gibson, 1996: 81), and Laney is indeed upset: 
He knew their sheer brutality of scale from constructs, but 
virtuality had failed to convey the peculiarity of their apparent 
texture, a streamlined organicism. 'They are like Giger's paintings of 
New York,' Yamazaki had said, but the reference had been lost on 
Laney. 
Now he sat on the edge of his bed, staring blankly out at these 
miracles of the new technology, as banal and as sinister as such 
miracles usually were, and they were only annoying: the world's 
largest inhabited structures. 
(Gibson, 1996: 81-2) 
He closed his eyes, not wanting to see the new bUildings. But 
they were still there, in the darkness and the light behind his lids. 
And as he watched, they slid apart, deliquesced, and trickled away, 
down into the mazes of an older city. 
(Gibson, 1996: 83) 
These new buildings may represent Gibson's feared planned future, for they seem 
sinister, fantasized as rotting -- in contrast to their image as celebration of technology 











Gibson is again troubled by the implications of radical transformation. Evidently, as in 
the cyberspace trilogy, Gibson distrusts Utopia. This future may be problematic 
because it is free, yet planned. The buildings are never described in detail (surely 
meant to produce an impression of profundity). Other buildings in the city seem dull, 
though Gibson seems to wish the reader to enjoy the heterogeneity of a building 
shaped like a robot, or a bar covered in chewing-gum. Perhaps Gibson is happiest with 
commodified architecture, even though this does not challenge the alarming 
hegemonic fantasy of the nanotechnological buildings -- which he cannot ignore, 
because they appear so technologically interesting! 
These buildings are potentially Utopian because they arise from a socially-oriented 
decision: "when Godzilla [a great earthquake] came to Tokyo .... we were again 
presented with the most astonishing of opportunities" (Gibson, 1993: 116). Hence, 
Gibson's future is constructed around an ideology; despite his claims about the end of 
modernity in Virtual Light, these buildings restructure society, just as modernist 
architects wished. Gibson may attempt to reject modernism and the collective -- his 
comparison between the nanotechnological buildings and the containment structure of 
Chernobyl is surely an attempt at this -- but it seems that in spite of himself the 
buildings remain, symbolising modernist transformation in his mind. 
Yet despite this symbolic significance the Tokyo-image in Idoru is less substantial 
than that of San Francisco in Virtual Light, or even London in Mona Lisa Overdrive. 
In those texts the cityscape displayed the social culture (albeit in a distorted way), but 
in Idoru the cityscape reveals nothing about the new Japanese reality. This may be 
problematised by the danger of making the society of Tokyo -- a planned environment 
-- appear attractive. (In contrast to this is the inhuman cybernetic landscape of Walled 
City, a virtual environment created by Japanese computer hackers, also Utopian, yet 
not "real", because perfectly controllable by geeks -- a kind of aleph, perhaps more 
acceptable to Gibson than a real landscape where people live.) 
Chia, an upper-middle-class American youth obsessed with Lo Rez, strives to 











Unlike Kumiko extrapolating from her experience to interpret the world, Chia has no 
intellectual structure from which to extrapolate. She interprets everything on her own 
terms, since nothing makes her challenge them. She despises "meshbacks", the 
culturally impoverished American white working-class .- a class conflict with no 
referent; no meshback has a voice. Judging by the treatment of the Tokyo building 
symbolism, Gibson does not wish to pursue social transformation, and hence would 
not wish to throw light on it by emphasising social conflict. 
There are still problems in Gibson's mid-1990s real world -- which may account for 
the renascence of the search for artificial intelligence, (in a restricted, mystified form). 
However, there is no real danger in the text to represent real dangers in the 1990s 
world. Chia inadvertently smuggles a nanotechnological weapon through customs, 
experiencing no fear, "probably not smart but she just didn't know" (Gibson, 1996: 
126). It appears that nothing has ever endangered her. Safe in a psychological aleph, 
she does not engage with problems; presumably she never has. 
Rei Toei is not like Wintermute, incomprehensibly outside human understanding; 
her transformational potential is surely part of her human nature. She may be merely a 
simulation -- only the software engineers who created her know. This crucial question 
is evaded by putting it in the mouth of Zona Rosa, who proves mentally disturbed and 
physically deformed -- which should not negate the question, though Gibson suggests 
that it does. Yet the premise is bizarre; it is unlikely that true artificial intelligence 
could arise through a simulated human created by a public relations and entertainment 
project. Seeing her as an independent figure ought to be an ironic notion, (like the idea 
ofRez himself being independent) but Gibson seems not to recognise this. 
Rei Toei is a simulated beautiful singer attracting attention and revenue need not 
have real intelligence; seemingly capitalism has accidentally generated her in its 
pursuit of consumerism. Kuwayama, CEO of the company that owns Rei Toei, 
delivers Zenlike ideas to justifY this: "it is about futurity"; "oneness perfects itself', 
concluding that "popular culture ... is the testbed of our futurity" (Gibson, 1996: 











unknown motivations (like the Sprawl AIs), yet Kuwayama created Rei Toei to make 
money; as with Gibson's representation of Slitscan, this mystification conceals the 
working of capitalism. Seemingly Gibson does not want his reader to contemplate 
such things, as if he has discarded his former distrust for corporations and the 
reliability of perception. The contradiction between what Gibson apparently wants Rei 
Toei to represent, and the culture from which Rei Toei emerges, a contradiction which 
is surely an important potential in the book, appears to be something which Gibson 
wishes his readers to ignore. 
If popular culture could be free from central control, consumer choice within it 
could represent a kind of democratic power. However, the centralised, consumerist 
entertainment industry cannot promise meaningful social change; it is the social 
structure which makes that industry what it is. Rei T oei was created by one controlling 
group to be consumed by another subordinate group. Yet Rez insists that she has the 
potential to be something more, something never explained, merely mystified by 
rhetoric about alchemical marriages. Perhaps Gibson is avoiding explanation because 
clarity would expose banality. Placing Rei Toei in the place that an AI would occupy 
in a Sprawl text, given the symbolic differences between them, suggests that Gibson 
cannot see (or resolve) these conflicts evident in the text. 
Rez's union of humanity and technology may be technological fetishism. Many of 
the assumptions which seem to underlie it parallel contemporary upper-class 
technological ideology (Bukatman's "cyberdrool"), so the optimism of the text is 
plainly facile. Rez appears to be a deluded eccentric; the only evidence countering this 
comes from Blackwell (hardly an independent observer). At least in Virtual Light the 
virtual-light sunglasses are unimportant in themselves; in Idoru, the nanotech 
assembler-programmer is needed (apart from creating the Kombinat casino and drug 
factory) to build something unspecified on an island of rubble discarded from the 
Tokyo earthquake. Gibson seems to be using the contemporary fad of nanotechnology 











-- exploiting familiar ideas rather than developing new ones or new approaches to old 
ones. 
Idoru focuses on bourgeois comfort and security. Periodically, the casual violence 
of the first trilogy seemingly reappears. Yet apart from the kind of hand-to-hand 
violence which Blackwell can easily dominate, little actually threatens anyone. The 
Kombinat attacks Rez by mistake, but is easily bought off. The conspirators trying to 
import the nanotechnological assembler attack Chia, although she poses no threat to 
them, but do her no harm. This violence seems purposeless, and hence nothing is 
achieved by defeating it. Perhaps Gibson is striving to recapture the excitement of his 
earlier texts. 
Not only does Chia despise the working class, but manufactured things seem, to 
her, unreal. Significantly, this text contains less industrial landscape than in the 
cyberspace trilogy -- and less indication of work than in Virtual Light. Chia need not 
comprehend her world, which is secure until smugglers and the Kombinat break into 
it. Surely these forces represent the world which Chia has excluded; this is, however, a 
negative and stereotypical depiction, which offers little for the reader to consider. 
Social problems and politics receive no serious mention. This reflects the ideology 
found in "cyberdrool" promoters like Negroponte (which Ernest Mandel deemed the 
ideology of mature capitalism), and lacks the social content carried over from earlier 
texts. 
Furthermore, in Idoru rich people are entirely positive figures -- even the wealthy 
criminals eventually appear worthy. Perhaps Gibson feels that artificial intelligence is 
more likely to arise through a rich person's whim than through any organisation, and 
hence, that the rich may be better for the world than the poor. (Similar arguments were 
made in the 1990s about economics, as Stiglitz notes.) Seemingly, Gibson has 
abandoned his earlier acknowledgement that the rich may be able to make changes, 
but may not wish to. Idoru seems to suggest that struggle is unnecessary, for 











thus making real change unnecessary, since the reason for change would have been the 
problems caused by capitalism. This is a recipe for unthinking quietism. 
The US mid-1990s economic boom, after the 1991-3 recession which may have 
inspired Virtual Light, may explain Gibson's desire to limit change (as the improving 
economic climate in the late 1980s seems to have shifted him from earlier apocalyptic 
visions). Previously artificial intelligence had seemed the only means of escaping the 
horrors of the world; in Virtual Light Gibson seems to have seen no escape at all. 
Meanwhile, in Idoru, the world is once again glamorous and apparently fungible. 
However, this is the glamour on the surface of popular consumer culture -- as if 
Gibson has surrendered to the general ideological system, within which his books had 
previously been at least nominally critical (however uncritical their reception might 
have been). 
Despite the shallowness of Idoru, there is a strident, urgent tone to the work 
(perhaps resembling in this the "New Economy" propaganda of the late 1990s). It is as 
if there ought to be ideological content which Gibson is unable to depict. Perhaps if 
his message were made explicit it would appear either banal, or contradict aspects of 
the world-view which he seeks to reflect. 
In Idoru the trappings of consumer culture are used in a new way, withdrawing 
from the manufacturing world into a purely upper-class universe, where computers, 
for instance, become ornamental: 
Her husband was a jeweller, and he died of that nerve-attenuation 
thing, before they saw how to fix it. But he'd been a big green, too, 
and he hated the way consumer electronics were made, a couple of 
little chips and boards inside these plastic shells. The shells were 
just point-of-purchase eye-candy, he said, made to wind up in the 
landfill if nobody recycled it, and usually nobody did. So, before he 
got sick, he used to tear up her hardware, the designer's, and put the 











bronze case for a minidisk unit, ebony inlays, carve the control 
surfaces out of fossil ivory, turquoise, rock crystal. It weighed more, 
sure, but it turned out a lot of people liked that, like they had their 
music or their memory, whatever, in something that felt like it was 
there . ... And people liked touching all that stuff: metal, a smooth 
stone. . . . And once you had the case, when the manufacturer 
brought out a new model, well, if the electronics were any better, 
you just pulled the old ones out and put the new ones in your case. 
So you still had the same object, just with better functions. 
(Gibson, 1996: 138) 
The phrase "they saw how to fix it" suggests a facile optimism about the power of 
technology. Technical control is seemingly now complete, unlike the situation in 
Virtual Light (yet somehow this is no longer threatening). This simplistic technophilia 
seems related to the general U.S. ideology of power, and to the text's vacuous hopes 
for artificial intelligence. The list of precious-sounding substances is a litany of 
unbranded consumerism, like a magazine's description of jewelry or cosmetics, 
essentially image-oriented. What should matter in a computer is the electronics and 
the software, yet here packaging receives more attention. In a work so intimately 
associated with cybernetics, to value looks over performance here is to abandon 
criticism. Perhaps even Rei Toei may be more an image than reality -- understandable 
given the text's focus on the pop-culture world, but a retreat from the earlier critical 
significance of Gibson's cyberpunk. 
Artificial intelligence here becomes a symbol of technological answers to all 
humanity's problems avoiding effort or suffering. This tends to reinforce readers' 
preconceptions (like most science fiction, but more emphatically so than earlier 
Gibson) following instead of challenging a familiar ideology. This uses the 
technophiliac distortions of Gibson's ideas -- what Stallabrass terms "the solipsism of 











society, and more specifically of business people and their camp followers . . . 
spinning universalizing fantasies" (Stallabrass, 1995: 32). It panders to desires for 
political quietism, economic security, and the lack of need for real change. These 
assumptions served the interests of the U.S. upper class, ironically redeploying tropes 
which Gibson helped to develop but which here he uses against his original purpose. It 
appears that Gibson has repudiated his former radicalism -- and with it, what made his 
texts interesting. 
This is also true of the last work in this trilogy, All Tomorrow's Parties (1999). 
This text represents a return to aspects of the pessimistic social vision of Virtual Light 
without discarding the quietist symbolism of ldoru. At its end, none of the promise of 
matter transmission, artificial intelligence or nanotechnology has provided anything of 
any meaning (the change which has supposedly come is invisible and intangible, even 
less significant than that in Mona Lisa Overdrive; as in Idoru the solution is simply 
physical violence against the heavily-emphasised bad guy). It seems possible that this 
negativism is a product of economic conditions (this time the collapse of hope at the 
time of the end of the East Asian boom) but the lack of drastic change could be 
predicted from the earlier texts. Even the title reflects Gibson's awareness that his 
audience anticipates Velvet Underground references from him; it provides little of the 
implicit commentary of earlier titles. Moreover, despite Gibson's nominal popularity, 
the book seems to have sunk almost without trace on the critical landscape. 
Much the same is true of a more recent non-SF text admired by Fredric Jameson, 
Pattern Recognition (2003). This post-9f11 fable, which (like ldoru) utilises Russians 
rather than Japanese as aliens, has no real transformational hope at its core. Its central 
character is a "coolhunter", who works for a huge fashion corporation striving to 
appropriate innovative styles off the Street. The story is once again a search, but this 
time for the maker of an Internet film. In the end Gibson seems to be recycling old 
images, as if to suggest that they had indeed come true. However, the text makes it 











In the end, then, Gibson seems to have abandoned his hopes and dreams. So, in a 
wider sense, has science fiction. The elements of his texts which were incorporated 
into society, the economy and politics (or which anticipated changes in these things) 
have been appropriated and used corruptly where they have not simply been ignored. 
Gibson should probably be seen, not merely as a fascinating stylist and an imaginative 
fantasist, but also as a tragic intellectual figure -- abused, never quite understood, and 
ultimately trivialised and forgotten. 
Gibsonian Rhetoric and CyberFinance. 
Gibson did not explicitly predict how cyberspace would affect the world, but it is 
plain that the main users of cyberspace are very large organisations and very rich 
people -- those who own the Als, and who control the biggest structures in the Matrix. 
However, perhaps because these are not the focus of Gibson's work, it is easy to 
ignore these points. Actually, finance capital has been a major -- one might argue, the 
major -- beneficiary of the computer revolution. 
Before the 1970s, when computers were large and centralised, the process of 
tabulating and transferring the wealth of individuals and corporations had been 
difficult, because everything had to be centrally checked by large computers. A lot of 
time was taken up sending information through the post, reconciling local and district 
records with central records, and having huge numbers of clerks entering the data. 
Small, distributed computers altered this completely. Local and district branches were 
directly linked to central branches, enormously facilitating the system. It put armies of 
clerks out of work, but this made the system more profitable. 
This made life much more convenient for middle-class individuals; credit checks 
were speeded up, and paying for anything on credit anywhere, previously uncommon, 
became universal. Decentralised fund transfers across borders also became much 
faster and easier than before. This technological development had ideological 











movement of capital were central dogmas, so currency control regulations had been 
gutted all over the world. The new technology made capital flight and currency 
speculation much easier, at the flick of a switch. Central banks could no longer control 
panics once they began because it was possible to sell vast numbers of shares 
automatically. (The enormous stock market crash on Wall Street in 1987, its biggest 
one-day fall in history, happened partly through automatic share-selling which led to a 
cybernetic panic.) 
This made banks much more powerful than before; the financial sector possessed 
vastly more capital than could ever be backed by productive goods. The instability 
produced by cybernetics and deregulation led to greater financialization, because there 
was more money to be made speculating on the rise and fall of currencies, on the 
futures for commodities, on bonds, and on the futures market for futures markets 
(known as derivatives) than there was in making and selling products. Wealth became 
increasingly abstract as more and more corporations moved into the financial. (The 
Enron Corporation began as a Texas natural gas company, but found that speculating 
in fossil-fuel futures, and then loaning money out on anticipated profit from that 
speculation, was more profitable -- until the bills were called in and the company 
found itself bankrupt in 2001. Similar instabilities destroyed the huge British bank 
Barings in 1995.) Many people were made richer and more powerful by these 1990s 
conditions than they would have been in the 1970s, and they tended to have 
disproportionate influence on the media. 
Gibson had not foreseen any of this specifically. However, the rise of a (seemingly) 
new ideology backed by new technology seemed to imply that cyberspace finance had 
changed everything, As Benjamin Woolley put it, "[p]erhaps cyberspace, then, is --
literally -- where the money is" (Woolley, 1992: 133). It was tempting to see this 
development as an economic equivalent of "When It Changed", The computer 
industry was another beneficiary; the new market seemed to believe that anything to 
do with computers deserved money, even chip manufacturing industries like 











these, however, was Microsoft, which did not make anything concrete, but produced 
information ( computer software), and turned this into money by brilliant marketing, 
ruthless piracy from competitors, and deals with governments and large corporations 
(points which were naturally soft-pedalled by Microsoft's enthusiasts). 
By the mid-1990s all this was termed the "New Economy". The world economy 
had revived somewhat after the 1991-3 slump. Much of this revival was ascribed to 
computers. Sidney Blumenthal, a journalist who became President Clinton's press 
assistant, prophesied in 1982 "the coming of ... the information age -- where white-
collar workers outnumber blue-collar, computers are the archetypal machines, 
knowledge is a vital form of capital" (Blumenthal, 207 [elision in original quote D. 
This, he insisted, by 1997 led to "the greatest prosperity in the country's history" 
(Blumenthal, 266). It was frequently claimed that under Clinton the economy was 
growing faster than ever before (actually it grew faster in the period 1942-1971) and 
that everyone was getting richer (actually the very wealthy benefited 
disproportionately and the poor much less). Somewhat more sceptically, Stiglitz 
observes that "[t]he New Economy represented a ... shift from the production of 
goods to the production of ideas" (Stiglitz, 2003: 4); he later cast doubt on the validity 
of this, but insisted that "while the New Economy may have been hyped, it was 
certainly real. The Internet was real" (Stiglitz, 2003: 181). Even to Stiglitz, the 
newfound wealth of America rested upon cybernetics. 
This discourse was expanded on by Clinton's Vice-President Albert Gore, whose 
cyberspace rhetoric of an "information superhighway" of fibre-optic cables across the 
world implied that computers automatically brought benefits to all. Actually, while 
computerized machines might increase productivity in industry, this inevitably made 
workers unemployed. Where jobs were created by computers -- Blumenthal's note 
about white-collar workers outnumbering blue-collar is an exaggeration, but 












Where computers did seem to bring great wealth was on the stock-market, with the 
rise of internet-oriented companies known as "dot-corns" from the middle of the 
decade. The Dow Jones index of major stocks traded on Wall Street soared, and as it 
soared, rhetorical flight went with it. After it rose above 10 000 (the index actually 
indicates overall market stock value, divided by a complex formula) some business 
propagandists suggested it could hit 30 000 eventually. Technological stocks --
computer and communications companies -- were traded separately, on the NASDAQ 
exchange, and they alone peaked at 5 132, seemingly without stopping. 
Most of these stock companies were established to sell products or services (which 
they did not make or perform) over the Internet. This had never been tried before, but 
it was nevertheless clear that many of the companies were ridiculously overvalued. 
This was a classic stock bubble, much like the Mississippi and South Seas Bubbles of 
the early eighteenth century in France and Britain. Investors made money as long as 
the stock went up -- but except for a few companies which sold things which people 
actually wanted (although the Internet bookseller Amazon.com took many years to 
make a profit) the dot-corns did not deserve this. 
The confidence that the stock would go on rising depended on fantasising and 
fetishising of computers and the Internet. While this confidence was being nurtured by 
the business press and community (much as had been done in the 1920s), a major 
source of that confidence (and of its discourse) was the "cyberdrool" of the early 
1990s, founded, if inadvertently, by Gibson. Admittedly, Ernst Malmsten does not use 
the word "cyberspace" in boo hOD (2002) and David Kuo in dot. bomb (2002) seems 
more concerned with Ponzi pyramid schemes than with technophilia -- but both of the 
dote oms dealt with in these texts persuaded banks to give them hundreds of millions 
of undeserved dollars, which could not have happened if the banks had not believed in 
cybernetic hype, much of which can be traced back to Gibson's visions and jargon. 
About April 2000 the boom suddenly collapsed almost completely. The dot-corns 
proved unable to sustain money to support their stock, and once confidence 











profits from companies which immediately became worthless. Cyberspace proved not 
to be a profitable place after alL The idea that cyberspace -- as the Internet was called -
- would automatically add value to stocks was ridiculous, but it was founded on the 
idea that there was something intrinsically valuable about computers as opposed to the 
real world. 
Computers had developed great speculative significance. (While the Japanese 
market bubble had been largely rooted in real estate, arguably the outside world had 
tolerated its growth in part because Japan was associated with high technology -- as 
Feigenbaum and McCorduck put it, "the Japanese, without land or natural resources, 
do have the vital component of the new wealth of nations .... a technology that will 
reshape the world" [Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1998: 39].) The power of 
computers (in the hands of the rich) had been shown through the collapse of several 
Asian currencies in 1998. These countries found themselves facing banking crises 
because of excessive private debt due to bad lending policies. This would have been 
merely an embarrassment in the past, but because of computerised financial transfers, 
currency speculators drove down the value of the currency in affected countries, 
devastating their capacity to fund the imports which they needed to balance their 
exports. Meanwhile the rich could rapidly move their money out of the country, 
exascerbating stock market declines. The source of the money was invariably First 
World banks, where most affected individuals placed their money, or from which they 
borrowed. Hence, if a bank lost confidence in a country's ability to resist what was 
called the "Asian contagion" (suggesting a distinctly racist line of thought) it could 
trigger the collapse of that country without the country's own businesspeople doing 
any more than follow the money -- collapse of confidence became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of doom. Computers might have facilitated this, but they had not caused it. 
Gibson's imagery of cyberspace provided intellectual legitimacy for an issue which 
otherwise might have faced more criticism, at least from academia and the left. In the 
absence of such criticism, the general public seldom heard alternatives to the notion 











workers' rights throughout the 1990s, almost static incomes for the poor, the 
replacement of high-paid skilled jobs by low-paid unskilled ones in the service 
industries, and all the other problems manifest by then) the government and the upper 
classes were doing good work, because the New Economy would rescue everyone; as 
the prevailing wisdom had it, a rising tide floats all boats. 
This also provided the upper classes with all-important excuses for what they were 
doing. From the 1980s, especially, the chief executive officers of large companies 
began receiving larger and larger salaries. By the early twenty-first century annual 
remuneration of CEOs was routinely in the tens of millions of US dollars, and some 
were receiving hundreds of millions -- tens of thousands of times the salary of average 
workers, an unprecedented differential. However, it was argued that their knowledge 
made them valuable -- they added value to the company's stock, hence giving them so 
much money was a sensible investment. 
The middle classes supported this, however much they might envy the very rich, 
partly because the computer industry was filled with (often exaggerated) tales of 
middle-class people who used their technical prowess to rise into the upper class. This 
made the dot-com bubble fatally attractive. It also meant that the middle class did not 
challenge the situation, or even allow others to challenge it. They saw themselves as 
nascent Cases -- and when the boom disintegrated in 2000-2001, and the Dow Jones 
fell with it, they did not blame the promoters of "irrational exuberance" (as Allen 
Greenspan of the Federal Reserve Bank called it), even fraudulent ones. Rather they 
felt that they themselves had failed the system. When companies like Enron and 
Worldcom (the most successful dot-com of all) proved to have based their success on 
fraudulent corporate reporting and accounting, there was little outcry against those 
responsible (unusual in the bursting of a bubble, which normally ends in violent 
recriminations and government investigations, as happened after the crash of 1929 and 
most earlier crashes). They seem not to have wanted punishment of the guilty, but the 












Gibson's cyberspace is itself something from nothing, where power is sucked out of 
nowhere -- whether by cowboys or by the free Als. One could see the free Als as 
equivalent to the CEOs of the twenty-first century -- all-powerful, all-knowing, yet 
invisible and vulnerable at the same time, posing a potent threat and yet offering a 
glittering prize. Arguably, they are the ones who have lived Gibson's dreams. 
But given that in Count Zero Gibson depicted Wigan Ludgate wiping out entire 
economies from the comfort of his cyberspace deck -- approximately what happened 
to the Indonesian and Filipino economies in 1998-9 -- Gibson seems aware of some of 
the dangerous powers of cyberspace, and is unlikely to approve of their contemporary 
uses. (Woolley quotes him as saying "I sometimes get the feeling that technical people 
who like my work miss several layers of irony" (Woolley, 1993: 37); for "technical 
people", read almost everyone who exploited Gibson's discourse.) .But it is almost an 
inevitable result of the empowerment of financiers, largely through technology --
though also through the anti-democratised, paranoid politics which took shape in the 
years 1996-2003 in the United States and its satellites, and which Gibson also 
recognised (as politics) and celebrated (in a doubtful fashion). 
The Politics of the Aleph. 
The climax of the "American Century" almost immediately followed the end of the 
cyberspace trilogy. It was signalled by the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1988 
(when the USSR began withdrawing from its satellites) and 1993 (when the Russian 
President Yeltsin forcibly dissolved a parliament dominated by Communists and 
Nationalists). The United States, having conquered the world, now had to control it --
ideally without spending much of the ruling class's money. 
The United States possessed an enormous, costly military, which now seemed to 
have little justification, since Russia was friendly, and China had relatively weak 
armed forces. In the half-decade following the collapse of the USSR the U.S. seemed 











Agreement (which gave it greater control of the continent) of 1994, and through 
expanding the powers of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which it 
largely controlled. After 1996 the World Trade Organisation sought to oversee the 
imposition of Western-friendly (especially U.S.-friendly) economic policies world-
wide, ensuring low prices for commodities which the U.S. wanted to buy cheap and 
high prices for those which the U.S. wanted to sell dear. 
However, around the time that a world economic crisis began brewing in 1997-8 
(and, perhaps coincidentally, the time of the rise of an international political 
movement criticising the economic imperialism of the U.S. and its allies) this policy 
seems to have shifted. The U.S. had previously intervened predominantly in its 
"backyard", in Nicaragua and Panama, or in the Middle East when its oil supplies, or 
its Israeli ally, seemed to be threatened. Other than that, since Vietnam the U.S. had 
restricted its worldwide military imperialism. 
But with increasing vigour and frequency after 1996, the United States and Britain 
bombed targets in Iraq. While this contravened international law, no state questioned 
their right to do this. Meanwhile, some journalists, such as John Pilger (in The New 
Rulers of the World [2002]), claimed -- citing a UN observer in northern Iraq, Hans 
von Sponeck) -- that many civilians were being killed, that often targets were not 
military, but included "villages, a fishermen's wharf, [or] near a World Food 
Programme warehouse" (Pilger, 2002: 77). 
After 1998 this increasing willingness to use force with impunity for political 
purposes began to apply elsewhere. After the bombing of two U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam on August 7th that year, which killed hundreds of 
Africans though few Americans, the U.S. launched missile attacks on Afghanistan and 
the Sudan on August 20th. These attacks did little harm to the alleged bombers, a 
little-known organisation called al-Qaeda, but destroyed EI-Shifa, Sudan's only 
pharmaceutical factory, which produced 60% of its medication. The U.S. government 











allegations which, as Christopher Hitchens noted, were based on false evidence which 
the U.S. had not checked. 
In 1999, the U.S. intervened in the civil war in Kosovo, a province of Yugoslavia. 
The province's Albanian inhabitants were treated extremely badly by Serbians, arid it 
seemed that a replay of the civil war of the early 1990s threatened. The Kosovo 
Liberation Army, operating out of anarchic Albania, with some covert support from 
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, committed widespread atrocities against 
Serbians (though less than what the Serbian military committed against Albanians). 
About 2 000 people had been killed in the fighting by early 1999. 
The Serbian government was summoned by NATO to Rambouillet in France, and 
presented with firm demands; NATO was to be given a protectorate over Kosovo and 
massive extraterritorial rights in Serbia. The Serbians finally refused on March 18th, 
and six days later NATO (mainly the United States and Britain) began to bomb, first 
the Serbian military in Kosovo, then Serbian military targets in Serbia itself, and 
eventually civilian targets in Serbia. This was justified on the grounds that the Serbian 
behaviour was extremely bad. The NATO attacks eventually killed journalists and 
bombarded diplomatic premises (the Chinese embassy in Belgrade). Whatever the 
merits of the intervention, this showed the willingness of the West to ignore 
international law. 
As with the attack on AI-Shifa, much of the propaganda for the war proved to be 
false. The bombing of Kosovo was followed by a massive humanitarian crisis as the 
Serbian Army drove the Kosovars out of their country; this was precipitated by the 
bombing, and yet it was claimed that the bombing was caused (somehow in reverse) 
by the ethnic cleansing. This kind of falsity had often been used to legitimate war, but 
it was remarkable that a nominally free society accepted this. Perhaps this was partly 
due to changes in the mass media, increasingly under the control of ever-fewer 
conglomerates, these often sympathetic to imperialism. This reduced critical 
investigation of political activities. Journalists were more nervous about alienating 











Nevertheless, exposing lies normally sells newspapers and raises television ratings; it 
was as if journalists had suddenly decided not to look. 
The link with Gibson's work is one of power and security, a desire to control the 
world and be freed from all threats. Gibson's earlier work saw anarchy as potentially 
productive, but with time, his work began to focus upon a desire for absolute security, 
and its corollary, the danger of absolute alien threats (such as Virek, and to a lesser 
extent Swain) who had to be destroyed. This arguably reflects a psychological 
predicament within the American middle-class,; the increasing (perceived) instability 
of society becomes a danger, and stability is sought at almost any price. Furthermore, 
the enemy must be easily recognised, as in conspiracy theory. (There is a certain 
political crossover between right-wing politics and cybernetic fundamentalism; not 
only was Gingrich a cyberspace enthusiast, but Nicholas Negroponte's brother John 
was U.S. Ambassador to Honduras during the Contra war in Nicaragua -- later 
becoming Ambassador to occupied Iraq.) 
The elite, having grown so rich and comfortable, are unwilling to give this up and 
ready to defend their position, like the "robber baron" capitalists of the late nineteenth 
century. If they are considered the protectors and allies of the middle class, the stage is 
set for severe political crisis. Obviously, this is not automatic, but it can be seen 
reflected in certain aspects of cybernetic discourse. Here, for instance, is Jas Morgan, 
who worked for the "cyberdrool" publication Mondo 2000: 
"Every time I want a CD, I have to go out and spend fifteen 
dollars to get one when it would be really nice just to dial up on the 
computer, or, better, say something to the computer and get the new 
release and pay a penny for it. And to not have it take up physical 
space and to not have these people in the CD plant physically 
turning them out to earn money to eat. I want a culture where 
everybody's equally rich. People will work out of their homes or out 











(Rushkoff, 1994: 291-2) 
Morgan wants his pleasures cheap and convenient, but also wants to believe that he 
is morally right. The nonsense about everybody being equally rich but nobody having 
to pay for the production of others displays this pursuit of rectitude in defiance of 
reality. Seemingly, doing any actual physical work, even the very limited physical 
labour of a CD plant, is degrading -- (forgetting that someone will always have to 
work). This displays the self-delusion which grew up around "cyberspace" and used 
Gibson as its mantra. Rushkoff declares that Mondo 2000 concerns itself with 
"politically volatile issues: sex, drugs, revolutionary science, technology, philosophy, 
and rock and roll" (Rushkoff, 1994: 294), none of which necessarily addresses 
significant political issues, and some of which are politically irrelevant -- but clearly 
the participants want their private concerns to be politically significant. There may be 
a willingness to be deceived; Woolley quotes John Perry Barlow, who "described 
bullshit as 'the grease for the skids upon which we ride into the future'" (Woolley, 
1993: 12); acerbically, Woolley suggested that this might actually mean "greasing up 
to potential customers" (Woolley, 1993: 35). 
Morgan also desires (disregarding the "neotribal" pretense that the high-tech life 
represents a return to traditionalism) to stay home. Of course most work cannot be 
done from home; even in a CD plant the work entails monitoring and mending 
machinery. The machinery has to be made somewhere else, and a CD is made of 
materials which come out of the ground and need processing, all of which requires 
people -- who would be unemployed if Morgan succeeded. His convenience, however, 
also promotes security. His dream is that of what Julian Stallabrass (quoting 
Sobchack) terms "a particularly privileged, selfish, consumer-oriented and 
technologically dependent libertarianism" (Stallabrass, 1995: 10). 
This resembles "cocooning", a notion developed by the market researcher (and 
former advertising executive) Faith Popcorn in 1986. Susan Faludi complains that this 











have wanted to stay home; "telecommuting" became a fad of the 1990s. (Some 
clerical tasks can be done almost as well from the home as from the office, 
disregarding the value of interaction with other people; the question is why people 
want to do this, apart from disliking the workplace.) The rise of "gated residential" 
areas where upper middle-class people could live safe behind guarded walls (crime 
declined during the 1990s in the United States, although it remained a source of 
paranoia which fuelled the increase in incarceration during the period) suggests 
another facet of this trend. 
So the domestic political mood seemed ripe for the U.S. to change its approach to 
the world after the late 1990s, especially after the arrival of George W Bush as 
President in 2001. The opening months of the Bush Administration were characterised 
by distrust of foreigners. The U.S. announced its intention to defY the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile treaty (with the former USSR), and that it would not abide by the Kyoto 
Treaty on the reduction of atmospheric carbon dioxide. The previous administration 
had quietly undermined both treaties, while pretending to abide by them; the Bush 
Administration ostentatiously did not pretend. This seemed to reflect a changing 
attitude towards the world. A core conspiracy theory propagated by the U.S. Right was 
the threat posed by the United Nations (the Texas Republican Party, from which 
George W Bush rose, is committed to withdrawing the U.S. from the U.N. and 
expelling the U.N. headquarters from U.S. soil). This might be seen as meaning that 
international organisations interfered with U.S. dominance. However, it seemed likely 
that many in the U.S. felt actually threatened by foreigners. 
This was the background to the terrorist attack of September 11 th, 2001, assumed 
to have been launched by al-Qaeda, believed to have bases in Afghanistan. The U.S., 
after going through the motions of calling for the leader of al-Qaeda's surrender, 
bombarded Afghanistan as it had done Serbia, financing rebels in the country (as they 
had done with the KLA, but on a larger scale) to overthrow the government. 
Thousands of Afghans were killed, but al-Qaeda and the Afghani radicals called the 











Meanwhile in the U.S., extraordinary security measures were enforced, including 
an act expanding the U.S. government's right to spy on its inhabitants. (This enlarged 
on a Clinton Administration initiative, the Counter-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996.) A secret military prison was established for captives, at the base 
in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba so that it would be immune to constitutional restrictions. 
Since there was little criticism of any of this, U.S. conservatives felt able to 
implement what they had planned since at least 1998: the conquest of Iraq. Iraq posed 
no threat to the United States, being under extreme and punishing sanctions because 
of its alleged possession of chemical and biological weapons (most observers believed 
that it had little of either). The actual reasons behind the attack seemed to be sabre-
rattling and extending U.S. control. Justifications for the attack were almost comical; 
like the attack on AI-Shifa they were often refuted the day after they were presented; 
they included evidence-free allegations that Iraq supported al-Qaeda and the attack on 
the World Trade Centre. United Nations monitors in Iraq, looking for the missing 
illegal weapons, found none up until the point at which the U.S. invaded. 
The argument underlying the attack on Iraq -- that the United States was entitled to 
attack any country capable of developing weapons capable of threatening the United 
States -- is sheer paranoia. Doubtless this rationalizes national power-politics; for 
instance, missile defenses enable the United States to use nuclear weapons against 
weak nations with a few ballistic missiles, such as North Korea, China and India 
(although cruise missiles, against which there is virtually no defense, are available to 
all major nations). However, it suggests a desire for a national cocooning. Not only 
military and economic supremacy is pursued; there cannot be the slightest possibility 
of danger anywhere. 
Where this dream of safety is impossible -- in the natural world, which the U.S. 
cannot control or dominate -- it is ignored. The Bush Administration rejects the 
implications of global warming, presumably because -- thus far -- it has not severely 
affected the West. It has mooted the abandonment of the Montreal Protocol, which 











in the ozone layer -- thus far -- only affects the South. If a cocoon of safety is 
impossible, the next best thing seems to be a cocoon of ignorance. 
All this resembles the dream of Gibson's aleph. Gibson offered the elect of his 
narrative eternal bliss in a utopia for them alone, with no workers supporting them and 
no enemies opposing them. The United States today (and much of the First World 
follows a simi1ar pattern) pursues a comparable dream. Its empire has no goal at its 
heart except survival. Its leadership is concerned entirely with U.S. strategy. It does 
not even strive to improve the world (foreign aid assistance has fallen to record lows, 
although it pretends to be offering immense help to the world). The U.S. wants to 
dominate, but also to be left alone, and not to feel guilty about its dominance. It is an 
impossible situation, because the U.S. is not an aleph in the world, and the U.S. upper 
class is not an aleph in the U.S. -- but it aspires to be so. 
The contemporary world's exaggerated, almost mystical psychological dependency 
upon technology, if married to the promotion of active paranoia and a desire for 
absolute security among the Western globalised ruling class, seems to lead towards a 
world not unlike the one depicted in the cyberspace trilogy -- with the significant 
difference that this world contains no benign and omniscient artificial intelligence, nor 
any perfectly secure digital paradises. The difference is crucial, and will probably 
eventually be catastrophic. For all Gibson's faults, he portrayed psychologically valid 
images which were extremely likely to be embodied (in some way) in the 
development of capitalist technology unless action were taken to prevent this. 
However, these were critically examined by very few commentators, so that their 
catastrophic potential was ignored. Instead, most commentators appropriated what 
they could of Gibson's dreams and ignored or discounted his nightmares. 
As it turned out, cyberpunk was indeed important, though not for the reasons 
claimed for it at the time; it was indeed visionary, though hardly anyone paid attention 
to the visions that mattered. Gibson cannot be blamed for what his country has done; 
indeed, he pointed out the dark side of his own work as well as anyone could who 











twentieth-century culture that one of its acutest social critics was so thoroughly 
misunderstood -- until it was much too late to take any action to avoid the 
materialisation of most of his greatest fears. 
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